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RETRAINING THE GATEKEEPER: FURTHER
REFLECTIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSIDERATION
Mark B. Wessman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The classical "doctrine" of consideration subdivides at a number
of points. Initially, it splits into two branches. The first branch is the
proposition that the presence of consideration for a promise is
presumptively' a sufficient reason to enforce the promise. That
proposition is now the subject of a broad consensus, and I do not wish
to challenge it in this Article. The second branch, however, is the
proposition that consideration is a necessary condition for the
enforcement of a promise, i.e., that only bargain promises should be
enforced. The second proposition assigns to the doctrine of consider-
ation the role of gatekeeper, admitting some promises to the regime
of contract and screening others out. In an earlier article2 I adopted
the traditional view that the second proposition itself subdivides into
a group of corollaries, all of which function as gatekeepers in various
contexts.3 I argued that, contrary to the beliefs and predictions of the
majority of contract scholars, these gatekeeper corollaries are still
frequently used by judges as the basis for refusing to enforce
promises.4 I then isolated four of the gatekeeper corollaries for
* Associate Professor, Tulane Law School. B.A. 1973, St. Olaf College; M.A. 1976,
Oxford University; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. I thank Paul Barron, Lissa L. Broome,
Jeanne Carriere, Shael Herman, Julie Jackson, Suman Naresh, Vernon Palmer, and Larry
Ponoroff for reading previous drafts of this Article.
1. The qualifier "presumptively" must be added because there is also broad
consensus that certain bargain promises should not be enforced, for example, those
induced by fraud, mistake, duress, and similar forms of error or misbehavior.
2. Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the
Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993).
3. Id. at 49.
4. l at 47-48. My conclusions were based on an analysis of over 300 cases decided
since the mid-1970s in which courts either declined to enforce.promises on grounds of lack
of consideration or left that possibility open on remand. An updated version of the same
database of cases forms the basis for this Article.
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examination-specifically, the rile that an illusory promise is not
consideration, the requirement of mutuality of obligation, and the
rules that past consideration and moral consideration are not
sufficient The conclusion of my analysis of the current operation of
those rules was that the four corollaries are largely redundant and
that, when not redundant, they result in a denial of enforcement to
classes of promises that should be enforced.6
In this Article I examine the remaining gatekeeper corollaries to
the doctrine of consideration. Specifically, I shall analyze the current
operation of the requirement of consideration for an option,7 the pre-
existing duty rule, which itself fragments into a number of sub-rules,
certain special consideration requirements pertaining to covenants not
to compete and to employment that is not terminable at will,9 and
the presumptive invalidity of "gratuitous" promises under the general
requirement of bargained exchange." I conclude that, to varying
degrees, the corollaries are all partially redundant, in the sense that
many of the case dispositions they produce could be produced by an
appeal to other doctrines or defenses or by a direct appeal to the
policies allegedly served by the corollaries. In addition, I conclude
that each corollary denies enforcement to certain classes of promises
that it would be better to enforce. 2
I then proceed to a more general examination of the reasons
often given for and against enforcing promises of various kinds in
order to assess their bearing on the question of whether the
gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration should be
retained. 3 Initially, I observe that the class of promises lumped
together and classified as "gratuitous" by the doctrine of consideration
actually includes a broad range of promises of different kinds, many
of which have little in common with the stereotype of the purely
5. Id at 49-51.
6. l at 51-52, 116-17.
7. See infra part II.
8. See infra part II.
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra part V.
11. See infra notes 55, 115, 119-65, 191-95, 230, 233, 251-56, 270, 281-95, 390-93 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 61-76, 197-213, 234-50, 257-69, 271-72,320-39,343-57, 363-86, 395-
96, 412-427 and accompanying text.
13. See infra part VI.
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altruistic gift promise that seems to dominate discussions of gratuitous
promises.
14
Using a more expansive conception of the range of gratuitous
promises, I proceed to an examination of the reasons commonly given
for having any regime of promissory enforcement, with a view to
determining whether those reasons support a new presumption in
favor of the enforcement of gratuitous promises or the retention of
the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration." First, I
consider the view that bargain promises are enforced because doing
so enhances utility through the facilitation of exchange.16 I conclude
that many gratuitous promises likewise are designed to facilitate
exchange, and that even those that are not may enhance utility.7
Second, I consider the view that promises should be enforced to
protect legitimate expectations, reliance, or both.8 I conclude that
both the expectation and reliance rationales for promissory enforce-
ment support a presumption in favor of enforcing gratuitous promises,
and I reject the view that reliance upon, or expectations based upon,
gratuitous promises are somehow inherently less rational or legitimate
than in the case of bargain promises.9 Third, I briefly examine the
view that enforcement of promises is justified by some normative
conception of human autonomy and conclude that such a justification
is entirely neutral with respect to the gratuitous or bargain character
of the promises at issue.'
After concluding that the general reasons in favor of enforcing
at least some promises provide no basis for a general denial of
enforcement to the whole class of gratuitous promises, I examine
more particular reasons that have been, or might be, given for
denying enforcement to gratuitous promises, even assuming that
bargain promises are generally enforceable.21 I first examine and
reject the contention that gratuitous promises are too trivial to merit
state enforcement, whether the criteria for assessing importance are
financial or nonfinancial.' Second, I reject the claim that gratuitous
14. See infra part VI.A.
15. See infra part VI.B.
16. See infra part VI.B.1.
17. See infra part VI.B.1.
18. See infra part VI.B.2.
19. See infra part VI.B.2.
20. See infra part VI.B.3.
21. See infra part VI.C.
22. See infra part VI.C.1.
January 1996]
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promises should be denied enforcement because the bulk of them are
impulsive or imprudent, partly because the claim lacks empirical
foundation and partly because the use of consideration doctrine to
police for impulsiveness or imprudence is theoretically inconsistent
with the treatment accorded bargain promisesP Third, I reject the
contention that gratuitous promises should not be enforced because
they are too easily fabricated.24 I argue that such a contention is
overbroad, that it is empirically suspect, and that better methods of
addressing the potential problem of fabrication can be devised.'
Fourth, I consider the contention that enforcing gratuitous' promises
would create an inordinate risk of attaching contractual consequences
where none were intended.26 I conclude that such a contention both
posits a dubious correlation between the gratuitous character of a
promise and the lack of serious contractual intent, and exaggerates
the importance the common-law system of contracts attaches to the
possibility of inadvertent contractual consequences.27 Fifth, I
examine an argument that gratuitous promises are understood to be
subject to a broader range of moral excuses than other types of
promises, and that a regime in which such promises were presump-
tively enforceable would therefore be burdened with an excessively
complicated system of novel defenses.' I dispute both the empirical
premise of the argument and the degree of difficulty in accommodat-
ing the concern reflected in the argument, even if its premises are
true.
29
Finally, I examine the merits of a claim occasionally made in
defense of the doctrine of consideration. That claim is that abandon-
ment of the doctrine would produce significant distortions elsewhere
in the system of common-law contracts and that, therefore, the
doctrine of consideration should be retained even if, examined in
isolation, it has obvious faults."' My analysis suggests that claim is
false, and I conclude that retention of the gatekeeping function of the
doctrine of consideration is unjustified.3 My analysis also suggests
23. See infra part VIC.2.
24. See infra part VI.C.3.
25. See infra part VI.C.3.
26. See infra part VI.C.4.
27. See infra part VI.C.4.
28. See infra part VI.C.5.
29. See infra part VI.C.5.
30. See infra part VI.C.6.
31. See infra part VI.C.6.
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the relatively minor adjustments in 'other doctrines that should
accompany the abandonment of consideration's gatekeeping role, as
well as the residual and somewhat reduced functions that the concept
of consideration might continue to serve.
32
II. THE REVOCABILITY OF OFFERS IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONSIDERATION
The contract formation mechanism envisioned by classical
contract theory was the familiar and simple model of a definite offer
followed by a mirror-image acceptance. Because the model presup-
posed, or, at the very least, allowed, sequential communications of
assent, its articulation required an answer to the question: Under
what circumstances may an offer be withdrawn prior to acceptance?
The answer of classical theory was as simple as the offer/
acceptance model itself. The universe of offers was divided into two
classes. The more numerous class consisted of unadorned offers,
which were revocable in the unfettered discretion of the offeror unless
and until accepted.3" Escape from the fully revocable class into the
smaller class of irrevocable offers required either that the offer be
contained in a writing under seal' or that the offeree pay some
consideration for an undertaking to hold the offer open for a period
of timeO35 A promise to hold the offer open, by itself would not
confer irrevocability on the offer; a seal or some form of payment was
essential to preclude revocation.36
To one not steeped in the common-law tradition, or, indeed, even
to one who can remember what it was like not to think in terms of
common-law categories, this division of the universe of offers must
seem curious. After all, not every offer is so obviously advantageous
or disadvantageous to the offeree that a rational response can be
given immediately. Indeed, if one were to design a system of contract
32. See infra part VI.C.6.
33. For a statement of the classical rules on the revocability of offers, see GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 28-30 (1974).
34. For a concise description of the deterioration of the seal as a formal touchstone
of promissory enforcement, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 640, 659-60 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Principles]. While this
Article will devote some attention to the question whether there should be some purely
formal device for creating promissory liability, the erosion of the seal is so advanced that
there is no hope of saving it. Accordingly, the seal will not be considered further.
35. GILMORE, supra note 33, at 28-30.
36. Id
January 1996]
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law from scratch, one might presume that a period of deliberation
upon an offer was necessary or desirable and create a rule making
offers irrevocable for a reasonable period of time unless the offeror
clearly indicated an immediate response was required.
3 7 Some civil
law systems do exactly that." At the very least, however, one might
regard the presence of a specific undertaking to hold an offer open as
an indication that a period of deliberation or investigation was in the
interests of both offeree and offeror. One would then be inclined to
create a rule making an offer irrevocable for any period of time
specified by the offeror,.9 whether the offeror had sold, or simply
given, the undertaking to hold the offer open.
Classical theory's presumption of the revocability of offers thus
calls for some explanation. The primary explanation relies upon the
doctrine of consideration.' Its premise is that offers are promises,
albeit promises conditional upon the offeree's response, and perhaps
other things or events." Like other promises, offers must be
supported by consideration or they are unenforceable. In this regard,
there is nothing special about a specific promise to hold an offer
open.4 If the offeree has paid for such a promise, it is enforce-
able43 and is classified as an "option" or "option contract."'
Otherwise, it is just another naked promise added to the cluster of
promises constituting the offer, and it accomplishes nothing.45
It is possible to question the foregoing argument at a number of
points. One could argue that offers are not always,46 or even
37. See JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 213 (1980).
38. See id. (discussing the German approach).
39. See id. (discussing the French approach).
40. GILMORE, supra note 33, at 21-22, 29-30. For an argument that the principle of
free revocability is not properly regarded as a corollary of the doctrine of consideration,
see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.16 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS].
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 cmt. a (1981) (describing cases in
which offers are promises as the "normal" cases).
42. See GILMORE, supra note 33, at 29-30.
43. 1l
44. The latter term is used by the current Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 25, 87.
45. See GILMORE, supra note 33, at 30.
46. Williston and Goble once engaged in a brief debate over whether the offer of a
so-called "reverse unilateral contract" took the form of a promise. See George W. Goble,
Is an Offer a Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 567 (1928); Samuel Williston, Is an Offer a
Promise?, 22 ILL. L. REV. 788 (1928). Because such cases are relatively atypical, the
Williston/Goble debate has little relevance to this Article.
[Vol. 29:713
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION
often,47 promises, and that offers not classifiable as promises need
not satisfy the consideration requirement at all. Such a maneuver
accomplishes little, however. If the majority of offers are promises,
then the consideration requirement imposed by classical theory
applies to them. Even if most offers fall into some category of
communication other than "promise," it is open to the proponent of
the doctrine of consideration to argue that such communications are
sufficiently similar to promises that the doctrine should apply to them
as well.
A more promising line of attack upon the classical rule on the
revocability of offers begins with the observation that the evolution
of the law, apparently driven by the needs of the commercial world,
has riddled the classical rule with exceptions. Consistent with
Llewellyn's belief that business actors recognize the short-term
irrevocable offer in practice,48 the firm offer provision of Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code gives merchants a formal device
that permits the creation of gratuitous 9 but irrevocable offers for the
sale of goods.5" State statutes occasionally recognize the firm offer
device outside the context of the sale of goods."1
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise
recommend that assurances of the irrevocability of an offer be
enforceable even in the absence of consideration if the offer is fair
and reasonably limited in duration, and if the offeror is prepared to
put the offer in proper form. 2 Given the trend toward enforcement
47. Dawson seemed to regard offers as a category of communications-which he called
"proposals"--conceptually distinct from promises, although he conceded that offers could
include or be accompanied by promises. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 213.
48. See K.N. Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?,
41 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 872 (1941) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Reform].
49. By characterizing firm offers as "gratuitous," I mean only that they do not satisfy
the technical requirements of the classical doctrine of consideration. I do not mean to
imply that such offers are intended as gifts, a connotation sometimes associated with the
word gratuitous. I shall refer to promises to make a gift as either "donative" or "gift"
promises.
50. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1994), which'permits a merchant to make an irrevocable offer
to buy or sell goods by putting the offer in a proper form. The formal requisites of the
firm offer are a writing, a signature, and an express assurance that the offer will be held
open. Id. The maximum period of irrevocability under § 2-205 is three months. Id.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 1989).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1). The formal requisites for
an irrevocable offer under that section are a signed writing and a mere recitation of
consideration. Id. The Restatement also recommends that an offer be deemed irrevocable
if the offeree has reasonably and foreseeably relied upon it. See id. § 87(2).
January 1996]
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of assurances of irrevocability on the basis of form and the tendency
of the commercial community to adjust to legal rules over time, one
would expect that whatever remains of the classical rule on the full
revocability of offers53 would create few problems. One would
expect that commercial actors who wanted to make or receive
gratuitous but irrevocable offers would have a formal device enabling
them to do so, and one would expect to find few cases in which a
party believed he had a firm offer or option but did not.
It is therefore somewhat surprising to find a significant number
of cases in which offerees of purported options, rights of first refusal,
or other offers attempt to exercise or accept and enforce the offers in
question, only to run afoul of the classical rule of full revocability in
the absence of consideration. 4 In a few of these cases, one observes
53. Obviously, verbal assurances of irrevocability do not fall within any of the
exceptions to the classical rule of the revocability of offers enumerated in the text.
Moreover, both § 2-205 of the U.C.C. and § 87(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
contain temporal limits on the permissible period of irrevocability. In addition, it is always
possible for an offeror's purported assurance of irrevocability to fall short of the clarity
required by those provisions. Thus, notwithstanding the breadth of the exceptions, there
is still room for the classical rule to operate.
54. See, e.g., First Dev. Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 959 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1992);
First Nat'l Bankshares v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Kan. 1994); International Adm'rs,
Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 564 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. I11. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1373 (7th
Cir. 1985); Joneil Fifth Ave. Ltd. v. Ebeling & Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); In re III Enters., Inc. V, 163 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), affd, 169 B.R. 551 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); In re Wilhoit, 69 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); Campbell v. CO Realty
Invs., Inc. (In re CG Realty Invs., Inc.), 79 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Stuart v.
Ennis, 482 So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 1985); Crowley v. Bass, 445 So. 2d 902 (Ala. 1984); Allen R.
Krauss Co. v. Fox, 644 P.2d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Benson v. Chalfonte Dev. Corp.,
348 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834 (Idaho 1980);
Hermes v. William F. Meyer Co., 382 N.E.2d 841 (III. App. Ct. 1978); Berryman v. Kmoch,
559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruiz, 367 So. 2d 79 (La. Ct.
App. 1979); Pearl v. Merchants-Warren Nat'l Bank, 400 N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. App. Ct.
1980); Barbat v. M.E. Arden Co., 254 N.W.2d 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); National
Advertising Co. v. Herold, 735 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Serpa v. Darling, 810 P.2d
778 (Nev. 1991); Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 457
N.Y.S.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1982); Normile v. Miller, 306 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), affd
as modified, 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985); Campbell v. Matlock, 749 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987); Culbertson v. Brodsky, 788 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Hott V.
Pearcy/Christon, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Bastian v. Cedar Hills Inv. &
Land Co., 632 P.2d 818 (Utah 1981); Ragosta v. Wilder, 592 A.2d 367 (Vt. 1991); Clarke
v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 783 P.2d 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Callaway, 708
P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see also Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides, 602
F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1979) (involving failure to make timely tender of consideration for
extension of duration of option); Star Pac. Invs., Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc., 121 Cal.
App. 3d 447, 176 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981) (involving lack of consideration for agreement to
make override payments upon exercise of valid option); Beall v. Beall, 434 A.2d 1015 (Md.
[Vol. 29:713
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a pattern that has become familiar from the examination of other
corollaries to the doctrine of consideration. Specifically, in a few
cases, the refusal to permit the offeree to enforce the purported
option or similar offer is supported by an independent legal theory
quite unrelated to the doctrine of consideration.55 If the alternate
theory is used, the doctrine of consideration is redundant; if the
alternate theory is not expressly mentioned, the doctrine of consider-
ation may be pretextual and is clearly replaceable.
In most of the cases in question, however, no such alternate
theory is apparent, and the corollary to the doctrine of consideration
1981) (finding a lack of consideration for extension of duration of option); McGee v.
Clark, 343 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1977) (finding a lack of consideration for supplemental
agreement providing for termination of option); Foster v. Ohio State Univ., 534 N.E.2d
1220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (reaffirming in dictum full revocability of offers); Barnett v.
Buchan Baking Co., 724 P.2d 1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (finding a lack of consideration
for modification of option), aff'd 738 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1987).
55. See, e.g., First Dev. Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 959 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1992)
(involving a failure to accept unconditionally and failure of governing documents to reflect
intent to create irrevocable option); International Adm'rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
564 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. I11. 1983) (assuming implicitly the traditional rule of revocability;
expressly relying on parol evidence rule, revocation of previous offer by subsequent offer
and acceptance), affd, 753 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1985); Joneil Fifth Ave. Ltd. v. Ebeling &
Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (involving a failure to establish prerequisites
of specific performance); In re III Enters., Inc. V, 163 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) (holding
that option failed for lack of consideration, indefiniteness, failure of assent, and failure of
the governing document to reflect anything more than preliminary negotiations), affid, 169
B.R. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Campbell v. CG Realty lnvs., Inc. (In re CG Realty Invs., Inc.),
79 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that option fails for lack of consideration and
because unlimited escape clause indicates lack of intent to be bound); Stuart v. Ennis, 482
So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 1985) (holding that option fails for lack of consideration, unfairness of
price, and non-assignability to party seeking to exercise option); Star Pac. Invs., Inc. v. Oro
Hills Ranch, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 447, 176 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981) (holding agreement to
make override payment for each acre purchased pursuant to valid option rescinded for
lack of consideration and intentional misrepresentation); Barbat v. M. E. Arden Co., 254
N.W.2d 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding irrevocability clause in offer to purchase real
estate unsupported by consideration because consideration alleged illegal); McGee v.
Clark, 343 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1977) (holding supplemental agreement terminating option
void for misrepresentation, mistake, and want of consideration); National Advertising Co.
v. Herold, 735 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no consideration and no
commitment to hold offer open); Serpa v. Darling, 810 P.2d 778 (Nev. 1991) (finding lack
of consideration, failure to agree on essential terms, failure of consideration, and
indefiniteness); Normile v. Miller, 306 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (court of appeals
finds lack of consideration for option), affd as modified, 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985)
(Supreme Court finds absence of commitment to hold offer open); Bastian v. Cedar Hills
Inv. & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818 (Utah 1981) (confusing lack of consideration and failure of
consideration; defenses of indefiniteness and failure of condition precedent also potentially
available); Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 783 P.2d 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
option fails because consideration not paid and because final option never signed).
January 1996]
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providing for the full revocability of offers seems to be the genu-
ine-and the only possible-ground of decision. Such cases most
often involve offers to purchase or sell real property, and the ways in
which the parties run afoul of the classical rule on the revocability of
offers fall into recurring patterns. Sometimes there is neither
provision for-nor payment of-consideration for the offer at issue.56
In other cases consideration for the offer is recited or required, but
it is never actually paid." In a small number of cases, a deposit or
earnest money is extracted from the offeree, but the offer provides for
its return if the purported option is not exercised or if the proposed
deal is not consummated for reasons other than the offeree's
default."8 In a slight variation of the last type of case, one purported
option required the offeree to tender a $5000 check to a title company
but prohibited its negotiation and required its return in the event the
offeree decided against exercising the option. 9 Finally, in the most
curious of the cases in question, purported options granted as part of
a larger bargain transaction are occasionally invalidated for failure to
56. See, e.g., In re III Enters., Inc. V, 163 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) (stock option),
affd, 169 B.R. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1994): Crowley v. Bass, 445 So. 2d 902 (Ala. 1984); Pearl v.
Merchants-Warren Nat'l Bank, 400 N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Cdpalongo v.
Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1981), affd, 457 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1982);
Ragosta v. Wilder, 592 A.2d 367 (Vt. 1991).
57. In re Wilhoit, 69 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834
(Idaho 1980); Hermes v. William F. Meyer Co., 382 N.E.2d 841 (III. App. Ct. 1978);
Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruiz, 367
So. 2d 79 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Campbell v. Matlock, 749 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn, Ct. App.
1987); Hott v. Pearcy/Christon. Inc.. 663 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Clarke v.
Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 783 P.2d 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); see also First Nat'l Bankshares
v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Kan. 1994) (involving a stock option; consideration recited
but not paid); Normile v. Miller, 306 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (earnest money
contemplated but not paid), affd as modified, 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985). Such cases must
be regarded as at least implicit rejections of the suggestion in § 87(1) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts that option contracts should be enforceable based on a mere
recitation of consideration. However, of the foregoing cases, only Lewis v. Fletcher
contains an explicit rejection of the Restatement rule.
58. First Dev. Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 959 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1992); Allen R.
Krauss Co. v. Fox, 644 P.2d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (involving earnest money subject
to forfeiture only if purchaser defaults); Benson v. Chalfonte Dev. Corp., 348 So. 2d 557
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (involving deposit returnable with interest at prevailing passbook
rate; case remanded for submission to jury on issue of consideration); Saunders v.
Callaway, 708 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that where larger contract of which
option was a part failed and optionee's payment was returned, option was not supported
by consideration).
59. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 788 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
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allocate a separate amount or item of consideration for the irrevoca-
bility of the option.' °
The persistence of such cases of "failed irrevocability" might be
partially explained by simple ignorance of the traditional requirement
of consideration for irrevocability or by the explicit or implicit
rejection by the courts of the exception to it recommended in section
87(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. An alternate
explanation is also possible, however. It may be that the very variety
of ways in which commercial parties try to provide a "free look," i.e.,
a period of guaranteed, but gratuitous, irrevocability for an offer,
indicates that the free look meets a legitimate commercial need.
It has been suggested, for example, that an offeror's commitment
to a period of irrevocability might be a tool of sales psychology.61
The offeror's willingness to hold the offer open-and thus hold the
subject matter of the offer off the market-might serve as a signal to
the offeree of the offeror's confidence that the offeree will find the
proposed exchange beneficial.62  Alternatively, a short period of
irrevocability may suggest to the offeree the need for urgent action.'
Commentators have also suggested that the free option might be
explained and justified in terms of its effect on the offeree's incentive
to consider the offer seriously.' Deliberation on an offer and
investigation of its desirability are not cost-free activities. Sometimes
investigation and deliberation require out-of-pocket expenditures,
6
and they presumably always involve some opportunity cost.
66
Assuming that offerees are generally rational economic actors, they
60. Joneil Fifth Ave. Ltd. v. Ebeling & Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
In re Wilhoit, 69 B.R. 365 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); Campbell v. CG Realty Invs., Inc. (In
re CG Realty Invs., Inc.), 79 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Stuart v. Ennis, 482 So. 2d
1168 (Ala. 1985). Such decisions are simple misapplications of traditional consideration
principles, as the consideration for the larger transaction should support the option as well.
See Metropolitan Park Dist. v. Griffith, 723 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Wash. 1986) ("When an
option agreement is a subsidiary part of a larger transaction.., the consideration for the
option itself is rarely a definitely determinable portion of what the option holder gives to
the other party. The parties need not make a separate valuation of the option in order
for it to be enforceable.").
61. See Harold C. Havighurst, Consideration, Ethics and Administration, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1942) (discussing the firm offer). Havighurst remained a defender of the
traditional rule of full revocability.
62. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 653.
63. See Havighurst, supra note 61, at 24.
64. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 653-54.
65. See id. at 653.
66. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 213 n.39.
January 1996]
724 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
can only be induced to incur such costs and risks by the prospect of
some anticipated benefit. Normally, that anticipated benefit will be
the perceived likelihood that investigation and deliberation will reveal
the offer to be a proposal for a beneficial exchange.
If an offer may be withdrawn before investigation and delibera-
tion is complete, there is a risk that investigation and deliberation
costs will be wasted even though the offer does propose a beneficial
exchange. This risk will effectively reduce the anticipated benefit of
such activities relative to their anticipated costs. A period of
irrevocability for the offer would eliminate that risk and so increase
the anticipated benefits of investigation and deliberation relative to
their anticipated costs. An offeror who wished to induce an offeree
to invest time, effort, or expense in investigation and deliberation on
the offer thus might choose to make the offer irrevocable,67 particu-
larly if the cost of irrevocability to the offeror were small. Indeed, if
the offeree's initial or preinvestigation assessment of its value is
sufficiently high, it might make sense to offer a token, or even a
substantial, payment in return for a period of irrevocability coexten-
sive with the time necessary for investigation. In such situations the
conventional paid option makes economic sense.
There is no reason, however, to suppose that all offers fit that
pattern. If the gap between the anticipated benefit and the anticipat-
ed cost of investigation and deliberation were nonexistent or
sufficiently narrow,' a free period of irrevocability might be neces-
sary to induce such activities. An offeror who wished to induce an
offeree to investigate and deliberate in such a situation would thus
search for a device which gave the offeree a free look. It thus seems
likely that the gratuitous irrevocable offer meets a commercial need,
providing some reason to enforce the promise of irrevocability even
in the absence of consideration.
Indeed, if the attempt to induce deliberation and investigation
through a promise of irrevocability is sufficiently explicit and direct,
67. Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 653; see James D. Gordon III, Consider-
ation and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REv. 283,294 (1991) [hereinafter
Gordon, Consideration].
68. The gap between anticipated benefits and anticipated costs of investigation and
deliberation may be narrow if the offeree had very limited initial information as to the
potential benefit of the offer, if the costs of investigation were particularly high, or if the
opportunity created by the offer was a particularly speculative one. In a reasonably
competitive market, in which a wide range of potential exchanges are available, all of these
possibilities are realistic.
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it may be that the so-called free look really qualifies as a bargain,
albeit one that classical theory did not recognize.69  Successful
attempts to induce action through promises result in perfectly
ordinary unilateral contracts, and some assurances of irrevocability
may very well fall into that category. Since it is universally conceded
that genuine bargains should be enforced,' a promise of irrevocabili-
ty given as an express or implicit inducement for serious investigation
and deliberation on an offer should qualify for enforcement quite
easily.7
Of course, express or implied-in-fact bargains in which assurances
of irrevocability are consciously used to induce investigative or
deliberative activities may not explain all, or even the bulk, of such
assurances. Some assurances that an offer will be held open are
undoubtedly given, not as part of a discrete bargain for investigative
or deliberative activity, but out of a more vague and indirect hope
that some such benefit will be produced.72 Even such assurances,
however, are not intended as simple gifts or favors.73 They are
business promises intended to facilitate the process of exchange, and
they should be enforced for largely the same reasons bargains are
enforced. One of the reasons ordinary classical bargains are enforced
is that bargain promises facilitate exchange and the consequent
creation of surplus!4 Even if an assurance of the irrevocability of an
offer does not technically qualify as part of a discrete bargain, it is
directed toward the same end: increasing the likelihood of ex-
change.' The reasons supporting the enforcement of the ordinary
69. See Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 294.
70. The statement in the text must, as usual, be qualified to exclude bargains procured
by fraud, duress, undue influence, and the like. For statements of the traditional reasons
in favor of enforcement of ordinary bargain transactions, see DAWSON, supra note 37, at
221; Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 643.
71. It does not follow, of course, that the investment of time, effort or expense in
deliberation could be easily proven. Professor Eisenberg suggests that the desirability of
enforcing the firm offer follows from the offeror's intent to induce such investment, the
likelihood that it will be made, the difficulty of proving it directly, and the increased
probability of exchange. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 653-54.
72. The benefit hoped for could, of course, be an increased likelihood the offeree will
consider the offer seriously, or it could simply amount to a favorable impression on the
offeree created by an apparent expression of offeror confidence. See id. at 653.
73. See id.; Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 294.
74. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 643, 653-54.
75. Id.; Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 293-94.
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bargain thus dictate enforcement of the assurance of irrevocability as
well.
76
A proponent of the classical rule requiring consideration for an
option might make three objections at this point, corresponding
roughly to the three functions-evidentiary, channeling, and caution-
ary-said to be served by the doctrine of consideration." First, it
might be argued that assurances of irrevocability are too easily
fabricated to be enforced in the absence of consideration. A
disappointed offeree who waits too long to accept and allows the
offeror to revoke will be tempted to invent a promise to hold the
offer open. Payment for a promise of irrevocability provides some
independent evidence that the promise was made.
The first objection has little merit. Initially, it must be observed
that the traditional rule requiring consideration for an option does not
serve the evidentiary function very well in any event. Because the
payment for an option may be a mere token payment, it can be
fabricated as easily as a promise of irrevocability."8 A disappointed
offeree who lies by saying the offeror promised to hold the offer open
can easily add that the offeror was given a dollar to do so, If
fabrication of assurances of irrevocability is really a recurring
problem, a requirement that such assurances be in writing would
provide a much better solution. Indeed, because the most frequent
use of the option device appears to be in the context of offers to buy
and sell real estate, which are normally subject to the statute of frauds
in any event, such a writing, requirement would effect little change
from current rules.
79
The second.possible objection invokes the channeling function
allegedly served by the doctrine of consideration. A formal device or
legal requirement serves a channeling function if it provides a
recognizable way for parties who intend their actions to have, or
avoid, specified legal consequences to attain their end and if it
76. See K.C.T. SUTTON, CONSIDERATION RECONSIDERED 215 (1974); Eisenberg,
Principles, supra note 34, at 653-54; James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine
of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 995 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Dialogue].
77. The classic statement of the three functions of formality, and their attribution to
the doctrine of consideration, is found in Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
78. Similar doubts about the alleged evidentiary function of consideration generally
are expressed in Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 990.
79. Professor Gordon makes the same general point about the other recurring type
of irrevocable offer, the firm offer for the sale of goods. See Gordon, Consideration, supra
note 67, at 296.
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provides a vehicle for courts to recognize such intent. 0 The need for
a channeling device for irrevocable offers arises because it is often
difficult to distinguish in practice between an offer which the offeror
is committed to hold open and an offer for which the offeror has
merely specified a lapse date. Consider the following statements:
(1) This option is irrevocable until, and may be exercised by
optionee at any time before December 1, 1993.
(2) This offer will remain open until December 1, 1993.
(3) Offeree may accept this offer by written notice to offeror
at any time before December 1, 1993.
(4) This offer will expire on December 1, 1993.
(5) Unless revoked earlier by offeror, this offer expires on
December 1, 1993.
Statement (1) clearly purports to create a period of irrevocability.
Statement (5) clearly does not; it merely specifies the time at which
the offeree's power of acceptance lapses if neither party does anything
further. Statements (2)-(4) illustrate the varying degrees of ambiguity
that an offeror might inadvertently introduce into the offer while
attempting to accomplish what either (1) or (5) accomplishes clearly.
Particularly if the offeror is not a lawyer, the introduction of such
ambiguity is quite likely. A proponent of the doctrine of consider-
ation might argue that the requirement of payment for an option is
important because it provides a way of determining whether the
offeror means (1) or (5) when using 'an expression similar to (2)-(4).
It must be conceded, of course, that an expression like statement
(1), accompanied by a nonrefundable option payment, is an unambig-
uous indication of an intent to create a legally enforceable period of
irrevocability. It thus fulfills a channeling function for parties who
intentionally use it or courts who recognize it. All that implies,
however, is that the classical option should continue to be an effective
way of creating a legally enforceable period of irrevocability. It does
not settle the question of whether the classical option should be the
exclusive method for creating such a period of irrevocability."
Moreover, the payment of consideration in the course of
negotiations over an offer containing ambiguous language such as
statements (2)-(4) does not necessarily perform a similar channeling
80. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 801; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 991.
81. 1 am ignoring, for the moment, the exceptions to the consideration requirement
found in U.C.C. § 2-205 (1994) and recommended in § 87(1) of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.
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function and does not reliably distinguish a commitment to irrevoca-
bility from a specification of a lapse date. The mere payment of
money during negotiations may itself be an ambiguous act; both
refundable deposits and "earnest money"-forfeitable only in the
event a prospective purchaser breaches-have failed to qualify as
option payments making an offer irrevocable under current rulesY
The ambiguity created by sloppy language in statements (2)-(4) thus
may not be removed by the simple expedient of an accompanying
payment. Indeed, statements (1) and (5) are potentially effective
channeling devices primarily because of their language, not because
(1) is typically accompanied by a small payment.
In sum, the .problem of distinguishing between commitments to
irrevocability and specifications of a lapse date is quite real, 3 and its
solution may very well require a channeling device. But the problem
is one of interpretation or of assent, and the doctrine of consideration
does not solve it. The need for a channeling device to distinguish
commitments to irrevocability from specifications of a lapse date
therefore provides no support for retention of the consideration
requirement.
Finally, a proponent of the doctrine of consideration might argue
that retaining the requirement of consideration for an option fulfills
a cautionary function.' Real estate options, in particular, are often
granted by individuals unsophisticated in business to more savvy
optionees' Everyone can conjure up the image of the greedy real
estate developer inveigling the aged and infirm landowner into signing
an option to sell the Old Homestead for a pittance. Indeed, in such
situations there is both a risk that the proposed exchange will be
unfair at the outset and a risk that, even if fair initially, the deal will
become unfair over time if the duration of the option is so long that
it encompasses drastic movements in the market. Requiring payment
for an option, it might be argued, impresses the optionor with the
seriousness of the transaction and encourages self-protection.
82. See cases cited supra notes 58-59.
83. For cases in which the parties or the courts seem confused over the distinction
between an assurance of irrevocability and the specification of a lapse date, see First Dev.
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 959 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1992); Normile v. Miller, 306 S.E.2d
147 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), affd as modified, 326 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1985); Ragosta v. Wilder
592 A.2d 367 (Vt. 1991).
84. For a general description of the cautionary function, see Fuller, supra note 77, at
800.
85. See Llewellyn, Reform, supra note 48, at 872.
[Vol. 29:713
DOCTRINE- OF CONSIDERATION
The response to the foregoing argument is that it greatly
exaggerates the cautionary function served by option payments. It
may be that the substantial option payments one occasionally
encounters in the cases do perform such a function. Options,
however, can be bought for a dollar, 6 and it is an open question
whether the payment of a dollar for a real estate option solemnizes
the occasion or trivializes it. A token payment probably has no
greater cautionary effect than a simple requirement of form (for
example, a signed writing or the use of specified language). If, as
argued above, the free look has some business utility, it would be
better to use formal requirements to serve any necessary cautionary
function' and enforce commitments to hold an offer open even if
the commitment were not supported by consideration.88
III. THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE, MODIFICATIONS,
SETTLEMENTS, COMPROMISES, AND RELEASES
A. Introduction
Of all the purported corollaries to the doctrine of consideration,
the pre-existing duty rule has probably received the harshest
treatment at the hands of the critics.89 It appears to have no current
86. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 212.
87. Requirements of form cannot, of course, assure that the gratuitous option will
propose a fair exchange. However, option payments cannot guarantee fairness either. See
Llewellyn, Reform, supra note 48, at 872 ("Now I suppose that if an option to buy for a
song is itself bought for a hundred, there is not too often much that a court can do about
it."). The possibility of unfairness in the proposed exchange at the time of the grant of the
option must be policed, if at all, through doctrines of good faith and unconscionability.
The possibility that an option will become unfair with the passage of time and fluctuations
in the market can be reduced either by setting a specific time limit on the duration of
options, as U.C.C. § 2-205 does for firm offers, or by imposing a requirement that an
option propose an exchange within a reasonable time, as § 87(1) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (1981) does. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bankshares v. Geisel, 853 F. Supp.
1344 (D. Kan. 1994) (finding that the requirements of the Restatement rule were not met
where sufficient time passed that the proposed exchange had become unfair).
88. Whether an offer should be presumed irrevocable for a reasonable time even in
the absence of a specific commitment to hold it open is a separate policy question and is
beyond the scope of this Article. The fact that a rational response to many offers requires
some time and effort counts in favor of such a rule. On the other hand, Professor
Farnsworth has observed that abandonment of the general presumption of revocability
would allow the offeree to speculate with respect to the subject matter of the contract
while the offeror could not. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 3.2. In any case
this Article is concerned only with offers including an express assurance of irrevocability.
89. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 207-11; See id. §§ 4.21-4.25; 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO &
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academic advocates, and the last serious defense of it in its pure
form90 was published in 1954."' The pre-existing duty rule is,
nevertheless, one of the most durable of the corollaries to the
doctrine of consideration, and it is invoked in judicial opinions with
a frequency unmatched by any other corollary. The longevity of the
rule in the face of nearly unanimous criticism is somewhat puzzling.
One of the possible explanations for the persistence of the pre-
existing duty rule is the very variety of contexts in which it is possible
to invoke it.92 The rule appears deceptively simple, the sort of
doctrine that may be stated in a sentence or two: Promising to
perform, or performing, an act that one is already under a legal duty
to perform, is not consideration for a return promise.93 Similarly,
doing or promising to do part of what one is legally obligated to do
is not consideration for a discharge, release, or compromise of the
remainder.
9 4
HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 7.1-7.21 (rev. ed. 1995)
[hereinafter CORBIN]; SutrrON, supra note 76, at 200, 211-13, 237-38, 261; Eisenberg,
Principles, supra note 34, at 644-49; Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 288-90;
Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 998-1001; CJ. Hamson, The Reform of Consideration,
54 LAW Q. REV. 233,237-40 (1938); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 684-88 (1982) [hereinafter
Hiilman, Restatement]; Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification in Iowa-Recker v.
Gustafson and the Resurrection of the Preexisting Duty Doctrine, 65 IOWA L. REV. 343
(1980) [hereinafter Hillman, Resurrection]; Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the
Future-and Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82
MICH. L. REV. 932, 942-44 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
(1982)); Henry Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C. L. REV. 615, 616-17
(1982); Richard Nathan, Grappling with the Pre-Existing Duty Rule: A Proposal for a
Statutory Amendment, 23 AM. Bus. LJ. 509 (1986); Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for
Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936-39 (1958); B.J. Reiter, Courts, Consideration,
and Common Sense, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 439 (1977); Thornton E. Robison, Enforcing
Extorted Contract Modifications, 68 IOWA L. REV. 699,700-04 (1983); Lord Wright, Ought
the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the Common Law?, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1225, 1229-31 (1936).
90. Partial defenses based upon the pre-existing duty rule-defenses of the "rule" as
qualified by a significant battery of exceptions-are less rare and include fairly recent
attempts. See; e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts,
65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 546 (1981), discussed infra note 225.
91. See K.O. Shatwell, The Doctrine of Consideration in the Modern Law, I SYDNEY
L. REV. 289, 306-08 (1954); see also Havighurst, supra note 61, at 25-30 (defending the
traditional pre-existing duty rule).
92. For a useful division of the pre-existing duty rule into its component sub-rules, see
Shatwell, supra note 91, at 306-07.
93. See CORBIN, supra note 89, §§ 7.5-7.6.
94. Id.
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Such simple formulae, however, obscure the complexity of the
rule, the variety of tasks it performs, and the way in which it overlaps
with related applications of the more general doctrine of consider-
ation. To be sure, in its paradigm cases, the pre-existing duty rule is
a postformation policing device. It applies to modifications of ongoing
contracts, and its traditional role is to distinguish enforceable from
unenforceable modifications. It performs that role by requiring that
any adjustment in contractual duties be an adjustment to the duties
of both parties, i.e., that the modification on each side be supported
by "fresh" consideration on the other. However, particularly when
the pre-existing duty is a "public" duty or a duty to a third person,
the pre-existing duty rule can also be invoked at the formation stage
of the contracting process.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, particularly in its incarna-
tion in Foakes v. Beer,95 the pre-existing duty rule operates as a
policing device at the stage of cessation of contractual relations. In
that role it applies to the compromise or release of contractual
bbligations. At that point the pre-existing duty rule blends with
related applications of the more general requirement of bargained
exchange, and the scope of the resulting cluster of rules extends to the
settlement of disputes not even founded on a contract. It is perhaps
understandable that judges would be reluctant to give up a tool
capable of working with such a broad range of materials. It is also
apparent that rational evaluation of the pre-existing duty rule will
require separate analysis of each of the typical contexts in which it
operates.
B. Pre-Existing Contractual Duty Owed to a Third Party
One of the more controversial subrules encompassed by the pre-
existing duty rule is the doctrine that an existing duty to one person
may not provide consideration for an agreement with a new party.9"
Thus, if A owes B a particular duty under an existing contract, A's
promise to C to perform the duty to B will not provide consideration
for a promise from C to A. This aspect of the pre-existing duty rule
has never commanded unanimous support, even in the courts.97
95. 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884).
96. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.5.
97. For a recent case declining to apply the rule, see USLife Title Co. v. Gutkin, 732
P.2d 579 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). In that case an escrow agent in a land sale transaction
prepared a deed containing an erroneous description of the land vendors intended to
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There is however a small group of recent cases in which it has been
applied."
Critics of the extension of the pre-existing duty rule to duties
owed to third parties realized long ago that such cases usually involve
genuine bargains.99 If C promises to pay B if B will perform or
promise to perform a pre-existing contractual duty to A, it is often
because B's performance .will benefit C as well as A. If B's promise
to C is enforceable, B has given up some portion of the freedom B
would otherwise have to seek a modification or release of B's
obligation from A. 1" The exchange and mutual inducement aspects
of the notion of bargain are clearly present.'"
Arden Equipment Co. v. Rhodes" provides a more concrete
example. Mr. and Mrs. Rhodes bought a backhoe from Arden
Equipment, apparently financing the purchase with a secured loan
from the Bank of Asheville." The Rhodes defaulted, and the bank
convey to purchasers. Il at 581. The ultimate result was that a remote purchaser was
unable to secure financing and construct apartments on a portion of the property. Id. at
582. Faced with a lawsuit by the remote purchaser, the escrow agent agreed to pay the
original vendor $17,000 for a quitclaim deed to correct the original error. Id. at 583. After
payment and receipt of the deed, the escrow agent sought to recover the $17,000 as unjust
enrichment, in part on the theory that the original vendor's pre-existing duty to convey the
land to the original purchaser made the quitclaim deed insufficient consideration for the
escrow agent's promise to pay for it. Id. at 585. The court rejected the escrow agent's
theory. Id. at 586. The court relied on § 73 cmt. d of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (1981), which identifies a modem trend to regard the performance of a pre-
existing duty as sufficient consideration for a promise provided the duty is not owed to the
promisor. USLife Title Co., 732 P.2d at 586.
98. Bennett v. Genoa AG Ctr., Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1993); American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. First Am. Inv. Corp., 463 F. Supp. 186 (N.D.
Ga. 1978); Mann Elec. Co. v. Webco S. Corp., 390 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); City
Nat'l Bank v. Russell, 615 N.E.2d 1308 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); Arnold v. Krewson, 834 S.W.2d
229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Tender Loving Care Agency v. Hladun, 488 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App.
Div. 1985); Arden Equip. Co. v. Rhodes, 285 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
99. See Hamson, supra note 89, at 237-38.
100. Id. at 237.
101. The "requirement" of consideration may be summarized roughly as a requirement
that an enforceable promise be part of an exchange of values and that each side of the
exchange induce the other. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 40, §§ 2.2-2.10;
GILMORE, supra note 33, at 18-34; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW
292-95 (1881).
102. 285 S.E.2d 874 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
103. Mr. and Mrs. Rhodes apparently signed a note and a security agreement making
the backhoe collateral for the loan. Id. at 874-75. The court's opinion does not make it
clear whether the Bank of Asheville was the original note payee and secured party or
whether the bank acquired its interest by assignment from Arden Equipment. By the time
of default, however, the bank was acting as secured party. Id.
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gave notice that the backhoe would be sold at a private sale,104
which is permitted by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code."
The backhoe was sold at a price which left a deficiency on the note
in excess of $6000. The bank and,'Arden Equipment apparently
had some form of recourse arrangement as Arden Equipment then
purchased the note from the bank and sought to recover the
deficiency in an action against Mr. and Mrs. Rhodes.1" By way of
defense, the Rhodes alleged that Arden Equipment had promised
them that it would not seek a deficiency judgment if they surrendered
the collateral-the backhoe-to the bank voluntarily." Although
Mr. and Mrs. Rhodes had performed their side of the bargain, the
court refused to hold Arden Equipment to its promise." The bank
was legally entitled to possession of the backhoe, and the Rhodes'
promise to surrender it voluntarily thus could not supply consideration
for its agreement with Arden Equipment."
Quite clearly, however, the agreement between Arden Equip-
ment and the Rhodes is indistinguishable from conventional bargains.
Arden Equipment was presumably responsible to the bank for any
deficiency resulting from the sale of the collateral. To the extent it
could reduce the bank's costs of sale, that deficiency would be
smaller. The cost savings entailed by a nonjudicial, voluntary
repossession thus inured directly to the benefit of Arden Equip-
ment.' On the other side of the transaction, it is clear that the
Rhodes gave up something of substance. As a practical matter, a
debtor can normally force a secured party to resort to judicial process
to establish its entitlement to the collateral1 and giving up such
104. hd at 874.
105. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1994).
106. Arden Equip. Co., 285 S.E.2d at 874-75.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 874.
109. Ld. at 876.
110. Id.
111. Indeed, if a borrower has too few assets to make obtaining a deficiency judgment
worth the effort and expense, trading the right to a deficiency judgment for a voluntary
surrender of the collateral might very well be a prudent move for a creditor. Obviously,
if Arden Equipment once felt such a trade was prudent, it had reconsidered its decision
by the time suit was filed.
112. The reason a debtor has some control over a secured creditor's resort to
repossession is the requirement in U.C.C. § 9-503 that the remedy of self-help repossession
be exercised without a "breach of the peace." U.C.C. § 9-503. Violation of that
requirement can expose a secured creditor to tort liability, including liability for punitive
damages. As a practical matter, § 9-503 makes it perilous for a secured creditor to
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procedural protection constitutes a forfeiture of rights of more than
negligible importance. Even under the archaic formula defining
consideration as "benefit to the promisor or detriment to the
promisee, '  therefore, the Rhodes/Arden Equipment compromise
appears to qualify as a bargain.
Extending the pre-existing duty rule to encompass contractual
duties owed to third persons thus introduces internal inconsistency
into the doctrine of consideration. Real bargains are disqualified
from enforcement by a purported corollary to a more general doctrine
that is designed to guarantee the enforcement of bargains."4 To be
sure, in some of the cases so extending the pre-existing duty rule the
resulting case dispositions are satisfactory, or, at least, not obviously
unsatisfactory. In such cases, however, there is generally some ground
unrelated to the doctrine of consideration for refusing to enforce the
promise in question."5 If it is desirable to withhold enforcement
proceed with self-help repossession if the debtor even protests orally. The secured
creditor's only truly safe response to a debtor's objection is to obtain judicial authorization
to seize the collateral. For a collection of illustrative cases, see 2 JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27-6 (Prac. 3d ed. 1988).
113. The formula persists in consideration cases in spite of the fact that neither benefit
nor detriment is universally required as a condition of the enforcement of promises. P.S.
ATIYAH, Consideration: A Restatement, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 179, 191-99 (1986).
114. In addition to Arden Equip. Co., see Bennett v. Genoa AG Ctr., Inc. (In re
Bennett), 154 B.R. 157, 159-60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding junior creditor's promise
to release lien on property to enable debtor to sell property and satisfy pre-existing duty
to pay proceeds to senior creditor unenforceable, even though sale would have improved
junior creditor's position as to debtor's remaining property); Mann Elec. Co. v. Webco S.
Corp., 390 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an owner of a construction
project, who had no direct contractual relationship with subcontractor, but who promised
to pay delinquent general contractor and subcontractor with joint checks; court remands
for determination whether general's breach of subcontract is so material as to excuse
subcontractor's performance, implying that only under that circumstance is consideration
present).
115. The alternate ground of decision is embraced by the court in some cases. In
others, the use of the pre-existing duty rule truncates the record, and the alternate ground
is merely suggested by the facts of the case. See American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. First
Am. Inv. Corp., 463 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (holding standby lender's alleged
agreement to make loan to developer if primary lender funded loan to developer
unenforceable because primary lender was already under a duty to developer, and because
of failure of assent and of conditions precedent); City Nat'l Bank v. Russell, 615 N.E.2d
1308 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing summary judgment on guaranty; court finds material
issues of fact as to consideration for and fraud in the inducement of an increase in the
amount guaranteed); Arnold v. Krewson, 834 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
former wife's promise to reduce former husband's child support obligations in return for
former husband's payment of debt upon which former husband and former wife were
jointly liable unenforceable, because husband was already obligated to pay debt; facts
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from such promises, it is not because they are not constituents of
bargains, but because there are some grounds for refusing to enforce
genuine bargains. The extension of the pre-existing duty rule to
contractual duties owed to third parties is thus either redundant or
harmful, and it creates doctrinal and theoretical inconsistencies as
well.
C. "Public" Duties
The pre-existing duty rule is also applied in instances in which the
duty in question is a duty imposed by some branch of law other than
contract.'1 6 The duty may be one imposed on all citizens, such as
the duty to refrain from conduct that amounts to a tort or a crime.
Alternatively, the duty may be an official duty imposed upon a certain
group of public employees, elected officials, or other limited class. In
either case the traditional rule is that a promise to perform, or actual
performance, of the public duty is not consideration for a return
promise."7 The traditional rule is alive and well and reflected in
recent cases." 8
In contrast to cases decided under other corollaries to the
doctrine of consideration, the cases decided under the "public duty"
arm of the pre-existing duty rule do not appear to include a significant
number of undesirable decisions. Nevertheless, those cases do not
provide significant support for retention of the pre-existing duty rule
suggest husband may have taken advantage of former wife's economic necessity and
pressure by obligee); Tender Loving Care Agency v. Hladun, 488 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App. Div.
1985) (holding daughter's oral promise to pay for health care services for which father had
contracted unenforceable on grounds of pre-existing duty rule and statute of frauds).
116. See infra cases cited in note 118.
117. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 76 (1932).
118. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981);
Holcomb v. United States, 622 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d
882 (1st Cir. 1980); Spiering v. City of Madison, 863 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1994); Robles
v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Salaymeh v. St. Vincent
Memorial Hosp. Corp., 706 F. Supp. 643 (C.D. I11. 1989); Floyd v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.
889 (1992), affid, 996 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 328 (1993); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Breese, 675 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Schaefer v. Williams, 15 Cal. App.
4th 1243, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212 (1993); Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 366
So. 2d 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); White v. Village of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 633 N.E.2d 16 (I11. 994); Harris v. Johnson, 578 N.E.2d 1326
(I11. App. Ct. 1991); Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256 (N.M. 1980), overruled on other
grounds by Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 637 P.2d 564 (N.M. 1981); G6ncalves v. Regent Int'l
Hotels, Ltd., 447 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1983); Cronk v. State, 420 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Agristor Credit Corp. v. Unruh, 571 P.2d 1220 (Okla. 1977); City of Spartanburg v. Spartan
Villa, 253 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 1978); Bayer v. Burke, 338 N.W.2d 293 (S.D. 1983).
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because the rule reaches its greatest level of redundancy in the public
duty cases." 9 The public duty arm of the pre-existing duty rule is
conceptually connected to more satisfactory doctrines that may be
used in lieu of the doctrine of consideration in cases involving a
promise exchanged for performance-or a promise of perfor-
mance-of a public duty.
More specifically, the public duty cases tend to fall into three
categories." In the first category the promise to perform the pre-
existing public duty operates as an instrument of coercion. Indeed,
the connection between coercion and the promise to perform a pre-
existing public duty is most obvious when the public duty is the duty
to refrain from committing a crime or a tort. The crudest extortionist
may threaten to beat a victim if the latter does not promise to pay a
sum of money. The extortionist who promises to refrain from battery
for the same return is only slightly more refined. The first category
of pre-existing public duty cases includes a few equally severe cases
of coercion.
Salmeron v. United States" is probably the most appalling
example. Robert Salmeron began divorce proceedings in California
against his wife, Susan." Service of process on Susan was accom-
plished with little difficulty, as Susan was in the local county jail at the
time."z Robert had physical custody of the couple's two minor
children, and he sought permanent custody in the divorce proceed-
ing. 4 At the appropriate time, Robert's attorney informed Susan
of a final hearing date on Robert's petition for dissolution of the
marriage."z Susan then arranged an extremely unpleasant surprise.
Robert and the children had been living with Robert's mother in
her home.'26 Five days before the final hearing, U.S. marshals took
the children from the mother's home while Robert was away. 7
119. Hamson seems to have recognized this overlap between violation of public policy
and bargains for performance of a public duty. Oddly enough, however, he seemed to
regard the overlap as a reason for retention of the public duty arm of the pre-existing duty
rule. See Hamson, supra note 89, at 240.
120. The categories overlap to some extent, and certain cases could be placed in more
than one category.
121. 724 F.2d, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983).
122. Id. at 1359.
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id
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The marshals neither gave prior notice of the action they were about
to take nor obtained any form of judicial authorization) 28  The
children were turned over to Susan, whose release from jail had been
arranged by the local U.S. attorney.29 Susan's boyfriend, who was
apparently a member of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club, was
released at the same time.3 Although Robert was awarded custody
of the two children in the divorce proceeding, Susan, her boyfriend,
and the two children were accepted into the federal Witness Protec-
tion Program, presumably in return for testimony against the Hell's
Angels.' All four were then relocated to an undisclosed loca-
tion." -
It took Robert twenty-one months and litigation in both
California and the District of Columbia to get the children back,3
largely due to the recalcitrance of federal officials."M Finally, while
the litigation was still pending, a government attorney offered to
return the children if Robert would release the government from any
liability for their "relocation."'35  Robert signed the release, the
children were returned, and Robert promptly filed a tort action
against the government.'36 Summary judgment in favor of the
government, based on the release, was reversed on appeal.'37 The
Court of Appeals determined that there were. two "triable issues of
fact."'38 First, notwithstanding Robert's representation by counsel,
there was a significant possibility that the release had not been
executed voluntarily.'39 Second, it appeared that, in offering to
128. Icd
129. Ud
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1360.
134. Id. at 1362. Indeed, although the government was informed of the state custody
order, it was more than six months before any federal official disclosed to Robert that his
children were in the Witness Protection Program. Id. at 1360. The government broke an
agreement to produce the children for a custody hearing in California. Id. Robert's
habeas corpus proceeding in the Northern District of California was then transferred to
the District of Columbia when the government, in an ex parte communication, informed
the California judge that the children were not in the jurisdiction. Id. The government's
offer to return the children came only after the government hadmoved to dismiss the
District of Columbia case on the grounds that jurisdiction was proper only in Virginia. Id
135. Id
136. Id.
137. Id at 1364-65.
138. Id. at 1363.
139. Id. at 1362.
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return the children in compliance with a state custody order, the
government merely promised to give Robert something he was
already entitled to."' If so, the government's satisfaction of its
correlative duty could not provide consideration for the release. 4'
The close connection between the two grounds of decision is
quite obvious. The "promise" to perform the pre-existing duty
carried a thinly veiled threat. 4 2 Other cases in this category are less
colorful, but the use of a promise to perform a pre-existing public
duty as an instrument of coercion is equally clear." In such cases
the various doctrines used to police coercion, including duress, undue
influence, and unconscionability, could provide substitutes for the pre-
existing duty rule.
In the second category of cases, the public duty arm of the pre-
existing duty rule exhibits an equally close connection to another
cluster of contractual defenses, specifically the defenses of illegality
and inconsistency with public policy. The major concern in this
category of cases is that enforcement of a transaction in which one
party merely promises to perform a pre-existing public duty would
encourage some form of behavior inimical to the interest of society.
The clearest cases are those in which a public official receives a
promise of special compensation or some other benefit in return for
performing the duties of the office.'" Enforcement of such promis-
140. 1& at 1362-63.
141. 1&
142. Robert's attorney testified that when he received the offer of the return of his
children in exchange for a release, Robert specifically asked whether the government
would turn over the children in the absence of a release. The response was, "'Well, do
you want the children back?'" Id. at 1361.
143. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir.
1981) (invalidating waiver of right to use trade name in return for approval of site plan for
restaurant; one judge relies on pre-existing duty rule while the other relies on defense of
duress); Spiering v. City of Madison, 863 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1994) (involving settlement
of grievance in return for refraining from discharge of employee in violation of First
Amendment rights); Agristor Credit Corp. v. Unruh, 571 P.2d 1220 (Okla. 1977) (holding
that agreement by feed suppliers not to disrupt commercially reasonable sale conducted
by secured creditor with priority over feed suppliers was not consideration for alleged
agreement by secured creditor to pay a portion of proceeds to suppliers; feed suppliers'
disruption of sale would have had "disastrous effect" on sale); City of Spartanburg v.
Spartan Villa, 253 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 1978) (finding no consideration for alleged agreement
by developer, after project was completed, to pay unusually high sewer tap fee in return
for city's performance of pre-existing duty to provide sewer service; appellate court did not
reach lower court finding of economic duress).
144. See, e.g., Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 366 So. 2d 157 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (precluding independent polygraph operator employed by state offices from
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es might encourage public employees to shirk their duties unless such
special benefits became routine or to perform their duties selectively
in favor of their benefactors. 45 In other cases the objectionable
feature of the transaction is that one party uses the performance of a
public duty to extract a waiver of an important right."4  Finally,
there is a series of cases in which the courts express concern that the
enforcement of promises given in return for the performance of a
public duty would encourage behavior which would actually frustrate
the statutory scheme giving rise to the public duty.47 In the cases
recovering on promise of reward for information learned during the course of state
employment; recovery barred by pre-existing duty rule and public policy); Harris v.
Johnson, 578 N.E,2d 1326 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (holding promise by incoming mayor to
reappoint current police chief if police chief would continue to fulfill duties of the office
in the interim unenforceable on grounds of lack of consideration and inconsistency with
public policy). Harris is of particular interest because it illustrates the primacy of the
public policy rationale in this type of case. The incoming mayor's promise to reappoint
the police chief if the chief remained on the job may or may not have satisfied traditional
consideration requirements. If the chief were required by the terms of the contract to
remain in the job for a specific term, the pre-existing duty rule would apply, and the
mayor's promise would be unenforceable. If, on the other hand, the chief were free to
leave at any time, it is at least arguable that the agreement to forego exercising the right
to leave would provide consideration for the mayor's promise even under classical
consideration theory. In either case, however, the public policy concerns implicated when
the chief, a public employee, extracted an additional benefit for doing the chief's duty are
sufficient to deny enforcement to the mayor's promise. It thus matters very little whether
the transaction is a classical bargain.
145. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.11; Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 647-49;
Patterson, supra note 89, at 939.
146. See, e.g., White v. Village of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that where municipal code required administration of pre-employment agility test,
test administration was not consideration for applicant's release of potential liability for
negligent administration), cert denied, 633 N.E.2d 16 (Il1. 1994); Goncalves v. Regent Int'l
Hotels, Ltd., 447 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that where statute required hotel to
provide a safe as condition of limiting liability, privilege of using safe was not consideration
for liability limitation and release contained in safe deposit box receipt); Cronk v. State,
420 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding that interim payment mandated by statute in
appropriation cases in which parties do not reach settlement does not provide consider-
ation for provision preventing claimant from introducing specific evidence in court;
agreement lacks consideration, is unconscionable, and is contrary to public policy).
147. See, e.g., In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 617 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that
agreement by bankrupt to retrieve assets secreted in Bermuda in return for permission to
use half the assets for bail in criminal proceeding unenforceable by bankrupt; bankrupt
had pre-existing duty to turn over all funds to receiver, and recognizing agreement would
encourage bankrupts to refuse to comply, in contravention of public policy); Goncalves v.
Regent Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 447 N.E.2d 693 (N.Y. 1983) (noting that recognition of liability
limitation in hotel safe deposit box receipt would encourage hotel operators to provide less
security than statute requires for limitation of liability); Bayer v. Burke, 338 N.W.2d 293
(S.D. 1983) (holding that note given in return for forbearance from suit upon gambling
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in this category, the defense of illegality or inconsistency with public
policy is sufficient by itself to dictate the desirable result.4 ' The
pre-existing duty rule is a needless complication.
The third category of cases decided under the public duty arm of
the pre-existing duty rule is similarly intimately connected with public
policy, but the structure of the cases is somewhat different. In this
class of cases, one of the parties attempts to transform a public duty
into a contractual duty, usually for the purpose of collecting damages
for its breach.149 Though the courts often use the doctrine of
consideration as a vehicle for deciding such cases, the truly objection-
able feature of such cases is the impropriety of classifying the
underlying duty as contractual.
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation v. First Pennsylvania
Bank5" provides a straightforward example. The plaintiff bank
financed an individual's purchase of a new car from an automobile
dealer, Murphy Ford."'1 The bank reserved a security interest in the
vehicle, and, when Murphy Ford submitted a title application to the
Department of Transportation (DOT), it requested notation of the
debts held unenforceable). In addition to the foregoing cases, Holcomb v. United States,
622 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1980) is probably explainable on similar grounds. That case'
involved a suit by the officers of a bankrupt corporation against the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for a refund of payments of corporate taxes made by them individually on
behalf of the corporation. Id. at 939. The officers alleged that, in return for their
agreement to make payments of corporate "trust fund" taxes, for which they were
personally liable, during the pendency of the corporate bankruptcy, the IRS agreed to
apply any proceeds from the corporate bankruptcy to corporate taxes for which the
officers were personally liable rather than corporate taxes for which they were not
personally liable. Id at 938, 940. The effect of the agreement, of course, would be to
reduce the officers' individual exposure. The court held that the officers were under a pre-
existing duty to pay the corporate taxes, and that any agreement by the government based
on the satisfaction of that duty was without consideration. Id at 941. While the court did
not mention it, it may be that enforcement of such agreements would encourage taxpayers
to "stonewall" the government until they could extract such a liability reduction at the
expense of the public purse. Absent some such public policy implications, the alleged
agreement at issue in Holcomb would appear to be a reasonable form of compromise
agreement.
148. Indeed, the illegality/public policy defense is actually superior because it will yield
the desirable result even if the party whose behavior is undesirable manages to circumvent
the pre-existing duty rule by adding a "peppercorn"-some trivial consideration-to his
promise to perform a pre-existing duty.
149. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v. First Pa. Bank, 466 A.2d 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 754.
[Vol. 29:713
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION
name of the secured party on the certificate of title.152 By statute
DOT had a duty to record such a lien upon request." DOT,
however, failed to endorse the title properly and, instead, mailed it to
the vehicle's purchaser." The purchaser then sold the car, default-
ed on the loan, and left the jurisdiction.' The bank obtained an
award against DOT from the Pennsylvania Board of Claims in the
amount of the outstanding loan balance.5 6 The bank's theory was
that it was the third party beneficiary of a contract between DOT and
Murphy Ford under which DOT was obligated to record the lien.
15 7
The award was reversed on appeal on the grounds that the require-
ment of a bargained exchange could not be satisfied if one of the
parties-DOT-had a pre-existing duty to render the promised
performance.
5 1
It requires very little reflection to appreciate the contrived nature
of the court's reasoning and the presence of a strong, but unarticulat-
ed, policy basis for the decision. The pre-existing duty rule is
normally used to invalidate a promise given in return for a promise to
fulfill a pre-existing duty. 9 It is not designed to deny enforcement
of the pre-existing duty itself In First Pennsylvania Bank, however,
the effect of the court's decision was to preclude an award of damages
for violation of the pre-existing duty to record a lien on a title
certificate." The court seems to have the doctrine of consideration
precisely backwards. If the duty to record the lien were truly
contractual, the consideration necessary to support it could presum-
ably be found in Murphy Ford's payment of the usual title application
fee."' The pre-existing duty rule could only be used to attack
whatever duties the alleged "contract" placed on Murphy Ford.
While further fancy judicial footwork might bring the case within the
ambit of traditional consideration principles,' 6 it is apparent that
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 1l
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.1.
160. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v. First Pa. Bank, 466 A.2d 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983).
161. Id. at 754.
162. It is possible, of course, that the ever-manipulable doctrine of consideration could
be stretched to deny enforcement of DOT's duty as well. Thus, it might be argued,
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there is no need to resort to such heroic measures. The simple truth
is that any reference to an "agreement" between Murphy Ford and
DOT is pure fiction. A statute requires Murphy Ford to pay a fee to
obtain a certificate of title. The statute likewise requires DOT to
record a lien on the certificate upon an appropriate request accompa-
nied by payment of the fee. There is nothing remotely like assent on
either side, and the obligations are in no sense consensual."6
If a public official fails to perform such a nonconsensual duty,
several interesting policy questions arise. The courts or the legislature
must decide whether sovereign immunity has been, or should be,
waived in order to permit a private right of action against the official.
The appropriate theory of recovery and standard of care must
likewise be selected. The bank's contract claim was nothing but an
attempt to circumvent such questions instead of answering them and
to recover from the nearest deep pocket when the bank's borrower
was beyond its reach. The court apparently sensed, but did not
articulate, the conceptual impropriety of the bank's use of contract
law for such purposes.1"
While the pre-existing duty rule could be bent and twisted to foil
the bank, a direct appeal to policy would have articulated the defect
in the bank's approach more clearly. Several of the cases decided
under the public duty'arm of the pre-existing duty rule seem to reflect
a similar, though sometimes unarticulated, recognition of the
impropriety of using contract law to enforce public duties or to
provide a covert resolution of the policy issues such duties raise)65
because DOT had a pre-existing duty to record the lien, Murphy's "promises" were not
supported by consideration and could not be enforced by DOT. Under the principle of
mutuality of obligation, however, if DOT could not enforce the contract, neither could
Murphy Ford. Thus, neither party has any remedy in contract against the other, and the
bank, as a third party beneficiary, has no greater rights. There are two responses to the
foregoing argument. First, the court actually adopted nothing remotely like the argument,
and, given the rather straightforward policy basis for its decision, it would have been
foolish to engage in such convoluted reasoning. Second, the crucial premise for the
argument is the principle of mutuality obligation, which I have criticized extensively
elsewhere. See Wessman, supra note 2.
163. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v. First Pa. Bank, 466 A.2d 753 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1983).
164. See id
165. See Floyd v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 889 (1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 328 (1993) (holding that the language of a security agreement with
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) obligating FmHA to "make or insure future loans
... provided funds are available and the Debtor meets all then current requirements
imposed by regulations" could not be the basis of a breach of contract action because the
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The three categories of cases described above literally exhaust the
cases decided under the public duty arm of the pre-existing duty rule.
While the public duty rule appears to do little substantive harm, it is
at best an indirect way of producing results desirable for other
reasons. Direct appeals to public policy and to the defenses used to
police coercion would produce the desirable results without the
doctrinal distraction.
D. Modifications of Ongoing Contracts
The bulk of the criticism of the pre-existing duty rule has been
directed at its role in policing adjustments to contractual relations in
which performance is continuing or expected to continue.' 66  As a
policing device for modifications, the rule has been subjected to a
battery of critical arguments which, by now, form a familiar litany.
Initially, critics have observed that the pre-existing duty rule was
not truly a logical entailment of the more general doctrine of
consideration, even if one assumes that consideration should generally
language merely restated administrative duties of FmHA and therefore (1) did not satisfy
the requirement of consideration, and (2) may not be transformed from discretionary
administrative responsibility into a contractual undertaking); Robles v. Humana Hosp., 785
F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that physician has no contract action against
hospital for failure to comply with its own bylaws concerning revocation of staff privileges;
bylaws concerning professional review are mandated by statute and cannot be consider-
ation for a contract, and interpreting them as a contract would be inconsistent with public
policy); Salaymeh v. St. Vincent Memorial Hosp. Corp., 706 F. Supp. 643 (C.D. Ii. 1989)
(holding that physician who resigned in return for promise of confidentiality of adverse
report may not maintain contract action; statute required that report be kept confidential,
and promise of confidentiality could not be consideration for contract); Schaefer v.
Williams, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1243,19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212 (1993) (holding an election campaign
pledge to abide by the Code of Fair Campaign Practices, including refraining from
defamation, not enforceable through private action in contract); Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d
256 (N.M. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 637 P.2d 564 (N.M.
1981) (involving a husband's promises to refrain from infidelity, be a faithful and providing
husband, and submit to counseling in return for wife's dismissal of divorce action; wife may
not recover for breach because (1) husband only promised to do what he was already
bound to do, depriving the contract of mutuality, and (2) contract is also against public
policy); Cronk v. State, 420 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding that evidentiary exclusion
in "Agreement for Advance Payment" not enforceable; agreement is required by statute
and not a true contract, and it would run afoul of the pre-existing duty rule if it were
assumed to be contractual); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Breese, 675 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that where worker's compensation carrier's election 'of remedies
agreement merely reproduced statutory obligations of carrier, those obligations could not
be consideration, and agreement imposed no duty on insured to file suit against third party
responsible for accident).
166. See authorities cited supra note 89.
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function as a gatekeeper. 1 Even if it is assumed that only promises
that are components of bargained exchanges should be enforced, an
adjustment to only one side of a bargained exchange does not
transform the entire exchange transaction into a gift transaction."
It merely alters the value or extent of the performances exchanged
and perhaps the balance of advantage to the exchange. 69 Nothing
in the very notion of consideration, however, logically compels that
modifications be treated like initial contract formation 7 ' or that
parties who have agreed on the terms of a proposed exchange may
not revisit and revalue it if they choose.' Therefore, even advo-
cates of the traditional gatekeeping function of the doctrine of
consideration need not accept the pre-existing duty rule as a simple
logical consequence.
Further, it has been argued, even if one accepts Fuller's view that
the general "requirement" of consideration serves cautionary,
channeling, and evidentiary functions analogous to the functions
served by formalities generally,'" the pre-existing duty rule is
167. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 4.21 ("The logic of the pre-
existing duty rule is far from inexorable. To one schooled in the contemporary bargain
theory of considerati6n, it might seem just as logical to conclude that performance, even
by one who is already under a duty to'perform, is consideration for a promise if the
performance is bargained for.").
168. Cf Reiter, supra note 89, at 456-57 (arguing that unilateral modifications involve
actual bargaining and allocation of goods and resources).
169. Obviously, there is a logically possible limiting case in which a one-sided
adjustment to an exchange transaction converts it from an exchange to a gratuitous
transaction. If one party has not yet commenced performance and the effect of the
adjustment is to eliminate all duties of performance incumbent upon that party while
preserving the duties of the other party, the other party's performance or promise becomes
technically gratuitous. Such cases are probably empirically trivial. In the reported
modification cases discussed infra notes 191-272 and accompanying text, both parties
typically render or promise some performance at some point. The modifications at issue
merely change the balance of advantage to the exchanges in question.
170. See SUTrON, supra note 76, at 261 n.251 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 742 (1931)); Reiter, supra note 89,
at 507.
171. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 210 ("Any performance that was already due under
an existing obligation was erased-deleted-as a permissible subject of new agreement,
unless it was modified in some minor way... ' Thus, within the limits of the obligation
their agreement had created, the parties had destroyed their own power to contract. The
logic that produced this contradiction could have been refuted, but it seemed easier to find
a way around it.").
172. Fuller, supra note 77, at 800-06; see also Nathan, supra note 89, at 514 (discussing
Fuller's "cautionary" function and "channeling" function in relation to the pre-existing
duty rule.); Reiter, supra note 89, at 454-55 (discussing Fuller's three functions performed
by legal formalities in contracts).
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neither necessary nor important in performing those functions. To
the extent evidentiary problems are presented in the context of
contract modification, such problems are better solved by requiring a
writing or some similar formality." Moreover, the modification
context does not present any particularly pressing need for cautionary
and channeling devices.74 Modifications are normally adjustments
in ongoing business exchanges, and" the exchange context itself
provides some incentive for caution and appropriate channeling of
conduct.7 '
If the pre-existing duty rule is thus neither required for the sake
of logical consistency nor supported by the alleged policy basis for the
general requirement of consideration, its genesis and durability call
for some explanation. The usual explanation is that the pre-existing
duty rule was a device developed by the common-law courts as an
indirect way of policing a particular type of bargaining evil, variously
characterized as "coerced,' ' 76 "extorted,"'" or "opportunistic"'78
modification. The precise definition of the evil to be avoided varies
to some extent among commentators. 7 1 The fundamental goal,
however, seems to be to distinguish modifications motivated by some
legitimate business justification, on the one hand, from modifications
at an opposite pole designed merely to reallocate the potential gain
of a previously-agreed exchange and procured by exploiting the
superior bargaining position of one party or the weakness or
vulnerability of the other s°
173. See Reiter, supra note 89, at 457 n.73.
174. Cf. Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 688 n.52 (arguing that most
modification cases involve modifications made with sufficient deliberation).
175. See Reiter, supra note 89, at 457.
176. See Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 288; Hillman, Restatement, supra note
89, at 681; Nathan, supra note 89, at 512.
177. See Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 289; Nathan, supra note 89, at 512;
Robison, supra note 89, at 701-02; see also CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.6 (identifying the
purpose of the pre-existing duty rule as the prevention of a "hold-up game").
178. See Muris, supra note 90, at 522-26, 532-52.
179. Compare Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 682-84 (characterizing the
problem as distinguishing between voluntary and coercive or extortionate modifications
and specifying the factors to be considered in making the distinction) with Muris, supra
note 90, at 523-26 (defining opportunism) and Robison, supra note 89, at 701-02
(explaining extortion in terms of temporary monopoly).
180. See authorities cited supra notes 173-79. A few commentators would go even
further and allow enforcement of some modifications that are, in some sense, coerced. See
Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE
L.J. 61 (1987); Robison, supra note 89. Even the view that all coercive modifications
should be denied enforcement, however, is a lesser restriction on modification than the
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Assuming that the goal of modification law is, or ought to be, to
distinguish coerced or opportunistic modifications from justified
modifications and enforce only the latter, it has been argued that the
pre-existing duty rule is a supremely clumsy tool for accomplishing
that goal. On the one hand the rule is clearly underinclusive because
it is so easily avoided by the sophisticated extortionist. Since, under
traditional rules, a mere peppercorn suffices as consideration, any
party who knows of the rule and has the power and desire to coerce
a modification can easily extract a major concession from the opposite
party while making a minor adjustment in his own contemplated
performance."" The pre-existing duty rule is thus a hurdle only to
the crude or ignorant extortionist.
On the other hand as a device for policing coercion, the pre-
existing duty rule is also overinclusive.'" It deters or blocks en-
forcement of one-sided modifications that are not coerced and for
which there are good reasons. Indeed, there are numerous instances
in which one who promises to pay an increased price for a previously
promised performance is making what Corbin called a "bargain in
fact," in the sense that the receipt of the previously promised
performance is a genuine benefit worth the increased price to the
promisor."83 More broadly, some have argued that the picture of
modification painted by the pre-existing duty rule is a distortion of the
actual character of the exchange process, particularly in the context
of long-term contracts or business relationships. Such long-term
relationships are often characterized by a series of adjustments in
performance on both sides, only some of which can be paired and
characterized as a mutual quid pro quo.M Moreover, the adjust-
pre-existing duty rule, which is the primary concern of this section. Accordingly, the
question whether all, or only some, coercive modifications should be denied enforcement
is irrelevant to this Article; the pre-existing duty rule is too restrictive under either view.
181. See SUTrON, supra note 76, at 212 n.76; Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at
684-85; Mather, supra note 89, at 616-17; Nathan, supra note 89, at 520-21; Reiter, supra
note 89, at 458-59.
182. See Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 685; Nathan, supra note 89, at 513.
183. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.2; see also ATIYAH, supra note 113, at 190 (arguing
that there may be benefit and detriment in fact where there is no additional consideration
for a modification to a contract); SutrON, supra note 76, at 237-38; Hamson, supra note
89, at 237-39 (arguing that there may be actual benefit or detriment to the parties to
modify a contract in the absence of additional consideration even where one party owes
a pre-exiting duty to the other); Nathan, supra note 89, at 518 (arguing that courts should
consider "actual" benefit and detriment as opposed to "legal" benefit and detriment).
184. See Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 995, 1004 n.121; Hillman, Restatement,
supra note 89, at 700-01; Reiter, supra note 89, at 465-66; Wright, supra note 89, at 1230-
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ments or promises of adjustment which may not be so characterized
generate the same expectations and are no less worthy of enforcement
than the ones that fit the more discrete modification model presup-
posed by the pre-existing duty rule.
Because of the imprecision of the pre-existing duty rule in its
pristine form, courts have been forced to find devices to ameliorate
its harsh effects in particular cases.1" An imaginative court wishing
to enforce an apparently one-sided modification may be able to "find"
a peppercorn's worth of consideration on the apparently unchanged
side of the transaction.1 86 If the contract of which modification is
sought is at least partially executory on both sides, an apparently one-
sided adjustment might be enforced on the-normally fictitious and
mildly silly-theory that the parties agreed to a mutual rescission of
the old contract and to a new contract on the modified terms."
Alternatively, if a court can find circumstances unanticipated at the
time of the initial formation of the contract that make a one-sided
modification fair, there is likewise authority for enforcement of the
modification."8
While all of these exceptions to the pre-existing duty rule
undoubtedly enable creative judges to enforce desirable one-sided
modifications, they also destroy the apparent simplicity of the pre-
existing duty rule, arguably its main attraction. As a result, some
commentators advocate the outright abandonment of the pre-existing
duty rule and favor the use of doctrines such as good faith and
economic duress as the devices for policing coercion in the modifica-
tion process. 19  The notion of duress, in particular, offers the
additional advantage that it not only offers a vehicle for refusing to
31.
185. See Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 685; Knapp, supra note 89, at 943;
Reiter, supra note 89, at 474.
186. See Patterson, supra note 89, at 936; Reiter, supra note 89, at 475-76.
187. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.15; Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 290;
Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 999; Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 685;
Knapp, supra note 89, at 943; Nathan, supra note 89, at 525-26; Reiter, supra note 89, at
492-98; Robison, supra note 89, at 700-01.
188. See Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 685; Knapp, supra note 89, at 943;
Nathan, supra note 89, at 522-25; Reiter, supra note 89, at 476-79.
189. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 210-11; Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at
289; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 998-99; Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at
703; Knapp, supra note 89, at 943; Nathan, supra note 89, at 528-42; Patterson, supra note
89, at 937. With respect to sales of goods, § 2-209(1) of the U.C.C. has abolished the pre-
existing duty rule, and the decades of experience under the Code have produced no clamor
for its reintroduction.
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enforce coerced promises but also supports a claim for unjust
enrichment in those situations in which the offending party manages
to coerce actual performance in addition to a promise. t '
In assessing whether the current operation of the pre-existing
duty rule lives up to the foul reputation spread by its critics, it is
helpful to note that its application is concentrated in particular kinds
of cases. Because the problems created by the rule vary somewhat
with these recurring factual contexts, the discussion of the rule's role
in policing modifications will likewise be organized according to the
most frequently recurring factual patterns.
1. Construction and similar cases
Building contracts and similar contracts for the development or
improvement of realty constitute a significant subset, of the cases in
which the pre-existing duty rule has been applied in recent years. In
a significant portion of these cases, the pre-existing duty rule is as
redundant as other corollaries to the doctrine of consideration have
proven to be in other contexts. It is comparatively easy to find cases
of purported modifications in which the pre-existing duty rule
produces results that are, or could be, justified by appeal to other
doctrinal mechanisms, including findings of failure of assent or of
misunderstanding; 9' applications of the defenses of duress, fraud, or
lack of good faith; 9 findings that particular communications do not
190. See Knapp, supra note 89, at 943 n.21.
191. See American Fletcher Mortgage v. First Am. Inv. Corp., 463 F. Supp. 186 (N.D.
Ga. 1978) (using pre-existing duty rule as a ground of decision alternate to failure of
assent); Newkirk Constr. Corp. v. Gulf County, 366 So. 2d 813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that alleged amendment to contract fails for lack of mutual assent and lack of
new consideration): All In One Maintenance Serv. v. Beech Mountain Constr. Co., 318
S.E.2d 856 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (applying pre-existing duty rule to support reversal of
summary judgment on contractor's claim that subcontractor released contractor from all
liability; parties also disagree whether release was intended to cover liability for
termination of contract or merely pre-termination claims); Remington v. Wren, 564 P.2d
1025 (Or. 1977) (finding attempt by contractor to establish account stated for amount
greater than contract price unsuccessful due to lack of consideration; facts suggest owners
never agreed to price increase); Ferrer v. Taft Structurals, Inc., 587 P.2d 177 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding that subcontractor's unilateral upward adjustments to subcontract
price lacked consideration and that contractor never agreed to any modifications).
192. See Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 776 F.2d
198 (7th Cir. 1985) (involving a contractor who agreed to pay extra charges only after
subcontractor refused to remove stockpiled material creating safety hazard); Montgomery
Indus. Int'l v. Thomas Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding alleged novation
of subcontract vitiated by duress and lack of consideration); Dugan v. First Nat'l Bank, 606
P.2d 1009 (Kan. 1980) (reversing summary judgment; material issues of fact remained as
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amount to contractual undertakings; 93 opportune interpretations of
the scope of particular contractual provisions;"9 or findings of
excuse by one party's breach or by failure of a condition prece-
dent.95 In such cases a corollary to the doctrine of consideration is
unnecessary, even if it does little harm.
Even disregarding those cases in which the pre-existing duty rule
is essentially unnecessary but harmless, however, there remains a
more troublesome class of construction cases decided under the pre-
existing duty rule.1 96 In this class, the pre-existing duty rule appears
to exhibit some of the flaws alleged by its critics or, at the very least,
to channel the development of the record so that it is difficult to tell
whether or not the rule is operating unfairly. Occasionally, one
encounters a case in which the pre-existing duty rule derails a
modification that clearly qualifies as one of Corbin's "bargains in
fact."'97  Okemah Construction, Inc. v. Barkley-Farmer, Inc.98 is
to contentions that second subordination agreement signed by elderly, widowed lessor
lacked consideration and was procured by misrepresentation); All In One Maintenance
Serv. v. Beech Mountain Constr. Co., 318 S.E.2d 856 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (reversing
summary judgment on contractor's defense based on subcontractor's release; contractor
procured ambiguous release while apparently concealing decision to terminate subcontract
from subcontractor).
193. See Newkirk Constr. Corp. v. Gulf County, 366 So. 2d 813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that letter temporarily directing joint payments did not amount to
irrevocable assignment of progress payments); Argeros and Co. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Transp., 447 A.2d 1065 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (applying pre-existing duty rule to claim
for extra work; court also suggests instruction to complete work did not amount to
modification); Barnhill v. Moore, 630 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (involving a
subcontractor on land clearing contract who had been ordered to stop work and who then
sought to recover for contractor's breach of alleged promise to notify subcontractor when
to resume; court applies pre-existing duty rule and also classifies alleged promise as "idle
conversation").
194. See Hoagland v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 572 P.2d 493 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that builder-vendor's unilateral attempt to eliminate liability on implied
warranties of workmanlike construction and habitability fails for lack of consideration and
because language of express warranty would not be construed to exclude implied
warranties).
195. See Brannan v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 399 (1985) (finding that state Farmers
Home Administration (FmHA) director's promises to waive requirements of federal
regulations regarding FmHA loan commitment lacked consideration and remained subject
to unfulfilled conditions); Carroccia v. Todd, 615 P.2d 225 (Mont. 1980) (finding that
supplemental agreement between owners and contractor for correction of structural
problems violated pre-existing duty rule; facts suggest agreement was also breached by
contractor).
196. See cases cited infra notes 197-224.
197. See authorities cited supra note 183.
198. 583 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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a good example. The case involved a contract under which Okemah
Construction, Inc. (Okemah) agreed to remove sixty-seven miles of
underground pipe, cut it into forty foot lengths, and load it onto
trailers, all for a total price of fifty-nine cents per lineal foot of pipe
removed.'99 Okemah agreed to provide two of the necessary
trailers, and, in addition to agreeing to pay the stated price, Barkley-
Farmer, Inc. agreed to furnish any additional trailers necessary to
enable removal and loading of approximately 50,000 lineal feet of
pipe per week.2'
Almost immediately, Okemah experienced delays in performing,
which Okemah attributed to Barkley-Farmer's failure to supply the
promised extra trailers.2"1 According to Okemah, the delays made
it impossible for Okemah to make money on the contract and
required a reduction of the size of its work crew.2"2 Though
Okemah apparently did not threaten to breach, it did indicate that, if
Barkley-Farmer so desired, it would discontinue work on the
project. 3 Barkley-Farmer then promised an increase in the con-
tract price to ninety cents per lineal foot of pipe removed.2'
Okemah, in turn, resumed work with an enlarged crew and more
trailers from Barkley-Farmer.' 5 For a time, Barkley-Farmer paid
Okemah's invoices at the revised rate.2 6  Eventually, however,
Barkley-Farmer refused to pay Okemah's last nine invoices, apparent-
ly in an effort to reduce the overall contract price to the original fifty-
nine cent rate." When Okemah sued for the balance of the
contract price at the revised rate, Barkley-Farmer successfully resisted
the claim on the basis of the pre-existing duty rule.2°
As a policy matter, however, there is every reason to enforce the
sort of price increase found in Okemah. There is no indication that
Okemah employed any form of coercion or behaved opportunistically
in obtaining the modification. Indeed, the only behavior properly
characterized as opportunism is Barkley-Farmer's obtaining the
199. Id. at 459.
200. Id.
201. ld.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. id
205. Id.
206. Id
207. It.
208. Id. at 460.
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functional equivalent of specific performance by agreeing to the
modification, appearing to honor it, and then contesting it when
Okemah had performed.' Moreover, in a situation in which one
party to a contract can perform only at a loss, a simple unilateral
price increase may very well be as reasonable a business response to
the situation as some form of mutual adjustment.2 Indeed, with a
little creativity, the modification at issue in Okemah might even have
been fit within traditional consideration doctrine, either on the theory
that it represented a compromise of Okemah's potential claim for
breach arising from Barkley-Farmer's failure to supply enough trailers
or on the theory that the price increase conferred a genuine benefit
on Barkley-Farmer by enabling Okemah to continue in business.
211
When a party on the opposite side of a transaction is financially
troubled or can perform only at a loss, an upward price adjustment
that enables a mutually beneficial exchange to go forward may be a
perfectly reasonable response, and its claim to enforcement stands on
no different footing than exchange promises generally. Similar
reasons justify enforcement of other possible one-sided responses to
the financial ills of a contracting partner, including both price
reductions in favor of a party whose duty is to pay money212 and
209. Professor Narasimhan has characterized this form of opportunism as "self help
specific performance.' Narasimhan, supra note 180, at 62.
210. Indeed, under the peppercorn theory of consideration, Okemah and Barkley-
Farmer could easily have produced an enforceable mutual adjustment yielding the
economic equivalent of a simple price increase. For example, if Okemah agreed to supply
three trailers-rather than two-and Barkley-Farmer agreed to a price increase of 90 cents
plus any incremental cost per foot required to amortize the cost of the additional trailer,
the resulting modification would avoid the pre-existing duty rule and yield the economic
equivalent of a simple price increase. There is no reason to require such machinations,
however. Absent coercion or opportunism, there is as much reason to enforce the simple
price increase as the more complicated mutual modification formula.
211. Obviously, the latter theory supposes that continued performance at the original
contract price would, at some point, have threatened the solvency of Okemah. It should
hardly be any great revelation that some contractors are so thinly capitalized that such an
assumption is realistic. See also Intercon Mfg., Inc. v. Centrifugal Casting Mach. Co., 875
P.2d 1149 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a general contractor who promised to pay
supplier interest after general contractor's delays deprived supplier of all profits on
contract; promise lacked consideration).
212. See Construction Assocs. v. Peru Community Sch. Bldg. Corp., 393 N.E.2d 792
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979). Peru involved a dispute between a contractor, the owner, and its
architect on a project plagued by delays and the need for extra work. d at 793. Much
of the opinion is devoted to a recitation of findings attributing blame for the delays to the
owner and its agents, which should have, but did not, cause the architect to extend the
deadline for substantial completion. Id. at 794-96. At the end of the opinion, however,
the court considered a change order, executed by both parties, that effectively reduced the
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promises of profitable work in the future to a party who must perform
at a current lOSS.
2 13
Another recurring type of construction case provides further
reason to doubt the wisdom of retention of the pre-existing duty rule,
although this type of case tends to be somewhat more ambiguous in
its implications. There are several recent cases of the type in
question. In each such case a contractor sought to recover from the
price of the contractor's provision of additional fill material from the original contract
price of $5.00 per cubic yard to $3.50 per cubic yard. Id. at 797. The previous
recalcitrance of the owner and architect in granting extensions of time for delays caused
by their own fault might suggest that the price modification was extorted. Yet both the
trial and appellate courts rejected the contractor's assertion of a defense of duress. If,
however, the price modification was uitainted by unfairness in the bargaining process, it
probably represented a reasonable concession to a school district on a troubled project,
and its enforcement is supported by the arguments made in the text. Indeed, it is also
supported by the Restatement's authorization of the gratuitous waiver of a portion of a
return performance under an executory contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 275 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981). The appellate court's remand for a finding on
the issue of consideration was thus unnecessary.
213. See Thermoglaze, Inc. v. Morningside Gardens Co., 583 A.2d 1331 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1991); W.E. Koehler Constr. Co. v. Medical Ctr., 670 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
In Koehler a contractor was induced to hold a bid price firm by an oral promise that he
would be permitted to make changes from the contract specifications with respect to
materials and methods of construction. Id. at 559. When the final contract documents
were executed, however, they contained no reference to the oral promise, and an
integration clause and the parol evidence rule effectively precluded the contractor from
recovering on it. Id. at 559, 561-63. When the owner insisted on strict performance of the
contract, the contractor agreed to proceed only in response to an oral promise of
additional work at a reasonable price on the lower unfinished level of the same building.
Id. at 560. The court ultimately held the second oral promise unenforceable under the
pre-existing duty rule. Id. at 561. Thermoglaze was somewhat simpler. After a window
installer had installed 195 windows with white trim, as required by the contract, the owner
expressed a preference for bronze trim. Thermoglaze, 583 A.2d at 1332. The contractor
allegedly agreed to re-install bronze windows at no charge provided the owner made up
the loss by awarding the contractor additional contracts on other properties that the owner
controlled. ld. The trial and appellate courts held the re-installation promise unenforce-
able for lack of consideration, although it is not clear whether the courts believed the
promise of future work was insufficient as consideration or was simply never made. Id.
at 1333.
Assuming the promises of future work were made in both cases, the arguments made
in the text would support enforcement of both modifications. Indeed, the modification at
issue in Thermoglaze was a mutual adjustment of duties, and so should have satisfied the
pre-existing duty rule. The real problem in such cases is whether the promise of future
work is sufficiently definite to be enforced. If the promise of future work is vague as to
the property at issue or the number and size of the projects at issue, as was apparently the
case in Thermoglaze, the requirement of definiteness precludes enforcement. If, however,
a specific property is specified, and particularly if the project in question is awarded to and
completed by a rival contractor, both of which occurred in Koehler, it is difficult to see
why a court could not fashion a remedy.
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project owner for "extra" work-unanticipated work that the
contractor regarded as outside the scope of the original contract-for
which the owner allegedly agreed to pay a sum in addition to the
original contract price.2 4 In each case, however, the owner was
subsequently able to contest the alleged modification successfully on
the grounds that the work in question was not really extra work.215
Rather, it was within the scope of the original contract specifications
or requirements, often because a duty to inspect for and discover the
risk leading to the need for the extra work had been imposed on the
contractor by the contract documents. 16 A promise by the owner
to pay for such work was therefore a promise of additional compensa-
tion for performance of a pre-existing duty and unenforceable as a
consequence.
2 17
Of course, few would classify such results as unfair if the
contractor was aware of the duty to inspect or at fault for not being
aware of it, and if the contractor either (a) became aware of the risk
creating a need for additional work but disregarded it; (b) inspected
negligently; or (c) deliberately avoided inspection. In such cases the
contractor seeking a modification would appear to be attempting to
recover for risks expressly or negligently assumed at the time of
contracting, and such attempts to recapture gains foregone at the time
of contracting may be classified as opportunism,"1 or even bad
faith.219 It is not clear, however, that contractor opportunism, or
bad faith, accounts for all, or even most, of the disputes in this
category.
214. Crookham & Vessels, Inc. v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 414 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1985); Hiers-Wright Assocs. v. Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corp., 356
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); W.H. Lyman Constr. Co. v. Village of Gurnee, 475 N.E.2d
273 (III. App. Ct. 1985) [hereinafter Lyman (1985)]; Argeros and Co. v. Pennsylvania
Dep't of Transp., 447 A.2d 1065 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
215. Crookham, 699 S.W.2d at 416; Hiers-Wright, 356 S.E.2d at 905-06; Lyman (1985),
475 N.E.2d at 278; Argeros, 447 A.2d at 1067-68.
216. Crookham, 699 S.W.2d at 415-16;-Hiers-Wright, 356 S.E.2d at 906; Lyman (1985),
475 N.E.2d at 278; Argeros, 447 A.2d at 1067-68.
217. Crookham, 699 S.W.2d at 416-17; Hiers-Wright, 356 S.E.2d at 906; Lyman (1985),
475 N.E.2d at 279; Argeros, 447 A.2d at 1068.
218. See Muris, supra note 90, at 522-24.
219. For a concise summary of the view that "good faith" is to be explained in terms
of recapture of opportunities previously foregone, see A. Brooke Overby, Bondage,
Domination, and the Art of the Deal: An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender
Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963,980-83 (1993) (summarizing the
approach of Burton and Andersen).
January 1996]
754 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The fact situations presented by cases involving claims for
unanticipated work also provide opportunities for coercion, opportun-
ism, or bad faith on the part of the project owner. Clauses imposing
a duty to inspect on the contractor or imposing the risk of unantici-
pated site conditions upon the contractor may be inserted as early as
the initial bid specifications,' when the bargaining power of the
project owner is at its height and the owner's control over the
documents is virtually absolute. They may be at variance with
industry practice," and their existence or importance may be
minimized or hidden. Indeed, an owner's promise to pay for
unanticipated work in order to keep the contractor on the job may
have precisely such a minimizing effect. Alternatively, the risk
creating the need for additional work may be particularly difficult to
discover.' Under such circumstances, it is by no means clear that
refusal to enforce the owner's promise to pay is either fair or effective
in avoiding the evils that modification doctrine is supposed to prevent.
Thus, in situations in which an owner promises to pay a contrac-
tor for extra work and then contests the modification on the grounds
that the contract documents allocated such work to the contractor, it
is not possible, without more, to determine which of the two is
behaving improperly-the contractor in seeking the modification or
the owner in granting and then contesting it.2" The problem with
220. See, e.g., Crookham, 699 S.W.2d at 415-16; W.H. Lyman Constr. Co. v. Village of
Gurnee, 403 N.E.2d 1325, 1328-29 (I1. App. Ct. 1980); Argeros, 447 A.2d at 1067.
221. The contractor unsuccessfully asserted such a variation from industry practice in
Lyman (1985), 475 N.E.2d at 277, 279.
222. The contractor alleged that the need for additional work could not be ascertained
until the project was underway in Hiers-Wright, 356 S.E.2d at 906.
223. Lineberger v. Williams, 393 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) is an interesting variant
of the usual "extra compensation" construction case. In Lineberger an owner serving as
his own general contractor hired another contractor to assist him in return for specified
payments at certain stages of construction. Id. at 24. The contract contained no provision
concerning duration, and the contractor expressed a desire to move out of state part way
through the project. Id. The owner then promised additional compensation to induce the
contractor to remain on the job until completion. Id. When the owner subsequently
refused to pay, the contractor sued and won a jury verdict. It The appellate court
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether the original contract
required the contractor to remain on the job until completion of the project. Id. at 25-26.
If so, the promise of additional compensation would be invalidated by the pre-existing duty
rule. If not, the modification could stand. Surely, however, the key issue is whether the
contractor extorted the modification by a threat to quit at a time when he had the owner
"over a barrel" or whether the owner voluntarily agreed to a revaluation of the
contractor's services and then opportunistically contested it once performance was
complete. While the parties' original understanding of the duration of their agreement
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the courts' continued invocation of the pre-existing duty rule in such
situations, however, is that it is utterly mechanical and so prevents the
courts from taking the inquiry far enough to make such a determina-
tion. In each of the actual cases in this category during the relevant
time period, it appears that the contractor had not actually anticipated
the site conditions that increased the cost of his own performance,
and in only one did the court actually find that the owner had not, in
fact, promised to reimburse the extra expense.' The pre-existing
duty rule-together with the relevant risk-shifting language of the
contract and/or the parol evidence rule-then derailed any further
analysis of opportunism, coercion, deception, or bad faith, and it is
therefore virtually impossible to determine if the dispositions of the
cases were justified. As a result it is virtually impossible to ascertain,
in the construction context, whether the purported exception to the
pre-existing duty rule for work required by unanticipated circumstanc-
es is functioning as a reliable corrective to the harshness of the pre-
existing duty rule or whether it is actually being evaded through
judicious use of boilerplate risk allocation and integration clauses, the
parol evidence rule, and opportunistic behavior. In turn this
undermines the contention of the rule's only recent defender that, for
all its conceptual and practical faults in its pure form, the pre-existing
duty rule operates well when it operates in tandem with its recognized
exceptions.m
would clearly be relevant to that issue, the appellate court's exclusive focus on the pre-
existing duty rule prevented any discussion of other evidence relevant to determining
which of the parties acted improperly.
224. In Argeros the court held that the owner's instruction to complete the project did
not amount to a promise to pay for additional work. Argeros, 447 A.2d at 1068.
225. See Muris, supra note 90, at 551-52. If I understand Professor Mudis correctly, he
is not claiming to have provided an empirical demonstration that the pre-existing duty rule,
coupled with the "unanticipated circumstances" exception, produces uniformly desirable
results. Indeed, he concedes, at one point, that there is no empirical proof of the
percentage of litigated modifications that are extorted. See id. at 542. Rather, he seems
to be arguing that the point of modification law is to deter opportunistic behavior, and that
using the pre-existing duty rule and its exceptions as vehicles for doing so is more efficient
than permitting courts to examine the question of opportunism directly. Id. at 531,543-46.
Whether a modification is opportunistic depends, in his view, on the reasons why the party
on the "short end" of the modification agreed to it, and, in particular, whether the
modification, in spite of its apparent disadvantage, in fact conferred a benefit upon him.
Id. at 534,543. Since, in any litigated case, the party on the short end will claim extortion,
direct examination of opportunism will force the trier of fact to decide which party's word
is more credible, a "subjective and treacherous task." Id. at 543. On the other hand, the
pre-existing duty rule effectively allocates the burden of persuasion on the issue of
opportunism to the party advocating the modification. Ia. at 546. To meet this burden,
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2. Other contracts for services
It should be no surprise that cases involving other service
contracts of various kinds 6 also form a significant subset of the
cases in which the pre-existing duty rule has been applied. It is easy
to conjure up images of a greedy and ruthless employer using superior
the proponent of the modification must demonstrate the applicability of the unanticipated
circumstances exception. Id. at 543-44, 546. However, the factors relevant to the
exception are more likely to be "objectively verifiable" matters such as unexpected
physical obstacles, the financial condition of the party seeking the modification, or the
existence of a less costly alternative to modification. Id. at 544-45. Demonstration of such
objectively verifiable matters is, according to Professor Muris, less costly than the
credibility determinations required by a direct examination of the issue of opportunism.
AL at 546.
There are two replies to Professor Muris' argument. First, it exaggerates the extent
to which the exceptions to the pre-existing duty rule eliminate the need for the trier of fact
to assess subjective states or make credibility determinations. The "unanticipated
circumstances" exception requires that the facts supporting the need for modification be
either unforeseen by the parties or foreseen as a remote, general possibility but not with
specificity or as likely. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) cmt. b.
More generally, it makes relevant the reasons why a modification was sought or conceded.
The "rescission theory" exception makes the intent of the parties at the time of
modification highly relevant. Claims about what the parties to a contract anticipated or
intended or claims about the reasons why they sought or agreed to a modification,
however, are, at bottom, every bit as subjective and every bit as subject to conflicting
testimony as the claims about mutual benefit Professor Muris seeks to avoid submitting
to a trier of fact. Cf Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 689-92 (arguing that the
factors relevant to a direct assessment of the presence or absence of duress must be
considered in applying the qualified version of the pre-existing duty rule).
Second, Professor Muris' argument understates the extent to which the objectively
verifiable evidence of which he approves would be relevant to a direct assessment of
opportunism or coercion by a trier of fact. All of the "objective" evidence he speci-
fies-the presence of documents corroborating the ability of the party seeking modification
to perform without it, a protest by one party to the modification, the deteriorating
financial condition of one party, the presence of demonstrable obstacles to performance,
the existence of cheaper alternatives to modification-has some bearing on a direct
assessment of the question whether a particular modification is extorted or opportunistic.
In short, whether the evils modification law is supposed to deter are assessed directly,
through doctrines of duress, good faith, and the like, or indirectly, through the pre-existing
duty rule coupled with its exceptions, the domain of potentially relevant evidence will
include some "subjective" and some "objective" matters. There is no way of predicting
or demonstrating in the abstract which method of assessment will include more subjective
judgments or require more credibility determinations. Moreover, the examination of
actual cases applying the pre-existing duty rule suggests that the results produced by the
rule and its exceptions are usually unpredictable and frequently wrong in substance. This,
in turn, suggests that direct assessment of opportunism or extortion would be superior.
226. For purposes of analysis, I include in this category not only simple at-will
employment, but also more sophisticated agency, brokerage, distributorship, and similar
arrangements.
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bargaining power to force a unilateral reduction in compensation or
benefits upon a hapless employee. While the melodramatic imaginary
case is comparatively rare,227 there are nevertheless a few examples
of attempts by one party to a services contract to extract a unilateral
reduction of compensation or benefits from the other.2  Such
attempts have generally failed, in part because of applications of the
pre-existing duty rule. 9 However, in the reported examples of such
cases within the relevant time period, the pre-existing duty rule has
not operated alone. In each case a further ground of decision
supports the result dictated by the pre-existing duty rule. In the
recent cases the additional ground has generally been one of the
assent doctrines.2' °  This is somewhat curious, in part because
unilateral reductions of compensation almost cry out for an examina-
tion of the possibility of coercion, and policing for coercion more
naturally falls within the province of the defense of duress rather than
the requirements of mutual assent. Moreover, in some of the cases,
the party protesting the unilateral reduction continued in the business
relationship even after the reduction was imposed or announced,231
227. Ebling v. Gove's Cove, Inc., 663 P.2d 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) approaches the
imaginary case.
228. Medicare Glaser Corp. v. Guardian Photo, Inc.,- 936 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1991)
(involving unilateral suspension of advertising allowance by provider of photofinishing
services to chain of drug stores); Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 v. Weatherall
Concrete, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. W. Va. 1979) (involving erroneous billing and
payment of lower health and pension fund payments than required by collective bargaining
agreement); In re Estate of Johnson, 566 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (involving
alleged "nullification" of contingency fee agreement); Guild Management Co. v.
Oxenhandler, 541 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (involving alleged waiver of brokerage
fee); Ebling v. Gove's Cove, Inc., 663 P.2d 132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (involving alleged
agreement to reduce salesman's commission).
229. See infra note 230.
230. See, e.g., Medicare Glaser Corp. v. Guardian Photo, Inc., 936 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that an alleged waiver of advertising allowance was unsupported by
consideration and that the party resisting modification never expressly agreed to it);
Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 v. Weatherall Concrete, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1167
(S.D. W. Va. 1979) (holding that alleged accord and satisfaction of health and pension
fund contributions failed for lack of consideration and failure to show new agreement); In
re Estate of Johnson, 566 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (alleged modification of
contingency fee arrangement failed for lack of consideration and failure to reach
agreement); Guild Management Co. v. Oxenhandler, 541 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that alleged waiver of brokerage fee failed for lack of mutual assent; trial court
had rested its decision on lack of consideration); Ebling v. Gove's Cove, Inc., 663 P.2d 132
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that there was no mutual agreement to, or consideration
for, commission reduction).
231. See Guardian, 936 F.2d at 1018, 1020; Guild, 541 S.W.2d at 688-92.
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which might have enabled a court desiring to enforce the modification
at issue to conclude that assent had been manifested by conduct. The
fact that courts do not draw that conclusion where there is any
evidence of protest indicates that the distinction between coerced
assent and failure of assent is occasionally somewhat blurred 2 and
that assent doctrines are sufficiently malleable to assist the vitiating
defenses of bad faith or duress in the task of policing for coercion.
If the scope of examination is expanded to include other forms
of service contract modification, a pattern very similar to that found
in the construction cases emerges. In the majority of cases in which
the pre-existing duty rule is applied, there are alternate grounds for
invalidation of the purported modifications at issue, whether those
grounds are actually used by the courts or simply suggested by the
facts33 In such cases the dispositions dictated by the pre-existing
232. See, e.g., Guild, 541 S.W.2d at 691-92 (finding an absence of agreement as to
modification but characterizing proposal of modification as a "Hobson's choice," thus
suggesting agreement was made under duress).
233. See Metro Communications Co. v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 984
F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that alleged modification of agency contract failed for
lack of mutual assent and lack of consideration); Hensley v. E.R. Carpenter Co., 633 F.2d
1106 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that alleged promise of bonus failed under pre-existing duty
rule; facts suggest that communication in question did not amount to promise of bonus);
Greenamyer Eng'g & Technology, Inc. v. Mediscan Research, Ltd. (In re Mediscan
Research, Ltd.), 109 B.R. 392 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (invalidating amendment to
agreement and note increasing compensation for research and development project for
lack of consideration, impossibility, and common law fraud), affd, 940 F.2d 558 (9th Cir,
1991); Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989) (involving an attempt by
employer to effect change in terms of employment by unilateral handbook change;
summary judgment denied on issues of new consideration and assent to change);
Forstmann v. Culp, 648 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that alleged agreement
to hire as manager and grant 'equity share in company to be acquired failed for
indefiniteness and violation of pre-existing duty rule); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986) (holding that alleged
implied promise to employ until age 65 failed to reflect intention to effect novation,
violated parol evidence rule, and lacked new consideration; employer's alleged assurances
also ambiguous); Tierney v. Capricorn Investors, L.P., 592 N.Y.S.2d 700 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that alleged oral promise to increase investment banker's compensation lacked
consideration and contradicted Written employment agreement's integration clause and
clause requiring writing for modification); Software Clearing House, Inc. v. Intrak, Inc., 583
N.E.2d 1056 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that promise to make additional payments
under marketing agreement lacked new consideration; facts suggest that promise should
have been interpreted narrowly so that promise had been performed); Price v. Mercury
Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that alleged promises to
employ vice president for the rest of his life were mere statements of encouragement and
approval, not promises; only consideration asserted was past services). There are also a
couple of cases in which the consideration doctrine may have been used in lieu of a more
direct appeal to public policy. See Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 846 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir.
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duty rule and the alternate grounds do not appear to be particularly
troublesome. There is, however, a smaller class of service contract
cases in which the pre-existing duty rule does seem to do some harm.
There is the occasional case in which a court refuses to enforce a
promise to pay an employee a bonus on the grounds that the promise
was given subsequent to the services that motivated it-services that
the employee was already under a duty to perform'" In such cases
the pre-existing duty rule overlaps with another corollary to the
doctrine of consideration-the rule that past consideration is no
consideration. I have argued elsewhere that such bonus promises
should be enforced. 5 There is also an occasional case in which the
pre-existing duty rule invalidates a promise that seems to fit the
model of a one-sided adjustment justifiable on "relational"
grounds.36 Finally, and somewhat ironically, one occasionally finds
1988) (holding that employee's pre-polygraph release of claim for negligent administration
of polygraph examination lacked consideration and did not qualify as civil law gratuitous
remission); Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert, 160 Cal. App. 3d 123, 207 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1984) (reversing grant of injunction against performer enforcing exclusive services
provision of contract; lack of consideration used as subsidiary finding in application of
statute imposing minimum compensation requirement for injunction).
234. See Spickelmier Indus. v. Passander, 359 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
235. See Wessman, supra note 2, at 103-05, 105 nA03.
236. See Gary Safe Co. v. A.C. Andrews Co., 568 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Gary Safe Company manufactured safes used by businesses of various kinds. Id at 167.
For several years Gary Safe sold safes to Andrews and Andrews resold them at retail,
although there was no formal agreement making Andrews an official distributor or dealer
for Gary Safe. Il Andrews sold some of the safes to its own customer, Southland
Corporation, which operated a chain of convenience stores. Id. After approximately a
decade of this three-tiered business relationship, Gary Safe began selling safes directly to
Southland, bypassing Andrews. Id. When Andrews protested the direct sales to a
business that Andrews regarded as its own customer, Gary Safe agreed to pay Andrews
a commission, even on sales made directly from Gary Safe to Southland. Id While it is
not clear whether this agreement should have been considered the formation of a new
contract, as the court seemed to regard it, or as the modification of an ongoing business
arrangement, the court ultimately held the promise to pay a commission unenforceable for
lack of consideration. AL at 168. The appellate court was also troubled by the trial court's
conclusion that Andrews had tacitly agreed not to interfere with Gary Safe's direct
sales-an arrangement the appellate court thought might violate state antitrust laws. Id.
Presumably, the court suspected that Gary Safe and Andrews were engaged in market
allocation. If so, that suspicion might have been a reason not to enforce the commission
arrangement, had the court examined the issue directly. If the arrangement was not a
form of market allocation, however, then, considered solely as a matter of contract law,
it would seem reasonable to enforce the commission arrangement. The promise to pay a
commission was an attempt to save an ongoing business relationship between Andrews and
Gary Safe, presumably in order to facilitate further exchanges between them. Obviously,
Gary Safe stood to gain if Andrews continued to- buy safes and sell them, to customers
other than Southland, and that outcome, presumably, is what the commission arrangement
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a service contract case in which the pre-existing duty rule is twisted
into an instrument for the covert examination of the substantive
fairness of a modification."
Gross v. Diehl Specialties International, Inc."3 was such a case.
Mr. Gross was a managerial and technical employee of the defendant
corporation under a fifteen-year employment contract z3 9  His
compensation package included a salary, profit sharing, and a royalty
for the use of his inventions, ownership of which reverted to Gross
when the agreement terminated.' The company prospered for
about five years, and the owner, whose health was failing, was able to
sell the company for $3 million. 4' The new owner demanded, as a
condition of paying so high a price, that Gross and the company enter
into a new contract. 42 Gross complied, and the new contract
contained only changes unfavorable to Gross, including a reduction
of his royalties, additions to his duties, and the loss of residual rights
in his own inventions.243 The company's performance declined over
the next two years, and. Gross was terminated.2' 4 In Gross's subse-
quent suit, it was necessary to determine whether the operative
contract was the original employment agreement or the subsequent
was designed to encourage. Though technically lacking in consideration, this type of
promise is so similar to a conventional bargain that it has a very similar claim to
enforcement. The only real problem with the promise should have been the failure to
specify a duration for the commission arrangement, but this omission should only create
a problem of interpretation, not of enforceability.
237. In addition to Gross v. Diehl Specialties Int'l, 776 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989),
discussed infra notes 238-50 and accompanying text, Medicare Glaser Corp. v. Guardian
Photo, Inc., 936 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1991) appears to be a case of this type. As indicated
supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text, the modification at issue in Medicare was a
unilaterally imposed reduction in the compensation due to one party. Medicare, 936 F.2d
at 1016. The party imposing the modification, however, was sufficiently clever that it
agreed to pay a portion of the originally agreed compensation earlier than contemplated
by the original agreement. Id Technically, of course, this is one of the classic ways in
which the peppercorn theory of 'consideration may be used to circumvent the pre-existing
duty-rule. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.20. The Guardian court, however, found that
the modification lacked consideration, presumably because the modification was patently
unfair. Guardian, 936 F.2d at 1020. However, because the court also found that the
disadvantaged party had never expressly agreed to the modification, the discussion of
consideration is technically redundant. Id.
238. 776 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
239. Id. at 881.
240. Id.
241. Id
242. Id
243. Id.
244. Id. at 881-82.
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agreement executed at the time of the sale of the company.24 The
appellate court ultimately decided that the original agreement was
operative because the subsequent modifying agreement lacked fresh
consideration.2'
If the disposition of the case appears appealing, it is probably
because the reader assumes, although the court did not find, that the
new owners extorted the modification from Gross in some manner
amounting to economic duress or, at least, exercised the bargaining
power available to a prospective purchaser in order to cut an
unconscionable deal. There is, however, the somewhat more
disquieting possibility that the modification derailed in the case was
a genuine bargain. Indeed, as a mere technical matter, the case is an
incorrect application of the doctrine of consideration. If Gross
entered into a modification of his employment agreement in order to
induce the new owner to enter into the purchase of the business, the
purchase is technically consideration for the modification whether
Gross, or the former owner, received any separate economic benefit
from the modification or not.247 However, quite beyond the mere
technical requirements of consideration, it appears that the new owner
increased the price of the business to reflect the reduction in Gross's
rights.2' The fact that the increased price was an economic benefit
to the former owner rather than Gross does not make it any less a
true economic concession. If the modification was not extorted-it
for example, it was motivated by Gross's desire to provide a nest egg
for a retiring friend in poor health or fear that the declining friend
would "run the business into the ground"-it was as much a bargain
as the purchase of the business itself. In short, absent duress or
unconscionability, the modification should have been enforced, and
the court's failure .to do so suggests that its real concern was the
perceived unfairness of the modification to Gross.
A defender of the pre-existing duty rule might respond with a
simple assertion that any rule can be misapplied, and that judicial
misuse of a rule says more about the judge than the rule. Indeed, this
assertion may often be true. However, Gross illustrates Llewellyn's
245. I& at 883.
246. Id. at 883-84.
247. Under the conventional bargain theory of consideration, the payment of the
purchase price could be consideration for any number of counterpromises or concessions
by Gross and the original owner. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71(3),
80.
248. See Gross, 776 S.W.2d at 881, 884.
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observations concerning the covert use of the doctrine of consider-
ation in order to police for substantive transactional fairness.249
After Gross it is difficult to predict how the pre-existing duty rule will
operate. If that is the case, moreover, the traditional channeling
function purportedly served by the doctrine of consideration is in
jeopardy. Suppose, for example, that the owners of a large but
financially troubled company wish to sell it to a "turnaround artist,"
but the latter insists on salary reductions for incumbent managerial
employees as a condition of sale. If the alternative is bankruptcy for
the company, the managers may very well be prepared to agree, and
they clearly will receive a real benefit if the company continues in
operation. How is this genuine bargain to be implemented? After
Gross the parties' goals can no longer be accomplished by reciting, or
even paying, a peppercorn's worth of consideration to the managers,
for Gross implicitly rejects the peppercorn theory. It is doubtful that
reciting that the reduction is a condition of the sale will help, for
Gross seems to require that the managers actually be enriched by the
sale if the modification is to survive.' With sufficient creativity,
the parties might be able to devise satisfactory documentation, but,
after Gross, it is difficult to imagine anyone giving a legal opinion that
the documents are enforceable according to their terms. It would
seem that the use of the pre-existing duty rule as a device for policing
the substantive fairness of a modification threatens the channeling
function that the notion of consideration supposedly serves. In turn,
249. See Llewellyn, Reform, supra note 48, at 865-66 (arguing that the use of
consideration to police for fairness upsets transactions randomly and unpredictably); see
also Wessman, supra note 2, at 92-93 (asserting that the use of consideration "to police for
fairness ... contains a ... built-in form of incoherence").
250. This statement illustrates what is perhaps the most confusing aspect of Gross. The
court first assumed that the buyer of the company "insisted" on the new contract with
Gross before the sale of the company, suggesting that it was part of the initial bargain.
Gross, 776 S.W.2d at 881. The court assumed throughout that the purchase price was
inflated to reflect the reduction of benefits to Gross. Id. Yet, at the end of the court's
opinion, it suggested there was no evidence that the modification of the Gross contract was
a potential deal breaker as far as the purchasers were concerned, in the sense that they
would have refused to proceed without it. Id. at 884. The doctrine of consideration, of
course, has never required that the consideration furnished by one party be the sole, or
even the strongest, motivation for the performance or promise of the other. See DAWSON,
supra note 37, at 204-05. The court then minimized the significance of the inflation of the
purchase price to reflect Gross's concession with the observation that the former owner's
windfall could not be a benefit to Gross. Gross, 776 S.W.2d at 884. As noted earlier,
however, a benefit to a third party is traditionally perfectly adequate consideration. See
supra part III.B. The implication of the court's view is that a successful modification
requires quantifiable enrichment on both sides of the modification.
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this possibility provides some reason to leave the policing function to
doctrines like duress and unconscionability.
3. Lending and credit relationships
Commercial loans and other types of credit extension often
contemplate or result in long-term contractual relationships, and
familiar fluctuations in business cycles create pressures toward
adjustments in such relationships. Some of these adjustments are one-
sided, and, as a result, cases involving a variety of long-term credit
relationships also form a significant subset of the pre-existing duty
rule cases. As in the context of service contracts, the context of the
lender-borrower relationship suggests a stereotypical case in which a
ruthless lender agrees to one set of loan terms at the inception of the
borrower's project and then, when the borrower is financially
dependent and in the midst of the financed business project, the
lender extracts a much more favorable set of terms. The stereotypical
case occasionally occurs, and the pre-existing duty rule invalidates the
coerced modification." It is difficult to see, however, why the
defense of economic duress could not be used to dispose of such cases
equally well. More broadly, in the context of lending and other credit
relationships, the cases exhibit the same pattern that was observed in
other subclasses of the pre-existing duty rule cases. In the majority
of cases, applications of the pre-existing duty rule occur in factual
circumstances that would justify applications of alternative doctrines
leading to the same results. 2 Most such cases are of little interest
251. See, e.g., K-Line Builders, Inc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 677 P.2d 1317
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In K-Line a lender made a commitment to a builder of duplexes
to supply permanent financing on specified terms. Id. at 1319. After the builder had
commenced construction on four units, incurred $660,000 in debt, and pre-sold 11 of 12
units, the lender reneged on the original commitment and agreed to provide financing only
on terms substantially less favorable to potential borrowers. lI& The court rejected the
lender's contention that the second agreement was an accord and satisfaction of the
original commitment, relying on the pre-existing duty rule. Id. at 1321.
252. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Waldron, 630 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding
that an alleged release of guarantors by renewal note failed for lack of consideration and
failure to meet writing requirement imposed by statute); Doyle v. Northrop Corp., 455 F.
Supp. 1318 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that alleged agreement to forbear foreclosure failed for
lack of fresh consideration, mutual assent, absence of authority, indefiniteness, vagueness,
and violation of the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds); Massey-Ferguson Credit
Corp. v. Peterson, 626 P.2d 767 (Idaho 1980) (finding insufficient evidence to support trial
court's conclusion that lender agreed to delay repossession and permit debtor's continued
use of collateral; any such promise also would have lacked consideration); Thornton v.
Ankeny State Bank, 453 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that cosigner's
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except as further illustrations of the redundancy of consideration
doctrine.
One group of cases in which the pre-existing duty rule is similarly
redundant is of somewhat greater interest. There are several lending
cases in which the borrower asserts, and the lender denies, that some
partial adjustment in the ongoing contractual relationship was actually
a permanent or total readjustment, usually characterized as a novation
or accord and satisfaction of the original contract. 3 If the adjust-
execution of substitute note for debt from which he had been discharged lacked valid
consideration; facts suggest fraud or mistake defenses); Windorf v. Ferris, 397 N.W.2d 268
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that alleged modification to land contract violated statute
of frauds and failed for lack of consideration and mutual assent); McGee v. Clark, 343 So.
2d 486 (Miss. 1977) (holding that alleged modification terminating real estate option was
void on grounds of lack of fresh consideration, mistake, and misrepresentation); Schwonke
v. Banister, 443 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 1981) (holding mortgagee's alleged oral promise
to permit mortgagor to delay payment of taxes unenforceable on grounds of pre-existing
duty rule and statute of frauds); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hyer, 413' N.Y.S.2d 939
(App. Div. 1979) (holding that alleged agreement to repayment schedule on overdue note
failed for lack of consideration and failure to satisfy writing requirement; facts suggest
scope of any agreement only covered payments already accepted); Mozingo v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 229 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (reversing summary judgment in
favor of lender on substitute notes, finding material issues of fact as to issues of
consideration and oral qualifications on notes); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Reggie,
546 A.2d 62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reversing summary judgment of foreclosure in favor of
mortgagee; lender's actions in obtaining mortgage securing debt that had already been
discharged left material issues of fact regarding defenses of lack of consideration, fraud,
and misrepresentation); Marcotte v. Harrison, 443 A.2d 1225 (R.I. 1982) (holding alleged
promise to cancel note unsupported by consideration; facts suggest possibility of undue
influence, and trial court finds no credible evidence promise was made); Garrett v.
Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990) (holding that personal property secured
lender's alleged promise to buy out real estate mortgagee's interest, redeem ranch, and
lease ranch to debtor failed for lack of consideration, indefiniteness, and failure to reach
complete agreement); see also South Am. Shoe Corp. v. Kurtz (In re Silberman, Inc.), 30
B.R. 219 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that alleged modification to workout agreement
by which receivers promised not to close stores was not supported by consideration; in
addition, receivers did not materially breach promise); United States Home Acceptance
Corp. v. Kelly Park Hills, Inc., 542 So. 2d 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, due
to lack of consideration, installment payment arrangement did not constitute novation
discharging guarantors; in addition, guarantors had agreed in advance to permit lender to
change time of payment); Sens v. Decatur Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 285 S.E,2d 226 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that agreement between lender and borrower delaying payment
did not amount to novation discharging guarantor as there was no consideration for
moratorium on collection; lender, however, had in fact permitted delayed payment); cf.
Mundy v. Arcuri, 267 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1980) (finding no evidence of consideration for
modification but affirming finding of waiver to produce disposition functionally identical
to modification theory).
253. See Miami Nat'l Bank v. Forecast Constr. Corp., 366 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (involving alleged novation and discharge of guarantors by virtue of prepaid
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ment consists of the borrower's taking or permitting some action that
he was under a contractual duty to take or permit, then the pre-
existing duty rule invalidates the alleged novation, accord and
satisfaction, or permanent modificationl If the proponents of the
doctrine of consideration were correct in what is asserted to be one
of its virtues, this is the type of case in which one would expect the
pre-existing duty rule to operate as the sole ground of decision.
Claims of novation or accord and satisfaction raise an issue as to
whether the parties to a contract intended by certain actions to
extinguish or satisfy their original obligations. Such issues of intent
are arguably more fact-intensive and less appropriate for disposition
as a matter of law than the issue of consideration. If so, one would
expect courts applying the pre-existing duty rule in order to invalidate
an alleged novation or accord and satisfaction simply to sidestep the
issues regarding the parties' intentions. Such issue avoidance,
however, is not characteristic of the cases now under examination.
More often, the courts applying the pre-existing duty rule also address
the issue of the parties' intention to extinguish their original obliga-
tions, sometimes through an express holding that the evidence of such
an intention is insufficient or, failing that, through some express
discussion of the issue. 5 The fact that the courts usually address
principal reduction and agreement to pay installments); Walsey v. Alterman Foods, Inc.,
231 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (involving alleged accord and satisfaction by substitution
of note for open account indebtedness); Sperry v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 799 S.W.2d
871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (involving alleged agreement to limit scope of repossession); Pink
v. Busch, 691 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1984) (involving an alleged release of original guarantors by
addition of new guarantors incident to sale of business); PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v.
Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (involving alleged accord and satisfaction of
judicial lien on piece of real estate by deed in lieu of foreclosure on another piece of real
estate); Greenwood Assocs. v. Crestar Bank, 448 S.E.2d 399 (Va. 1994) (involving an
alleged agreement by debtor to forbear other options in return for lender's assurance it
would not "double profit" from foreclosure sale).
254. See Miami Nat'l Bank, 366 So. 2d at 1204; Walsey, 231 S.E.2d at 5; Sperry, 799
S.W.2d at 877.
255. See, e.g., Miami Nat'l Bank v. Forecast Constr. Corp., 366 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding there was insufficient evidence for jury to find intention to
extinguish original indebtedness); Walsey v. Alterman Foods, Inc., 231 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1976) (finding no clearly expressed agreement to extinguish open account
indebtedness); Pink v. Busch, 691 P.2d 456 (Nev. 1984) (discussing conversations pertaining
to alleged release of guarantors); PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Balsamo, 634 A.2d 645 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (holding evidence established clear intention of the parties that deed in
lieu of foreclosure would affect judicial lien on only one parcel of real estate); Cf. Sperry
v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 799 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing conver-
sations' concerning alleged modification of security agreement provisions regarding
permissible scope of repossession). But see American Nat'l Bank v. Warner, 468 N.E.2d
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the issue of the parties' intentions directly thus undermines the
contention of the proponents of the doctrine of consideration that its
relatively greater amenability to summary disposition is a source of
savings in the time and expense of judicial administration. 2 6
Quite apart from cases in which the pre-existing duty rule is
redundant, however, there is a subclass of lending cases in which its
application is troublesome. First, there are cases of apparent
misapplication of the pre-existing duty rule to real bargains, trouble-
some not only because bargains generally should be enforced but
because such misapplications illustrate the complexity of the doctrine
of consideration and its consequent reduction of the predictability of
judicial decisions.' Second, there is at least one case in the
relevant time period in which a court appears to have made dubious
use of the pre-existing duty rule as a tool with which to nullify a jury
verdict based on evidence that was not credible. 8 While it is no
184 (III. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that an alleged release of the comaker of note by
acceptance of renewal notes and guaranty was unsupported by consideration and that the
bank's intention was irrelevant); Greenwood Assocs. v. Crestar Bank, 448 S.E.2d 399 (Va.
1994) (sustaining demurrer on theory of lack of consideration, avoiding decision on issues
of indefiniteness and statute of frauds). The Warner court's discussion of the consideration
issue, however, is sufficiently convoluted and confusing that it hardly represents any
advance over a direct assessment of the evidence concerning the parties' intent to effect
a release.
256. For a more abstract argument addressed to the same contention, see Wessman,
supra note 2, at 81.
257. See In re Bennett, 154 B.R. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding second priority lender's
agreement to release subordinate lien on land in order to permit sale of land and
retirement of debt to first priority lender, with consequent improvement in position of
second priority lender's position as to remaining assets, lacked consideration); Life Say.
& Loan Ass'n of America v. Palos Bank & Trust Co., 508 N.E.2d 262 (I11. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that substitution of new lead bank's obligations to secondary lender for original
lead bank's obligations was gratuitous); see also Greenwood Assocs. v. Crestar Bank, 448
S.E.2d 399 (Va. 1994) (involving alleged agreement by lender not to "double profit" from
foreclosure sale if borrower refrained from seeking other bidders, seeking injunction, or
filing bankruptcy; agreement lacked consideration due to insufficiently explicit agreement
to forbear).
258. The case in question is Brand S Corp. v. King, 639 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1981), and its
facts are quite peculiar. Brand S planned to build a sawmill and contracted with the King
family for a supply of logs. Id. at 430. The contract was a buyer financing arrangement
under which Brand S advanced $140,000 to the Kings. Id. The Kings were to repay the
advance in the form of logs credited at a specified rate or, at the option of Brand S, out
of the proceeds of the sales of logs to others. IM When the lumber market collapsed,
Brand S decided not to build the sawmill. IM. In addition, the Kings alleged, and Brand
S denied, that an agent of Brand S told them to "save themselves from bankruptcy" and
forget about the $140,000 loan. Id. When Brand S sued for repayment, the Kings
obtained a jury verdict that nothing was due. Id. The verdict clearly indicated that the
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secret that juries make mistakes, judicial use of consideration doctrine
as a method of evading the usual restrictions on the review of a jury's
credibility determinations should cause some intellectual discomfort
as long as society remains committed to the use of juries in commer-
cial cases.
Finally, in the lending context, as in others, one occasionally
encounters a case in which the pre-existing duty rule appears to have
been used quite cynically. Walker v. Associates Commercial Corp. 29
is an interesting example. Walker, a Tennessee trucker, financed the
purchase of a new truck by means of a conditional sale contract held
by Associates. 21 When the truck broke down in Kansas, Walker
missed one of his monthly installment payments.?s' To make
matters worse, the repair charges exceeded Walker's warranty
coverage by $1500, and the repair facility presumably acquired a lien
on the truck for the unpaid charges.262 Walker alleged, and the jury
apparently believed, that he agreed to borrow money from friends
and relatives in order to pay the repair charges and obtain release of
the truck in return for Associates' agreement to extend the time for
payment of the past due installment.2 Walker did as he promised,
but Associates repossessed and sold the truck just as Walker was
about to put the truck in service for a new company.264 Walker's
action for breach of the extension agreement was successful at the
trial level, but an appellate court ultimately held the extension
agreement unenforceable because Walker had a pre-existing duty
jury believed the Kings' version of the relevant conversation. See id. The appellate court
held that the alleged modification of the original repayment obligation lacked consider-
ation and that Brand S was entitled to judgment on its loan agreement. Id. at 431-32.
It is, of course, just barely possible that the promise to forgive the loan was made.
Certainly, if it was made, a relational contract theorist, and perhaps even Corbin, would
regard it as worthy of enforcement. In a time of economic crisis in a particular industry,
a promise made to facilitate survival of a future trading partner in the hope of future
beneficial exchanges is sufficiently similar to a conventional bargain to trigger similar
reasons for enforcement. It may even qualify as one of Corbin's "bargains in fact." See
CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.2. However, I am certainly skeptical enough to doubt that the
words "forget about the $140,000 you owe me" spring lightly from the lips of the average
businessperson, and it is tempting to explain the case by assuming that the appellate court
simply used whatever tool it could find to nullify what it regarded as a silly verdict by a
gullible jury.
259. 673 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
260. Id. at 519.
261. Id
262. Id
263. Id.
264. Id
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under the conditional sale contract to keep the truck free of all rival
liens. The modification granting an extension thus failed for lack
of consideration. 26
The case is extremely difficult to justify, as it seems clear that, if
one disregards the technical requirements of the doctrine of consider-
ation, the extension agreement was not only a "bargain in fact," but
a reasonable one. Quite apart from the physical journey to Kansas,
Walker took the extraordinary step of borrowing from family and
friends to pay his repair bill. It is doubtful that he would have done
so in the absence of an extension and equally doubtful that Associates
could have forced him to such lengths under the conditional sale
agreement's provision concerning rival encumbrances. Associates, on
the other hand, rid itself of a rival creditor with a lien that, in all
probability, would have been superior to its own267 and, in addition,
effectively enlisted Walker's unwitting aid in its own collection
activity. The lender's inducement of full-or perhaps extraordi-
nary-performance by agreeing to, and then contesting, a modification
seems to be a clear instance of creditor opportunism in the form of
"self-help specific performance."26  If one assumes that most
lending is done by professional repetitive participants in the market,
most of whom have access to legal expertise, one would expect similar
examples of the opportunistic use of the pre-existing duty rule to
occur in the future.269
265. Id at 518, 520-21.
266. Id at 521.
267. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (1994).
268. See Narasimhan, supra note 180, at 62.
269. Of course, such opportunistic use of the pre-existing duty rule is not confined to
lenders. See, e.g., McCrackin v. Clay, 261 S.E,2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). In MeCrackin
the vendors under a land sale contract hesitated to close the transaction out of fear that
monthly social security supplemental income checks that they received would terminate
if the sale were consummated. Id. at 472. The purchaser and her attorney persuaded the
vendors to close by signing a written collateral agreement in which they promised to
continue such payments to the vendors for life in the event the government terminated
them. Id. Ultimately, the purchaser and her attorney successfully contested the
modification on the grounds that the vendors had a pre-existing duty to close the
transaction and so supplied no consideration for the collateral agreement. Id. Over
dissent the court also refused to entertain the facially plausible claim that the attorney
committed promissory fraud by preparing and executing a contract he knew to be
unenforceable. Id. at 473 (Birdsong, J., dissenting). While it is not clear whether the
vendors' concerns over their benefit checks would have provided sufficient ammunition
for a defense of mistake to the original land sale contract or prompted a discretionary
refusal of specific performance, certainly those concerns provided a very practical and
facially appealing reason to seek renegotiation of the agreement. The purchaser was able
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4. The residue
The foregoing three categories of cases together account for the
vast majority of instances in which the pre-existing duty rule is used
to.invalidate the modification of an ongoing contract. The remaining
cases form an odd assortment that collectively coform to the pattern
established with respect to the primary categories of pre-existing duty
rule cases. In the vast majority of these residual cases, the pre-
existing duty rule is used in tandem with, or under factual circum-
stances that suggest, some alternate, independent ground for the
disposition of the case .21 The cases in which the pre-existing duty
to avoid the renegotiation, as well as any mistake defense and the burden of establishing
entitlement to specific performance, by what appears to be a very cynical use of the pre-
existing duty rule.
270. See Fischer v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 774 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (finding
summary judgment inappropriate as to effectiveness of releases; material issues remain as
to inconsistency with public policy, mistake, and consideration for and scope of alleged
waiver of releases); Thrash v. Deason, 435 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1983) (finding summary
judgment inappropriate on issue of consideration for alleged release of one obligor on note
and agreement to look to second obligor for payment; concurring opinion expresses doubt
that relevant communications amounted to release); In re Estate of Mariotte, 619 P.2d
1068 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding agreement to retroactive increase in compensation for
care of infirm friend lacked new consideration; facts suggest undue influence); Sterling v.
Sterling, 621 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that alleged novation reducing
contractual alimony failed for lack of consideration and insufficient evidence of intention
to accept reduced payments except on temporary basis); Sorrells v. Bailey Cattle Co., 595
S.W.2d 950 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that second writing modifying land sale contract
lacked new consideration and failed for lack of definiteness, violation of the statute of
frauds, and material breach by one party); Pino v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 535
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that alleged accord and satisfaction of insurance
company's obligations failed for lack of offer, acceptance, and consideration); Recker v.
Gustafson, 279 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1979) (holding that modification to land sale contract
failed for lack of consideration; facts suggest modification extorted by threat of baseless
litigation); Ponze v. Guirl, 794 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that alleged
novation converting investment to loan failed for lack of consideration as well as
indefiniteness and failure of certain communications to amount to a, promise); Sims v.
Craig, 627 P.2d 875 (N.M. 1981) (holding that alleged novation of real estate option lacked
consideration; facts suggest economic duress, and court expressly adopts negligent
misrepresentation theory); Jole v. Bredbenner, 768 P.2d 433 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that alleged agreement to forbear collection of back rent in return for repayment schedule
on arrearages violated pre-existing duty rule; letter agreement setting out schedule
contained no express promise to forbear); Guenther v. Fariss, 833 P.2d 417 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that release of claim against insolvent estate was insufficient
consideration for modification of limited partnership agreement changing profit allocation;
facts suggest court could have interpreted agreement so that condition terminating
reallocation was satisfied); Barnett v. Buchan Baking Co., 724 P.2d 1077 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that alleged modification of option failed for lack of new consideration;
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rule is harmless but unnecessary are accompanied by a much smaller
group of cases in which the application of the rule is more disturbing,
either because it is used to invalidate desirable modifications27 or
because it appears to be used as an indirect and imprecise way of
addressing some legal issue other than consideration.'
critical party also failed to assent to modification), affd, 738 P.2d 1056 (Wash. 1987); see
also Vergne Roig v. Corporacion Desarrollo Comercial (In re GEM de Puerto Rico, Inc.),
79 B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987) (holding that termination of lease to bankrupt
corporation and re-leasing to another company lacked consideration; transaction also
occurred without court approval in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 363, and facts suggest it was
a fraudulent conveyance), appeal dismissed, 860 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1988); Hassett v. Far
W. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.), 40 B.R. 380 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)
(using lack of consideration for modifications to computer lease agreement as a subsidiary
finding for avoidance of transfers in violation of various provisions of Bankruptcy Code),
affid, 44 B.R. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
271. See Beall v. Beall, 434 A.2d 1015 (Md. 1981). In Beall the court invalidated a
written extension of a conventional real estate option on the grounds that the extension
itself was unsupported by new consideration. Id. at 1021. If, as I have argued supra notes
33-88 and accompanying text, there is little reason to impose a requirement of consider-
ation for an initial grant of an option, it is difficult to see why an extension of an option
should be subjected to such a requirement. Moreover, the fact that the extension was
written and literally appended to the original option should have satisfied whatever
cautionary, evidentiary, and channeling functions a requirement of consideration is
supposed to serve.
272. See Penn Compression Moulding, Inc. v. Mar-Bal, Inc., 326 S.E.2d 280 (N.C. Ct.
App.), affd, 334 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1985). This case involved two "friendly competitors"
in the insulator business. Id. at 281. Penn Compression competed with Mar-Bal in sorte
product lines, but Penn also purchased from Mar-Bal some products Penn did not produce
itself. Id On one occasion Penn asked Mar-Bal to fill an order for one of Penn's
established customers, and Mar-Bal complied. Id. After Penn had discontinued its own
purchases from Mar-Bal, the same customer cancelled an order it had placed with Penn
and reallocated the business to Mar-Bal. Il Subsequent protests and negotiations
between Penn and Mar-Bal produced an agreement under which Penn committed to pay
its overdue balance with Mar-Bal and Mar-Bal agreed to pay Penn a sales commission on
certain product sales to the customer that Penn had introduced to Mar-Bal. Id. at 281-82.
Because Penn already had a duty to pay its outstanding balance, the commission
arrangement violated the pre-existing duty rule and was ultimately held unenforceable,
1d at 283.
If the disposition of the case has some intuitive appeal, however, it is either because
the arrangement between two competitors may have been a form of market allocation
inconsistent with the policy embodied in antitrust law or because Penn may have used the
threat of nonpayment and/or frivolous litigation to extort the commission agreement. If
so, however, it would have been preferable for the court to address those questions
directly, for, absent extortion or anticompetitive consequences, the commission
arrangement seems reasonable enough. As a matter of contract theory, its enforcement
could be justified either on the theory that the promise to pay a commission was simply
a recognition of the value of past services in introducing Mar-Bal to a new customer or on
the theory that the promise was made to salvage a business relationship between Penn and
Mar-Bal that could have produced further beneficial exchanges.
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In sum, the pre-existing duty rule has little to commend it as a
device for policing modifications of ongoing contractual arrangements.
In the vast majority of the instances of its use for that purpose, it is
simply redundant. In other cases, however, the rule causes the kinds
of harm that its critics attribute to it. In no single transactional
context are the harmful cases particularly numerous, but they recur
consistently in virtually every transactional context and collectively
provide some impetus to abandon the pre-existing duty rule.
E. Compromises, Settlements, and Releases
The use of the various branches of the doctrine of consideration
becomes even more complex when the focus of examination is shifted
from modifications of ongoing contractual arrangements to the
numerous and varied cases in which parties have made some effort to
reach a final adjustment-in the form of a settlement or release-of
their respective obligations. The increased factual complexity is, in
part, a result of the fact that a corollary to the doctrine of consider-
ation may be applied regardless of the temporal point in the history
of the parties' relationship at which a settlement is reached or a
release or discharge is granted. While the words "settlement,"
"compromise," "release," and similar expressions seem most at home
when a dispute has arisen, a default has occurred, or litigation is
already underway, there are nevertheless instances of pre-emptive
attempts to settle potential disputes or absolve potential liability.
Such attempts may occur, for example, at or near the initial stage of
contract formation273 or when liability-generating conduct has oc-
curred but no actual dispute is yet in progress.274
273. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F. Supp.
1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (involving an alleged surrender of claim in return for inclusion in
future transaction); George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D.
Ga. 1982) (involving a release and indemnification clause in work order receipt intended
to be signed before crane services rendered but actually signed after services supplied);
Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass'n, 765 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(involving a release of all liability executed contemporaneously with purchase of tag
entitling purchaser to firefighting services).
274. See Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving a general
release signed shortly after layoff announced); Mcllroy Bank & Trust Co. v. Comstock, 678
S.W.2d 782 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a bank that conditioned payment of certificate
of deposit to one of two joint payees on execution of indemnity agreement covering
possible disputes with the other); Williams v. Winn Dixie, 447 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(involving a shoplifting suspect who signed a release of civil liability during two to three
hour period of detention and interrogation by store manager and security guard).
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Further factual complexity is added by the fact that the doctrine
of consideration may be applied to a purported settlement or release
whether the underlying obligations or liability arise out of a contract
or out of some other source. Indeed, the consideration cases during
the relevant time period include numerous examples of compromises
or releases of contractual obligations2' as well as similar adjust-
ments to forms of legal obligation not based on contract, or, at least,
not exclusively based on contract.
276
275. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F. Supp.
1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (involving an alleged oral contract between a product manufacturer
and the product's exclusive licensing agent regarding the advertising of an unlicensed
product); Matey v. Pruitt, 510 So. 2d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (concerning an alleged
compromise of claims for contributive share of payment of judgment on a promissory
note); Owings v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust, 372 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)
(involving compromise of claims for attorneys fees under judgment on personal guaranty);
Hall v. Bank S., 368 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (concerning an alleged accord and
satisfaction of liability under promissory note and security agreement); Management
Recruiters, Inc. v. J & B Smith Co., 362 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (involving an oral
guarantee given in return for forbearance from suit to recover fees for services rendered
to corporation); Sellers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 338 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(concerning note given as part of settlement of real estate loan); Zagoria v. Dubose
Enters., 296 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (involving an alleged assumption of liability
for partner's dishonored checks), rev'd on other grounds, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983);
Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic, 825 P.2d 1053 (Haw. 1992) (concerning a purported
settlement of claims arising out of employment contract); Palmetto Leasing Co. v. Chiles,
602 N.E.2d 77 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (involving a settlement of claims arising out of
equipment lease); Upper Ave. Nat'l Bank v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 400 N.E.2d 1105
(I11. App. Ct. 1980) (involving a release of claim for air conditioning and heating services
in return for part payment); Burns v. Fernandez, 401 So. 2d 1033 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(concerning a release of insolvent insurance company and insured in return for partial
payment under policy); Passer v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 577 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.
1979) (involving an alleged covenant not to sue on contingency fee agreement); Dickey v.
Thirty-Three Venturers, 550 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (concerning a settlement of
claims arising out of purchase of five banks); Fletcher, Barnhardt & White, Inc. v.
Matthews, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an alleged promise to pay
deficiency in commission draw account upon termination of employment); Zorba's Inn,
Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 377 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (concerning a
promise by insurer to make check for covered loss jointly payable to insured and secured
creditor); Mancino v. Friedman, 429 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (involving a note
given in return for release of mechanics liens arising out of painting services); Di Sante v.
Russ Fin. Co., 380 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (concerning an alleged promise to
refrain from execution on judgment for 45 days in return for partial payment of judgment
on assumpsit and trespass claim); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
602 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1980) (involving a release of claim under fidelity bond upon partial
payment); Boardman v. Dorsett, 685 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (concerning a land
purchaser's withholding of $1000 of purchase price until vendor remedied certain alleged
defects).
276. See, e.g., Bank One v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992) (concerning a release of
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tort claims for lender liability in return for bank's disbursement of funds in frozen account
and agreement to forgo meritless claim for attorneys fees), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331
(1993); Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving a release allegedly
covering claims for age discrimination as well as ordinary claims arising out of employment
termination); Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 562 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Tex. 1983)
(concerning a settlement of claim for personal injuries); George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior
Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (involving a release allegedly covering
negligence liability as well as contract claims); Milwee v. Peachtree Cypress Inv. Co., 510
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (concerning a release of claims arising out of settlement
of estate and merger of two corporations); Smith v. Smith (In re Smith), 81 B.R. 888
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (involving a property settlement agreement in divorce
proceeding); Griffin v. Hardin, 456 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (concerning an
alleged compromise of obligation to pay judgment; nature of claim leading to judgment
unspecified); Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381 (Alaska 1994) (involving alleged accord and
satisfaction of personal injury claim); E.P. Dobson, Inc. v. Richard, 705 S.W.2d 893 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1986) (concerning an alleged compromise of negligence claim); Mcllroy Bank &
Trust Co. v. Comstock, 678 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (involving an indemnification
agreement in return for bank's performance of statutory duty to pay one of two joint
payees of certificate of deposit); Orange County Found. for Preservation of Pub. Property
v. Irvine Co., 139 Cal. App. 3d 195,188 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1983) (involving settlement of land
title dispute); Alhino v. Starr, 112 Cal. App. 3d 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1980) (concerning
alleged waiver of damages for fraud by entry into new agreement after discovery of fraud);
4934, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 605 A.2d 50 (D.C. 1992)
(involving an alleged compromise of personal injury claim); Interdonato v. Interdonato,
521 A.2d 1124 (D.C. 1987) (concerning release of claims for misuse of assets of
testamentary trust); Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (involving
an alleged compromise of personal injury claim); McAdams v. Scullin, 368 N.E.2d 1036 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977) (child support); Dyer v. National By-Products, 380 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1986)
(concerning an alleged promise of lifetime employment in return for release of claim for
personal injuries); Kansas ex rel. Ludwick v. Bryant, 697 P.2d 858 (Kan. 1985) (involving
a personal guarantee of corporate tax liability); Williams v. Winn Dixie, 447 So. 2d 8 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (concerning a release of liability for unlawful detention); Consiglio v.
Missouri Dep't of Social Servs., 863 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (child support);
Arnold v. Krewson, 834 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (child support); Elmore v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (involving an alleged compromise
of personal injury claim); Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass'n, 765 S.W.2d 712
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (concerning a release of both tort and contract liability); Rose v.
Howard, 670 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (involving an agreement concerning division
of estate); Otten v. Otten, 632 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (child support); Kennedy
v. Kennedy, 575 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (child support); Fafoutis v. Lyons, 540
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1989) (concerning an alleged compromise of obligations
determined by informal accounting upon dissolution of partnership); Holt v. Holt, 282
S.E.2d 784 (N.C. 1981) (involving a family settlement agreement regarding division of
estate); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (involving an
alleged accord and satisfaction of claims for fraud and deceptive trade practices arising out
of automobile sale), review denied, 261 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. 1979); Schloss v. McGinness, 474
N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (involving an agreement to share estate); Thibault v.
Cleland, 363 S.E.2d 114 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (concerning an acknowledgment of liability
by insurer for negligence claim against insured); Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady, 779
S.W.2d 893 (rex. Ct. App. 1989) (involving a release of claims against lender covering both
tort and contract claims), rev'd on other grounds, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991); Hamilton
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Finally, the settlement and release cases present an additional
layer of complexity because they implicate more than one branch of
the doctrine of consideration. Some of the cases are simple applica-
tions of the general requirement of bargained exchange to settlement
agreements or releases.2" Others involve applications of the pre-
existing duty rule to one-sided final adjustments to obligations of
various kinds.27 Still others implicate a functionally separate
corollary to the doctrine of consideration-the rule that, although the
adequacy of consideration is normally irrelevant to the enforceability
of a promise, the surrender of a frivolous or absolutely worthless
v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991) (concerning a personal injury claim).
277. See Ziggity Sys., Inc. v. Val Watering Sys., 769 F. Supp. 752, 835-36 (E.D. Pa.
1990); Milwee v. Peachtree Cypress Inv. Co., 510 F. Supp. 279, 283 (E.D. Tenn. 1977);
Smith v. Smith (In re Smith), 81 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988); E.P. Dobson,
Inc. v. Richard, 705 S.W.2d 893 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986); Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949,
950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Management Recruiters, Inc. v. J & B Smith Co., 362
S.E.2d 462,463-64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Sellers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 338 S.E.2d 480,
482-83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Zagoria v. Dubose Enters., 296 S.E.2d 353,358 (Ga. Ct. App,
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983); Palmetto Leasing Co. v. Chiles,
602 N.E.2d 77, 79 (II. App. Ct. 1992); McAdams v. Scullin, 368 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (III,
App. Ct. 1977); Williams v. Winn Dixie, 447 So. 2d 8, 10-11 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Passer
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 577 S.W.2d 639, 648 (Mo. 1979); Consiglio v.
Missouri Dep't of Social Servs., 863 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Elmore v. Wal-
Mart Stores, 812 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Rose v. Howard, 670 S.W.2d 142,
145-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Fletcher, Barnhardt & White, Inc. v. Matthews, Inc., 397
S.E.2d 81, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Zorba's Inn, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 377
S.E.2d 797, 798-99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989): Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc. 259 S.E.2d 1, 5
(N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 261 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. 1979); Thibault v. Cleland, 363 S.E.2d
114, 115 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540,543-44 (W. Va. 1991).
278. See, e.g., Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1992); George
R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985, 992 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Griffin v.
Hardin, 456 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 384
(Alaska 1994); Mcllroy Bank & Trust v. Comstock, 678 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Ark. Ct. App.
1984); Alhino v. Starr, 112 Cal. App. 3d 158, 168, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136, 142 (1980);
Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1134 (D.C. 1987); Owings v. Georgia R.R.
Bank & Trust, 372 S.E.2d 825, 826 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Hall v. Bank S., 368 S.E.2d 810,
811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic, 825 P.2d 1053 (Haw.
1992); Upper Ave. Nat'l Bank v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 400 N.E.2d 1105,1107-08 (III.
App. Ct. 1980); Burns v. Fernandez, 401 So. 2d 1033, 1039 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Weindel
v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass'n, 765 S.W.2d 712,715 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Arnold
v. Krewson, 834 S.W.2d 229,232-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Otten v. Otten, 632 S.W.2d 45,
48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 575 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
Fafoutis v. Lyons, 540 N.Y.S.2d 20,21 (App. Div. 1989); Mancino v. Friedman, 429 N.E.2d
1181, 1185-86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Di Sante v. Russ Fin. Co., 380 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1977); Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 903 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 602 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1980).
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claim is not consideration for a return promise.2 9 The various
guises in which the doctrine of consideration appears in the settlement
context, together with the increased variety in the stage at which it is
applied and the type of obligations compromised or released, make
the settlement and release cases somewhat less manageable than other
subclasses of consideration cases and less amenable to easy generaliza-
tions. Nevertheless, it is possible to make several useful observations.
First, there is the fairly obvious fact that, by the time parties
negotiate a settlement or release, either a dispute is in progress or at
least one party thinks a dispute is likely. The plausible assumption
that parties to a dispute are less likely to contemplate future dealings
than parties to the simple modification of an ongoing contract, leads
one to expect that the reputational concerns that provide some
deterrent to coercive, deceptive, or opportunistic behavior in the
simple modification context" would be less significant in the
settlement context. One would therefore expect to find a number of
settlement or release cases in which the defense of lack of consider-
ation serves as a backup theory for one of the defenses based on
misconduct. Indeed, an examination of the settlement cases does
reveal some of the more colorful instances of duress, fraud, and
similar misconduct. In Holt v. Holt,8' for example, a son who had
been excluded from sharing his mother's estate by a codicil to her will
extracted an agreement from his more fortunate brothers to share the
estate anyway.m The agreement was induced by violent and
279. See Bank One v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16,25-27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2331 (1993); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F. Supp.
1564, 1580-81 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Foundation for Preservation of Pub. Property v. Irvine Co.,
139 Cal. App. 3d 195, 188 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555-56 (1983); 4934, Inc. v. District of Columbia
Dep't of Employment Servs., 605 A.2d 50 (D.C. 1992); Matey v. Pruitt, 510 So. 2d 351,353
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 732, 735-36
(Iowa 1986); State ex rel Ludwick v. Bryant, 697 P.2d 858, 861-63 (Kan. 1985); Dickey v.
Thirty-Three Venturers, 550 S.W.2d 926,930 (Mo. Ct, App. 1977); Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d
784,790-91 (N.C. 1981); Schloss v. McGinness, 474 N.E.2d 666,668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
At a conceptual level, of course, the rule that the surrender of a frivolous claim is not
consideration can be assimilated quite easily to the pre-existing duty rule if one simply
posits that everyone has a pre-existing legal duty not to file frivolous litigation or make
unsupportable claims. In practice, however, courts tend not to assimilate the two rules,
and I have, therefore, characterized them as "functionally" separate.
280. See E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to
Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 604-06 [hereinafter Past of Promise] (suggesting that
nonlegal sanctions are more significant where the parties contemplate further transactions);
Muris, supra note 90, at 526-28.
281. 282 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. 1981).
282. lt at 785-86.
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profane tirades by the excluded son and his daughter at the reading
of the will, coupled with threats of litigation that would "inundate"
the other, somewhat more grief-stricken, brothers with attorney's
fees. 3 If this scene is not colorful enough, one may resort to
Williams v. Winn Dixie,' in which a grocery store manager and
security guard detained and interrogated a woman for two to three
hours after she allegedly attempted to steal cheese worth $2 .4 8.2ss
Before she left the woman signed a release, apparently under the
impression that signing was the only way to regain her freedom.8 6
Even more common, if less dramatic, are instances in which a
settlement or release is obtained by the use of threats, or actual
conduct, to block the consummation of a transaction economically
significant to the party who agrees to the release or settlement.2w
Consideration doctrine is frequently used to block the enforcement of
such compromises or releases.' However, although the evidence
283. Id
284. 447 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
285. Id at 9.
286. Id at 9-10.
287. See, e.g., Bank One v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992) (involving bank that
wrongfully froze depositor's funds causing depositor to miss business opportunities, and
also refused to turn over funds until depositor signed release), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331
(1993); Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124 (D.C. 1987) (involving an uncle who,
while acting as trustee of testamentary trust, refused to turn over trust assets for nephew's
business venture until nephew dismissed lawsuit and signed release); Dickey v. Thirty-
Three Venturers, 550 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (involving settlement agreement
induced by sham litigation that blocked consummation of bank sales); Mancino v.
Friedman, 429 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (involving an attorney for painters who
refused to release his clients' mechanic's liens and enable refinancing of property unless
part-owner of property gave note for attorney's fees); Boardman v. Dorsett, 685 P.2d 615
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a vendee who withheld $1000 at closing to induce vendor
to do work not required by earnest money agreement), review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1006
(1984).
288. See, e.g., Bank One v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that release
lacked consideration because surrender of baseless claim for attorney's fees insufficient),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993); Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124 (D.C. 1987)
(invalidating release under the pre-existing duty rule); Williams v. Winn Dixie, 447 So. 2d
8 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding insufficient evidence of consideration); Dickey v. Thirty-
Three Venturers, 550 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that relinquishment of
meritless claim as to which there was no good faith dispute was not consideration for
compromise); Holt v. Holt, 282 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. 1981) (holding that relinquishment of
right to contest a will as to which there was no bona fide dispute was not consideration for
agreement to share estate); Mancino v. Friedman, 429 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980)
(finding that fulfillment of pre-existing duty was insufficient consideration for note);
Boardman v. Dorsett, 685 P.2d 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that pre-existing duty
rule applied).
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of misconduct is not always as egregious as in the cases just dis-
cussed,2 89 it is clear that the defense of duress could, and often
does,',' block enforcement as well. Nearly as common are cases in
which the doctrine of consideration is used to invalidate compromises
or releases, but in which misrepresentations and dishonest conduct of
various kinds and degrees play a role in the inducement of the
compromises or releases at issue.2 91
289. See, e.g., Matey v. Pruitt, 510 So. 2d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
forbearance from threatened lawsuit was not consideration for indemnification; party
threatening lawsuit had neither valid claim nor belief that it would succeed), review denied,
520 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1988); Arnold v. Krewson, 834 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(involving ex-husband who obtained ex-wife's release of pre-existing child support
obligation in return for ex-husband's payment of debt for siding; release signed only after
siding company filed suit against ex-wife for payment); Schloss v. McGinness, 474 N.E.2d
666 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that niece who threatened to contest aunt's will did not
provide consideration for her sister's agreement to share aunt's estate by promising not to
carry out threat because niece had no standing to contest will). The reports of these three
cases are sketchy in varying degrees, and none of them contain an express finding of
duress. However, the facts of each case at least suggest a certain degree of coercion, and
it may be that, in the absence of the consideration doctrine, the courts in each case might
have focused on the issue of duress more explicitly.
290. See, e.g., Bank One v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the jury had
found that release was procured by economic duress), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993);
Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124 (D.C. 1987) (finding sufficient evidence on issue
of duress to survive summary judgment motion); Williams v. Winn Dixie, 447 So. 2d 8 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (indicating that plaintiff pled lack of consideration and duress in effort to
invalidate release); Dickey v. Thirty-Three Venturers, 550 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(noting that the defense of economic duress was asserted in trial court); Mancino v.
Friedman, 429 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (finding sufficient evidence of duress to
support vacation of judgment on note).
291. See, eg., Chaput v. Unisys Corp., 964 F.2d 1299 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting a
misrepresentation that release "didn't mean anything"); Milwee v. Peachtree Cypress Inv.
Co., 510 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (involving release executed by an agent,
apparently obtained after carrying out scheme to obtain reinstatement of corporate charter
through misrepresentations to deprive rightful heir of real estate held in corporate name);
Kansas ex rel. Ludwick v. Bryant, 697 P.2d 858 (Kan. 1985) (finding that an individual,
who was never personally liable for corporate debt, was induced to sign guaranty of tax
liability of defunct corporation by misrepresentation that bankruptcy could not discharge
her); Rose v. Howard, 670 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that agreement to
assign Native American headrights lacked consideration where trial court also found
elements of fraud, mistake, and undue influence); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 259
S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that fraud in the inducement of sale that was
undiscovered at time of alleged accord, tainted accord as well), review denied, 261 S.E.2d
919 (N.C. 1979); Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(involving a release signed as part of settlement of foreclosure action, culminating series
of transactions in which bank induced customer to sign documents assuming partner's pre-
existing debt, contrary to bank's own representations), rev'd on other grounds, 811 S.W.2d
931 (Tex. 1991); Hamilton v. Harper, 404 S.E.2d 540 (W. Va. 1991) (involving litigant who
accepted insurer's $100,000 offer before insurer could learn that case to which offer
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While the reports of the cases are not always sufficiently detailed
to permit the reader to ascertain whether all elements of fraud or
negligent misrepresentation are satisfied,2' the cases at least suggest
that a portion of the work performed in settlement cases by the
doctrine of consideration could be taken over by defenses based on
misrepresentation. To the extent courts are using consideration
doctrine to police settlements for coercion, deception, or opportunism,
it appears that they could use other defenses for the same purposes.
Second, an equally significant portion of the cases applying
corollaries to the doctrine of consideration in the settlement context
consists of cases in which the various doctrines grouped under the
heading of mutual assent could, or do, lead the courts in question to
the same conclusions as those dictated by the doctrine of consider-
ation.293 Similarly, courts invalidating a release for lack of consider-
pertained had been dismissed).
292. Of the cases cited supra note 291, only Holley contains an express finding of fraud
by the appellate court. Holley, 259 S.E.2d at 5. In addition, the trial court in Rose made
an express finding of fraud, Rose, 670 S.W.2d at 145, and claims for or defenses of fraud
were asserted at the trial court level in all of them except Chaput.
293. See, eg., Ziggity Sys., Inc. v. Val Watering Sys., 769 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding that there was no consideration for promise to contact before filing suit; facts
suggest alleged promise was mere courtesy); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that alleged compro-
mise of frivolous claim was not consideration for promise of inclusion in future transaction
and that promise was also mere agreement to agree and too indefinite to enforce); Griffin
v. Hardin, 456 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (finding that alleged settlement
agreement failed for lack of offer, acceptance, and consideration); E.P. Dobson, Inc. v.
Richard, 705 S.W.2d 893 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that there was no consideration
for alleged promise to pay for damage caused by defendant's son; facts suggest defendant's
statement was mere erroneous factual statement concerning scope of insurance coverage);
Alhino v. Starr, 112 Cal. App. 3d 158, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1980) (stating that reformed
note was not intended as new agreement waiving fraud claim but merely intended to
conform transaction documentation to original agreement, and that reformed note also
lacked new consideration); Leseke v. Nutaro, 567 So. 2d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that settlement agreement lacked consideration where court could also have
found agreement fatally indefinite); Douglas v. Dixie Fin. Corp., 228 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1976) (finding that renewal of promissory note was not accord and satisfaction due
to insufficient evidence of agreement and illegal consideration), overruled on other
grounds, 296 S.E.2d 593 (1982)); Palmetto Leasing v. Chiles, 602 N.E.2d 77 (II. App. Ct.
1992) (concluding that check given in connection with settlement lacked consideration and
unwritten aspects of settlement were indefinite and subject to condition precedent); Belt
v. Shepard, 808 P.2d 907 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that insufficient evidence existed
that deceased partner had assented to discharge of liability of retiring partner where
alleged discharge also lacked consideration); Passer v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 577
S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1979) (concluding there was no consideration for covenant not to sue;
facts suggest statement relied upon was not a promise); Consiglio v. Missouri Dep't of
Social Servs., 863 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no evidence mother either
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ation occasionally are able to reach the same practical result by
restrictive interpretations of the language of the release itself 2 4 or
expansive interpretations of conditions attached to it.29 The cases
in which consideration doctrine is thus made redundant by some
misconduct-based defense, some branch of assent doctrine, or simple
contract interpretation, collectively constitute the vast majority of the
consideration cases involving settlements.
The remaining settlement cases involving applications of the
corollaries to the doctrine of consideration form an odd assortment
that defy easy description and characterization. Initially, there is a
group of cases, each of which leaves the reader with the impression
that a consideration tail is wagging a public-policy dog. Given that
the settlement cases include so many in which the obligations that are
the subject of compromise derive from some source other than, or in
addition to, a contract between the parties and are thus, in some
agreed to reduced child support or received any consideration for reduction); Fletcher,
Barnhardt & White, Inc. v. Matthews, 397 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that,
notwithstanding post-termination statements of intent to repay, evidence indicated parties
did not intend to impose personal liability on commission salesperson for deficiency in
draw account, and that post-termination statements also lacked consideration), review
denied, 402 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. 1991); Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, 259 S.E.2d I (N.C. Ct. App.
1979) (finding insufficient language indicating check was offered by defendant in full
satisfaction of all claims and that alleged accord also lacked mutuality); Cardamone v.
University of Pittsburgh, 384 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that university's
agreement to pay medical expenses of injured student athlete lacked consideration where
language of agreement specifically disclaimed intent to make legally enforceable
commitment); Di Sante v. Russ Fin. Co., 380 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (stating that
payment of $1000 judgment that debtor already owed did not constitute consideration for
alleged promise to delay execution for 45 days where letter containing alleged promise
could have been construed as something less than unequivocal commitment to delay of 45
days); see also Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1986) (finding
material issue of fact as to sufficiency of consideration in case in which existence of the
promise was disputed); Hugh O'Connor, Inc. v. J. Robert Autenreith, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1090
(La. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that alleged release by owner lacked consideration where
alleged release was made by architect who lacked authority to agree on behalf of owner),
writ refhtsed, 345 So. 2d 59 (La. 1977); Elmore v. Wal-Mart Stores, 812 S.W.2d 178 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991) (stating that there was no consideration for defendant's alleged promises
to pay plaintiff's medical bills in case in which the existence of promises was disputed).
294. Victoria Bank & Trust v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 1090, 1095 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(concluding release lacked consideration), affd in part and rev'd in part, 811 S.W.2d 931,
939 (Tex. 1991) (concluding that claims against lender fell outside the scope of the released
claims); see also Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska 1994) (stating that there was
no consideration for alleged accord and satisfaction where facts also suggested alternative
theory of limited scope of release).
295. Burns v. Fernandez, 401 So. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that
release violated pre-existing duty rule and was voided by failure of condition subsequent).
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sense, public duties, it should not be surprising to find a group of.
cases in which courts seem to be manipulating consideration doctrine
to achieve a desired policy objective. The group includes most
obviously those cases in which a finding of lack of consideration is
used as a subsidiary finding on the way to a case disposition based
explicitly on some legislatively articulated public policy" as well as
the rare cases in which courts are authorized to examine not just the
sufficiency, or mere presence, of consideration but its adequacy as
well. 97
Though it is perhaps less obvious, in two other groups of
settlement cases consideration doctrine is used as a convenient
rationale for conclusions courts would like to reach for policy reasons.
First, there is a group of cases in which courts have refused to
recognize gratuitous releases of liability for overdue child support.
28
Though the level of child support payments may often be the subject
of agreement between divorcing parties, child support obligations are
hardly a simple matter of contract. They are characteristically
incorporated into a court order, presumably after a judicial analysis
of the interests of all concerned, including the children who are the
beneficiaries of, though probably not parties to, any child support
agreement. Indeed, courts commonly deny the divorcing parties the
right to make informal, private contracts changing the amount of child
support prospectively.2  While past due child support payments
296. See, e.g., Orange County Found. for Preservation of Pub. Property v. Irvine Co.,
139 Cal. App. 3d 195, 188 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1983) (holding that compromise of private
company's invalid claim to islands was insufficient to support settlement agreement and
that payment under settlement agreement therefore constituted gift of public money
barred by state constitution); 4934, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment
Servs., 605 A.2d 50 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that alleged settlement of personal injury
claim against foreign government was not true compromise because surrender of
unfounded claim is not consideration; accordingly, claimant's worker's compensation claim
against insurer was not barred by a statutory provision relieving insurer of liability if
claimant compromised claim without written approval of insurer); see also Keene Corp,
v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (relying on state judicial
decisions, court determined that compensated surety was not discharged from liability on
bond by an agreement granting additional time for performance on underlying contract
unless the extension was supported by new consideration).
297. Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78, Ltd., 562 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (finding "Mary
Carter" settlement agreement in admiralty/personal injury case to be based on inadequate
consideration, chhmpertous, and an improper impediment to settlement with remaining
defendants).
298. See cases cited. infra notes 299-300.
299. See, e.g., Otten v. Otten, 632 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kennedy v. Kennedy,
575 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
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may nevertheless be compromised, like any other debt, attempts to
enforce gratuitous releases of past due child support often fail.3°
It is tempting to conclude that judicial motivation in such cases
includes, not only belief in the soundness of consideration doctrine,
but concern for the welfare of the children involved, as well as
background awareness of the social problems generated by wide-
spread nonpayment of child support.
Second, on several occasions courts have used consideration
doctrine to deny enforcement of advance releases of, or attempts to
shift, liability for one party's errors or negligence. 0 ' Releases and
disclaimers of liability, particularly of tort liability, always raise
difficult policy questions, and it is once again tempting to conclude
that the courts in such cases are reacting less to the concern that the
releases in question are gratuitous than to their own doubts that
parties should be permitted to agree to them at all.
At this point, however, an advocate of the doctrine of consider-
ation might respond with a loud "So what?" If, in fact, courts are
achieving satisfactory results from a policy point of view in such cases,
what does it matter that the official. rationale is a reference to the
doctrine of consideration? Courts are not legislatures and are
therefore understandably reluctant -to make overt policy decisions. If
consideration provides a reliable, if somewhat archaic, tool for
accomplishing the same thing, what is the harm?
I have elsewhere echoed the general, abstract objections of others
to judicial decisions in which the real reasons are not the stated
reasons.3 While I would not entirely rule out the possibility that
300. McAdams v. Scullin, 368 N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Consiglio v. Missouri
Dep't of Social Servs., 863 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Otten v. Otten, 632 S.W.2d
45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 575 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see
also Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App.) (holding that wife's release of
judgment against husband lacked consideration), reh'g denied, 559 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. 1990).
301. See George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (holding that release covering liability for negligent provision of crane services failed
for lack of consideration because it was signed after service was provided); Mcllroy Bank
& Trust v. Comstock, 678 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that indemnity
agreement bank required before making payment on certificate of deposit to one of two
joint payees lacked consideration); Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass'n, 765
S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that release covering negligence liability required
by volunteer firefighting organization at the time of "fire tag" purchase lacked
consideration).
302. See Wessman, supra note 2, at 81-82, 92-93 (summarizing Reiter's view that
"dressing decisions in disguise" reduces predictability in the law, causes an appearance of
arbitrariness and unfairness, stunts the growth of the law with respect to the secret grounds
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relative ease of judicial administration might, on rare occasions,
dictate the use of rules in which one ground of decision serves as a
proxy for another, I generally believe that it is important, not just that
judges reach the right results, but that they articulate the right
reasons. More concretely, some of the cases in the categories
enumerated above provide illustrations of the clumsiness of consider-
ation doctrine as a tool in the covert service of policy concerns.
Sometimes, for example, the vagaries of consideration doctrine are
not finely tuned to the policy concerns they are dragged in to serve,
and courts are forced to distort consideration doctrine to achieve the
desired results. Weindel v. DeSoto Rural Fire Protection Ass'n3"
provides an illustration. The defendant in the case was a volunteer
firefighting association in rural Missouri, and the plaintiff was a
homeowner whose home had been destroyed by fire.3" In order to
be eligible for the protection of the association, the homeowner was
required to buy a "fire tag" for $12.50.15 At the time of purchase,
the homeowner signed a receipt for the tag that included very broad
language releasing the association from any liability to subscribing
homeowners, whether in contract or in tort. 6 When the homeown-
er sued to recover for the destruction of his property, alleging that the
association negligently failed to extinguish the fire, the association
asserted the release by way of defense.3" Ultimately, the appellate
court refused to enforce the release because it was not supported by
"new consideration." 308
As a matter of consideration doctrine, of course, the case is a
blatant errorS 9 The purchase of the fire tag and the execution of
the receipt were contemporaneous and so clearly part of a single
transaction. Since a single promise may, under traditional standards,
provide consideration for a number of return promises or performanc-
es, the association's commitment to provide services was technically
consideration for both the small payment and the advance release of
of decision and sets misleading precedent, as well as Llewellyn's similar observations
concerning the use of consideration doctrine to police fairness).
303. 765 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
304. Id. at 713-14.
305. Id at 713.
306. Id. at 715.
307. Id at 713, 715.
308. Id. at 715.
309. Indeed, that is one reason one suspects it is policy-driven in the first place.
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liability.31 By traditional standards, the fairness of the exchange is
immaterial.
Moreover, it is not even clear that the result reached by the
distortion of consideration doctrine is a desirable one. It may seem
unconscionable, at first blush, to permit those who provide such vital
services as firefighting to disclaim liability as broadly as the associa-
tion in Weindel. On the other hand, it may be that rural volunteer
firefighting associations would not be economically viable without a
fairly broad limitation of liability. The policy question raised by such
broad limitations of liability must be faced, and traditional consider-
ation doctrine does nothing to resolve it.3 Indeed, twisting consid-
eration doctrine to resolve such issues simply makes the doctrine so
malleable that it is capable of justifying nearly anything, and, once
that point is reached, its operation becomes utterly unpredictable.
In addition to cases in which the use of consideration doctrine to
resolve policy questions produces distortion in the doctrine itsel,
there are cases in which its use for that purpose is both futile and
distracting because applying the doctrine of consideration creates, at
most, a temporary obstacle to enforceability and leaves the underlying
policy question unresolved. In George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior
Trucking Co.,312 for example, the court used consideration doctrine
to invalidate a release and indemnity agreement in favor of a crane
company executed by a motor carrier.313 The work order containing
310. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80 (1981).
311. For a similar example among the child support cases, see Kennedy v. Kennedy,
575 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). In Kennedy an ex-husband fell behind on his
required support payments of $42 per week. Il at 834. He was acquitted of criminal
charges of failing to support his children, largely because of his poor financial condition
Id. His ex-wife then agreed to release him from the liability for past due child support if
he would pay $30 every two weeks until he "got back on [his] feet." Id A month later,
he suffered an injury and apparently never got "back on his feet," although he did have
railroad retirement benefits and an accident settlement available for garnishment by his
ex-wife. Id. The court refused to enforce the parties' settlement agreement, since the ex-
husband had only promised to do part of what he was already obligated to do. Id. at 835.
In so doing the court ignored the obvious contract question of whether the ex-husband's
severe financial embarrassment, and his subsequent disability, might qualify him for the
"unforeseen circumstances" exception to the pre-existing duty rule. Indeed, this apparent
indifference to the more technical aspects of the consideration doctrine is one reason for
the suspicion that the real reasons actuating the court were policy reasons. However,
contract law does not answer the policy question of what circumstances excuse the
payment of child support, and it would have been preferable for the court to face the
question directly.
312. 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
313. lI at 992. The crane operator had been hired by the carrier to transfer a large
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the release had not been signed until after the crane company had
completed its work?'4 Moreover, the crane company representative
who presented the work order to the carrier did not understand the
release and indemnity language, and the carrier's representative did
not even see it?' 5 Apart from the usual policy questions concerning
the propriety of advance disclaimers or releases of negligence liability,
the release at issue thus presented the question whether the party
disadvantaged by a disclaimer or release should be bound even in the
absence of subjective agreement.316 The court, however, focused on
the apparently shore17 period of time between the verbal hiring of
the crane company and the execution of the work order, and
invalidated the release contained in the work order as an unenforce-
able attempt to modify a pre-existing verbal contract without new
consideration. 8 The court did, of course, dispose of the case, but
the consideration problem is so minor that it can be avoided by the
simple expedient of obtaining execution of the work order before any
services are provided. The decision gives no guidance on the policy
questions which are more difficult, more interesting, and likely to
recur.39
printing press from one of its trucks to another. Id. at 989. When the press fell and was
damaged, the owner of the press obtained a negligence judgment against both the carrier
and the crane operator. Id. The carrier sought contribution from the crane operator
towards the tort judgment against both of them, and the crane operator defended on the
grounds that a work order signed by both parties contained language releasing the crane
operator from negligence liability and requiring the carrier to indemnify it against any loss.
Id. at 989-90.
314. Id at 990.
315. Id. at 990, 993. Apparently, the crane company representative handed the two-
page work order over for signature while still in a "receipt book" and with the relevant
language on the side face down. Id. at 990 n.1.
316. See also Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App.) (holding that
former wife's release of judgment against former husband lacked consideration; former
wife also contended she did not understand document), reh'gdenied,559 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind.
1990).
317. The court's opinion does not specify exactly how much time elapsed between the
provision of crane services and the execution of the work order. The crane services were
necessary, however, because the truck carrying the printing press had been involved in a
collision, and the task of the crane company was to move the press to a relief truck.
George R. Hall, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 989. The emergency nature of the occasion, and the
fact that the crane was apparently dispatched after a phone call, suggests that the whole
sequence of events was relatively short. See id. at 989, 992.
318. Id. at 992.
319. See also Mcllroy Bank & Trust v. Comstock, 678 S.W.2d 782 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984).
In Mcllroy two sisters, Comstock and Browne, were joint payees on certificates of deposit
originally purchased by their late mother. Id. at 783. Browne asked the bank not to cash
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The use of consideration doctrine as a tool for advancing some
independent public policy thus creates conceptual difficulties in the
doctrine itself, reduces the predictability of its application, and makes
judicial decisions less reliable guides for future action than they might
otherwise have been. However, the "bottom line" in such cases is
usually a conclusion that a father must pay his child support or that
an attempt to evade liability for negligence has failed, and, in the
current political climate, such conclusions are not generally unpalat-
able. However, a number of settlement or release cases show the
doctrine of consideration generating undesirable case dispositions. A
few are simple misapplications of the doctrine of consideration and
are of little theoretical interest except as reminders that the complexi-
ty of the doctrine remains troublesome in practice?' In a small
the certificates without notifying her, but she never gave written instructions not to cash
them without more than one signature. Id. Comstock then presented the certificates for
payment. Id. The bank required her to execute an indemnity agreement protecting the
bank, and then paid her. Id. Browne subsequently demanded payment of "her share" of
the proceeds, and the bank complied. Id. The bank then sought to recover an amount
corresponding to Browne's "share" from Comstock under the indemnity agreement. I
The court refused to enforce the indemnity agreement because it lacked consideration.
Id. at 784. At the time Comstock presented the certificates for payment, the bank had a
pre-existing duty to pay either of the joint payees upon proper demand in the absence of
written instructions from one of them to require more than one signature. Id. Payment
could thus not serve as consideration for Comstock's agreement to indemnify the bank.
Id. at 783-84. Again, however, the consideration problem could be avoided fairly easily,
presumably through the use of appropriately drafted agreements on signature cards
executed at the time of the purchase of the certificate. The more interesting question is
whether a bank should be permitted to shift its statutory risk of erroneous payment to one
of two warring joint payees through such indemnity agreements, and consideration
doctrine does not speak to that issue.
320. See Management Recruiters, Inc. v. J & B Smith Co., 362 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (holding alleged promise by individual to pay corporate debt in exchange for
creditor's forbearance from suing corporation lacked consideration); Zagoria v. Dubose
Enters., 296 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (finding agreement between attorney and
shareholder of a professional corporation to assume liability for dishonored checks written
by another shareholder of same corporation lacked consideration; neither agreement by
client to continue using firm nor agreement by another client to allow second attorney
further time for repayment constituted consideration), rev'd on other grounds, 302 S.E.2d
674 (1983); Bogigian v. Bogigian, 551 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding former
wife's release of judgment against former husband lacked consideration; dissent noted that
former wife received release of her liability on mortgage); see also Fafoutis v. Lyons, 540
N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1989) (finding promise to pay existing debt if creditor delayed suit
until contingency occured was not enforcable; though existing debt time-barred by the time
contingency occurred, second promise to pay it would not itself be consideration for valid
contract); Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet Co. v. Welch, 392 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div.
1977) (reversing lower court dismissal on issue of novation and finding that discharge of
the original obligation would be sufficient consideration).
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group of more disturbing cases, courts have refused to enforce
promises made in a business context by a commercially sophisticated
person or entity because of an inability to find a return promise or
performance.32 ' Recent examples include a promise by an insurer
to make payment jointly to its insured debtor and the debtor's
secured creditor3' as well as an acknowledgment by an insurer of
liability for its insured's negligent repair efforts and a promise to have
the damage corrected.3z Judicial refusal to enforce a technically
separate promise by an insurer made in the course of carrying out
what are clearly contractual obligations is objectionable because such
promises are as likely to generate expectations, as well as unprovable
forms of reliance, on the part of the promisee as more conventional
bargains. 34 Other apparently gratuitous promises extended in the
business context may even be given in the hope of generating
opportunities for future beneficial exchanges, even though the future
exchanges are not yet specified or even identifiable.31 If one aban-
321. Sellers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 338 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Zorba's
Inn, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Thibault
v. Cleland, 363 S.E.2d 114 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
322. Zorba's Inn, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 377 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. Ct. App,
1989).
323. Thibault v. Cleland, 363 S.E.2d 114 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
324. See infra notes 442-60 and accompanying text.
325. See Sellers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 338 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). In
Sellers an attorney representing a group of real estate developers received a 10% interest
in the land involved in the project in lieu of a monetary fee for his services. Id. at 481.
The attorney's interest was subject to a security deed, and the attorney assumed a pro rata
share of the debt secured by the deed. Id. Later, the attorney deeded the interest back
to the original investors who assumed his share of the debt in question. Md When the
development project proved not to be viable, the investors settled with the creditor holding
the security deed, and the attorney gave a note representing 10% of the settlement
amount. Id. The court found the note to be lacking in consideration and unenforceable.
Id at 481-82.
The initially puzzling aspect of Sellers, of course, is why the attorney gave a note in
partial payment of the settlement when the interest in the project had terminated and the
attorney had received nothing of real value for the previous services. The holder of the
note contended that it had been executed by the attorney to appease one of the original
investors, presumably in the hope of obtaining additional legal business from the investor.
Id. at 481. Indeed, the hopes of future business had been realized by the time of trial. Id.
It thus appears that the whole sequence of events fits a more "relational" model of
exchange. The note, as part of that sequence, was given by a commercially sophisticated
party and was presumably sufficiently formal to satisfy any evidentiary or cautionary
concerns. Enforcing the note would thus seem to be consistent with both the presumption
in favor of the enforcement of exchange promises and the functions sometimes attributed
to the doctrine of consideration. The court, however, rejected this rationale for
enforcement, on the grounds that the mere motive for a contract-here the prospect of
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dons the erroneous belief that all exchange consists of the discrete,
reciprocal pairings of specific promises or performances posited by the
classical theory of contract,326 any reason for distinguishing between
conventional bargains and the promises given in the hope of less
specific future beneficial relations disappears.
Slightly more common than the foregoing types of undesirable
cases are the recent applications of the branch of the pre-existing duty
rule commonly identified as the rule of Foakes v. Beer327-- the rule
that actual payment of a sum less than that owed cannot be consider-
ation for discharge of the remainder.3 ' A creditor's actual agree-
ment to accept less than the full amount of the claim in satisfaction
of the whole would seem to be a genuine bargain,32 9 and there
seems little reason to refuse to enforce such a bargain in the absence
of some vitiating defense such as fraud or duress. Indeed, it is clear
in some of the cases that the creditor receives more from the debtor's
partial, but voluntary, cooperation than the creditor could, as a
practical matter, compel the debtor to give up. Owings v. Georgia
Railroad Bank & Trust provides a good illustration. A Georgia
bank obtained a judgment against certain individuals on their personal
guaranties of a loan to a business 3 ' The judgment was in the
amount of $231,811.15 plus attorney's fees in the amount of fifteen
percent of the indebtedness.332 According to the individual judg-
ment debtors, the bank agreed to discount the attorney's fees to
future business-is not consideration unless it is the subject of explicit bargaining. Id.
326. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppek Contract
Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 920-29 (1985); see also
ATIYAH, supra note 113, at 241-42 (suggesting that promises in business context with hope
of indirect gain should be enforceable); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and
Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44
FLA. L. REV. 295, 309-17 (1992) (suggesting that elements of gift are embedded in
exchange and that exchange practice includes fluid, ongoing adjustments characterized by
trust and hopes of reciprocity).
327. 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884). For discussions of the rule, see GILMORE, supra note
33, at 30-33, 118-20; CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.4.
328. See, e.g., Owings v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust, 372 S.E.2d 825,826 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988); Hall v. Bank S., 368 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Sylvester v. Animal Emergency
Clinic, 825 P.2d 1053 (Haw. 1992); Upper Ave. Nat'l Bank v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank,
400 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co., 589 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd, 602 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1980).
329. See CORBIN, supra note 89, § 7.2 (arguing that cases governed by the pre-existing
duty rule may be instances of the exchange of genuine benefits or detriment).
330. 372 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
331. Id. at 825-26.
332. Id.
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actual expenses incurred if the judgment debtors made certain efforts
to pay promptly.333 In response the judgment debtors obtained a
loan from another bank and sold some property in Florida.M At
the meeting scheduled for payment of the proceeds to the Georgia
bank, however, the bank collected the full fifteen percent attorney's
fees in addition to the full amount of the debt.35 The individual
judgment debtors then sued for recovery of the difference between
the bank's actual expenditures for attorney's fees and the fifteen
percent collected, and were awarded in excess of $20,000 by a
jury.33  Neither the trial nor the appellate court let the award
stand.337 The appellate court concluded that the individual judg-
ment debtors' agreement to pay the judgment promptly was merely
the promise to perform a pre-existing duty and could not be consider-
ation for the bank's promise to reduce the amount of the debt.33
It is obvious, however, that the compromise agreement was a
substantial benefit to the bank. It is highly doubtful that the bank
could have compelled the debtors to obtain a loan from another bank
in order to pay the judgment. While the, bank might ultimately have
been able to reach the judgment debtors' Florida property, it could
only have done so upon incurring the expense of domesticating its
Georgia judgment in Florida and taking whatever steps were
necessary for execution in Florida. Even then, a forced judicial sale
would likely have brought a distress sale price, perhaps substantially
less than the market transaction that the judgment debtors apparently
arranged. In short, the bank and the judgment debtors made a
genuine bargain producing an apparent economic benefit to the bank.
The use of the pre-existing duty rule to allow the bank to reap the
benefit of the bargain without rendering its own performance is an
illustration of the formalistic character of the rule and a dramatic
example of the merit of the arguments of the rule's critics.3 9
At the end of a tour through the current operation of the
multifaceted pre-existing duty rule-as well as its overlap with other
corollaries to the doctrine of consideration in the compromise and
333. Id. at 826. While the bank disputed the existence of the agreement, a jury
implicitly resolved that issue in favor of the individual judgment debtors. Id.
334. ld.
335. I&
336. Ld.
337. It.
338. Id.
339. See supra notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
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release context-one is driven to the conclusion that even the most
durable of the corollaries to the doctrine of consideration has little
remaining justification. It is usually redundant, and, when it is not, it
consistently produces results that are troubling in various degrees.
IV PROMISE-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION REQUIREMENTS
As traditionally conceived consideration is a bit like Tabasco
sauce; a little of it goes a long way. Specifically, the traditional rule
is that a single item of consideration on one side of a transaction can
supply consideration for any number of return promises or perfor-
mances?' ° Presumably, this rule follows from the general proposi-
tion that it is not the task of the courts to inquire into the adequacy
of consideration. It is therefore somewhat counterintuitive to find
that, in certain contexts, the courts seem to focus on certain types of
promises and insistthat each promise falling within one of those types
be paired with its own supporting item of consideration? 4  This
unusually strict reciprocity requirement occurs principally in two types
of cases: those involving claims that an employee has contracted out
of employment at will and those involving covenants by an employee
not to compete with the employer upon termination of employment.
Obviously, both types of cases are highly charged with policy issues.
The policy issues are somewhat different in each type of case,
however, and I shall address them separately.
A. Contracting Out of Employment at Will,
Though the rules governing employment "at will" may have lost
some of their common-law harshness, employment for an indefinite
term is still generally presumed to be employment at will, both in the
sense that the duration of employment may be concluded at any time
and in the sense that there are no restrictions-or, at any rate, very
few restrictions-on the power of either party to terminate the
employment relationship.342 Given the precariousness of such an
340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACS § 80(1) cmt. a. (1981).
341. Obviously, in the case of modifications to ongoing contracts, the strict promise-by-
promise consideration requirement is not as counterintuitive, in light of the pre-existing
duty rule. If the modification consists of the addition of a single duty or promise on one
side, then the pre-existing duty rule requires that that duty or promise be paired with one
or more reciprocal items of fresh consideration. In the cases to be considered in this
section, however, the courts go beyond what the pre-existing duty rule requires.
342. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the
Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan,
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arrangement for the employee, it is hardly surprising to find cases in
which employees claim to have been promised something more
permanent, either in the form of a commitment to employment for
life or in the form of a restriction on the employer's power to
discharge. If such a promise is made after employment at will has
commenced, the doctrine of consideration is occasionally used to deny
enforcement of the promise of lifetime employment or restrictions on
the power to discharge. 43 Such cases are not particularly surprising,
as they are simply applications of the amazingly durable pre-existing
duty rule. As such, these cases are subject to all the criticism leveled
at the pre-existing duty rule by its critics." 4 Indeed, a midcareer
change in employment status from employment terminable at will to
employment for life or employment subject to discharge only for
cause could be justified in much the same way as a promise to pay a
bonus, either as a simple revisiting and revaluing of the original
exchange345 or as a promise made in recognition of the past receipt
of a benefit. 6
The more interesting cases are the true exceptions to the rule
that a single consideration can support any number of return
promises. In a number of cases, employees have contended that, at
the very inception of the employment relationship, the employer has
made some promise---typically a promise of lifetime employment or
a commitment to discharge only for cause-that takes the relationship
out of the category of employment at will. 47 In spite of the usual
The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed After At-Will
Employment Has Commenced: The "Afterthought" Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465,
1494-95 (1987); Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment As a Case Study
of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 335-37 (1986).
343. See Schoeneck v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696, 702
(N.D. Iil. 1994); Wilson v. Vulcan Rivet & Bolt Corp., 439 So. 2d 65, 66 (Ala. 1983);
Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299,318,231 Cal. Rptr.
820, 829-30 (1986); Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Iowa 1986);
Eaton v. Aid for Victims of Crime. Inc., 536 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Jones
v. East Ctr. for Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984); Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
344. See supra notes 167-89 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
346. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).
347. Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 945-46 (D.N.J. 1991);
Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Koch v. Illinois
Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281, 284 (I11. App. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 915 (II1.
1989); Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Alter v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., 560 A.2d 1290, 1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); Gonzales
v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 602 P.2d 619, 620 (N.M. 1979); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250
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rule that a single promise by the employee could support any number
of return promises by the employer, a number of courts have imposed
a requirement that the employer's promise of more permanent
employment be supported by some consideration other than the
employee's promise of services. If such a discrete item of consider-
ation is absent, the promise of lifetime employment or of discharge
only for cause is unenforceable.3 The exceptional nature of this
"additional consideration" requirement is either a signal that special
policy concerns are implicated in cases involving qualification of
employment at will or that consideration is performing some special
function in this context. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the
justifications that might be given for the additional consideration
requirement.
One justification sometimes offered is that additional consider-
ation beyond the promise of services is necessary for an employer's
promise qualifying employment at will because "mutuality of
obligation" requires it.349 Absent additional consideration supplied
by the employee, the employer is committed to lifetime employment,
or employment terminable only for cause, while the employee is still
free to end the relationship at will. Under the principle that "both
parties must be bound or neither is bound," it allegedly follows that
the employer's promise qualifying employment at will is unenforce-
able.
S.E.2d 678,680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Goodpaster v. Pfizer. Inc., 665 P.2d 414,416 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1983).
348. See, e.g., Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.J. 1991);
Forstmann v. Culp, 648 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D.N.C. 1986); Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So.
2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Koch v. Illinois Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281 (I11. App. Ct.
1988); Panther v. Mr. Good-Rents, Inc., 817 S.W.2d . (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Alter v.
Resorts Int'l, Inc., 560 A.2d 1290 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); Gonzales v. United
Southwest Nat'l Bank, 602 P.2d 619 (N.M. 1979); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Goodpaster v. Pfizer,
Inc., 665 P.2d 414 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
349. Schoeneck v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill.
1994); Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Koch v. Illinois
Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281 (Ii. App. Ct. 1988); cf. Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser,
407 So. 2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that in a bilateral contract, the promise
of one party constitutes the sole consideration for the promise of the other party), review
denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that absent mutuality, there can be no contract to enforce
in law or equity); Jones v. East Ctr. for Community Mental Health, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 969
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating that where employment contract of definite duration exists
between the parties, there is also mutuality of obligation).
January 1996]
792 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The foregoing basis for the additional consideration requirement
is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Initially, the argument proves more than
its proponent desires. Carried to its logical conclusion, it requires not
only that the employee provide some form of additional consideration
for an employer promise qualifying employment at will, but that the
additional consideration take the form of an employee commitment
to stay on the job for a specified term or to leave only for certain
types of reasons. Only in that event are both parties "bound" in the
requisite sense. Moreover, quite apart from the fact that the
"requirement" of mutuality of obligation has been riddled with
exceptions over the years,3" I have argued elsewhere that the
requirement has little to commend it and should be abandoned. 5'
Finally, if it is alleged that a requirement that qualifications of the
right to terminate employment be reciprocal rests on some notion of
fairness, the appropriate response is simply to deny that symmetry is
always fair. In particular for a society in which the great bulk of
citizens are dependent upon their employers for economic security but
in which employers have access to an ample supply of labor,
asymmetry in the power to terminate employment is hardly unfair.
The employee's "right" to terminate is not a major burden to the
employer if the employee has limited mobility or some other
economic incentive not to exercise it.3"' The employer's power to
fire at will, on the other hand, is normally potentially devastating to
the employee. Requiring formal symmetry in termination rights thus
ignores the differential impact of such rights. That is formalism, not
fairness.' ,
The other potential basis for the requirement of special or
additional consideration for employer promises qualifying employ-
ment at will is quite different. In many of the cases involving such
promises, the nature of the representation or commitment made by
the employer is problematic." An employer who tells a prospec-
350. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 78-79 cmt. f.
351. See Wessman, supra note 2, at 102.
352. See Krauskopf, supra note 342, at 196; Linzer, supra note 342, at 336-37.
353. Of course, judgments of fairness are often complex and difficult, and one might
object that fairness does require that an employer receive some return for effectively
restricting access to the ample supply of labor by qualifying the right to terminate a
particular employee at will. Even if that premise is true, however, it does not follow that
this employer's return must be separable from all other aspects of the employment
relationship or that it take any particular form, let alone the form of a parallel restriction
on the employee's right to discontinue services.
354. Schoeneck v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. I11.
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tive employee, "As long as you perform well, you will have nothing
to worry about," may be doing one of two things. The employer may
be making a somewhat clumsy promise of lifetime employment or
employment terminable only for cause, or may be engaging in "mere
puffery"-simple commendation of the employer's own track record.
The job of sorting out which the employer is doing is normally
assigned to the objective theory of assent. However, one might argue
that if a requirement of special or additional consideration is imposed,
the doctrine of consideration will function as an evidentiary and
channeling device," simultaneously providing corroboration that
the promise qualifying employment at will was made56 and enabling
the parties to signal, and the courts to recognize, the difference
between mere commendations and promises in this context.
One must concede, of course, that special consideration for an
employer's apparent commitment to lifetime employment or
restrictions on the right to discharge could serve such evidentiary and
channeling functions. If an employer and a prospective employee
drafted and executed an agreement containing representations by the
employer concerning length of employment and restrictions on the
right to discharge, and allocated some separate item of consideration
supplied by the employee for those representations-perhaps reciting
the separate consideration in the same paragraph that contained the
employer's representations-a court no doubt would and should
classify the representations as promises rather than puffery. All that
classification proves, however, is that supplying additional consider-
ation for an employer promise qualifying employment at will should
be available as an evidentiary and channeling device. The mere
possibility that consideration might facilitate such classification does
not prove that it should be a mandatory and exclusive device for
1994); Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.J. 1991); Malmstrom
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986);
Hesston Corp. v. Roche, 599 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Koch v. Illinois Power
Co., 529 N.E.2d 281 (Iii. App. Ct. 1988); Mayer v. King Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660
S.W.2d 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'l Bank, 602 P.2d 619
(N.M. 1979); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Price v. Mercury
Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 665 P.2d 414
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
355. Once again, I am relying on Fuller's influential analogy between consideration and
the functions of legal formalities. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 799-806.
356. Such corroboration might be deemed desirable either on the theory that promises'
qualifying employment at will are somewhat unusual or on the theory that they represent
the surrender by the employer of a valuable right.
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distinguishing true commitments to lifetime employment or restric-
tions on discharge from mere commendations or vague reassurances.
Assigning the requirement of additional consideration the role of a
gatekeeper with respect to such commitments is only defensible on
the assumption that the practice of supplying additional consideration
is not only effective as an evidentiary and signaling device but also
accessible to those charged with the duty of using the device.
However, there is good reason to doubt that the device of supplying
additional consideration for a commitment to lifetime employment or
restrictions on discharge is accessible to most employees. Such
commitments, of course, favor the employee, and it is therefore in the
employee's, not the employer's, interest to have such commitments
clearly signaled. 7 One may fairly assume, however, that, of the
two parties to the employment contract, the employee is the least
likely to be represented by counsel and the least likely to know that
a separate item of consideration needs to be allocated to the
employer's promise qualifying employment at will. If the employee
is unlikely to know or learn of the additional consideration channeling
and evidentiary device, it makes little sense to make its use mandato-
ry and to penalize the employee's failure to use it with the inability
to effectuate an intention to obtain the desired enforceable commit-
ment from the employer. In short, requiring additional consideration
to make an employer's commitment to lifetime employment or restric-
tions on the power to discharge enforceable cannot be justified by
appeal to the evidentiary and channeling functions of consideration
in corroborating the making of promises and distinguishing promises
from mere commendations. Indeed, substantial authority now
supports the abandonment of an absolute requirement of additional
consideration,358 and courts occasionally recognize that the presence
357. I am not suggesting that all employers will behave opportunistically by making
such commitments and then deliberately failing to put them in enforceable form, although
it is probably fair to assume that some will. Doing so would, after all, permit an opportu-
nistic employer to produce a desired favorable impression on the prospective employee
without incurring an enforceable commitment. But not all employers are opportunists, and
I am making the more modest suggestion that employers will often have little incentive to
invest the time, trouble and expense to learn of and use formal devices for signaling
contractual provisions that are for the sole benefit of the employee.
358. Corson v. Universal Door Sys., Inc., 596 So. 2d 565, 568 (Ala. 1991); Johnson v.
George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355, 1359-60 (II. App. Ct. 1993); Wior v. Anchor Indus.,
Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1275,1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d
776, 780-81 (N.M. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1068 (1994); Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605
N.E.2d 468, 471-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Moshtaghi v. The Citadel, 443 S.E.2d 915, 918
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of additional consideration may, in some instances, serve a more
limited evidentiary function 59
B. Covenants Not to Compete
At first glance the treatment of covenants not to compete seems
precisely the opposite of that accorded to promises qualifying
employment at will. There are very few cases imposing a requirement
of special or additional consideration for a covenant not to compete
given by the employee at the inception of the employment relation-
ship.3 ° In most cases if an employee agrees, at the time the em-
ployment relationship commences, that upon termination he or she
will not compete with the employer or disclose confidential informa-
tion obtained from the employer, the initial promise of employment
supports the covenant not to compete as well as any other commit-
ments made by the employee. 6' If, however, the covenant not to
compete is obtained by the employer after the employment relation-
ship has commenced,362 numerous cases hold that the covenant must
be supported by independent consideration.3  It is tempting to
(S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
359. Alter, 560 A.2d at 1293; Hartbarger 857 P.2d at 781 n.3.
360. See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1987) (analyzing
consideration supplied for covenant not to compete that was executed at time of grant of
franchise); cf McCandless v. Carpenter, 848 P.2d 444, 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)
(discussing consideration for covenant not to compete executed incident to sale of used
equipment).
361. Most of the cases cited infra note 363 articulate this traditional rule.
362. 1 shall refer to covenants not to compete executed after the employment
relationship has commenced as "post-employment covenants" or "afterthought" covenants.
In using those terms I am not referring to the rare covenants executed after an
employment relationship has ended. Nor am I referring to the fact that the covenant may
restrict the employee's activities after his employment ceases. Almost all covenants not
to compete restrict post-termination activities, regardless of when they are executed.
363. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. 11.), affd, 24 F.3d 941
(7th Cir. 1994); Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 824 F. Supp. 961 (D.
Colo. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994); National Risk
Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Gagliardi Bros. v.
Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Creative Entertainment, Inc. v. Lorenz, 638
N.E.2d 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d 1221 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993); Advanced Copy Prod., Inc. v. Cool, 363 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977);
Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1983); Insurance Agents, Inc.
v. Abel, 338 N.W.2d 531 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); Evco Distrib., Inc. v. Brandau, 626 P.2d
1192 (Kan. 1981); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); National
Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Josten's Inc. v. National
Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v.
Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980); Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct.
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regard such cases as simple applications of the pre-existing duty rule
in its role as a policing device for contract modifications. As such,
they are subject to all the general criticism of the pre-existing duty
rule outlined in the preceding section. 6 Indeed, considered as
simple applications of the pre-existing duty rule, such cases may be
particularly good examples of the rule's defects, as there are perfectly
good reasons for an employer to obtain a covenant not to compete
part way through the employment relationship and reasons to enforce
such "afterthought" agreements whether the employer supplies fresh
consideration or not.3" During the course of an ongoing employ-
ment relationship, an employee may acquire specialized expertise,
valuable information, or "relational" assets, all at the employer's
expense or with the employer's assistance.3" At the inception of
the employment relationship the employer may not be able to identify
which employees will acquire such assets, and it may be impractical
or uneconomical to extract post-termination covenants not to compete
from all prospective employees. 67 It may thus be practically neces-
sary for the employer to obtain the covenant not to compete in the
middle of the employee's career, and the informational and relational
interests that justify such a covenant would seem to do so whether
market forces dictate that the employer give the employee some small
raise for the covenant or not. Considered as mere applications of the
pre-existing duty rule, the cases denying enforcement to afterthought
covenants on grounds of lack of fresh consideration are arguably
App. 1993); Kari Family Clinic of Chiropractic v. Bohnen, 349 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Hogan v. Bergen
Brunswig Corp., 376 A.2d 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), vacated, 378 A.2d 1164
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Milner Airco,,Inc. v. Morris, 433 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993); Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Stevenson v.
Parsons, 389 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 389 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1990);
Brooks Distrib. v. Pugh, 373 S.E.2d 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 378
S.E.2d 31 (N.C. 1989); Collier Cobb & Assocs. v. Leak, 300 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983); Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 492 N.E.2d 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Bilec v. Auburn &
Assocs., Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Records Ctr., Inc. v.
Comprehensive Management, Inc., 525 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Central Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Environmental Prod. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1981); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520
N.W.2d 93 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
364. See supra notes 167-90 and accompanying text.
365. See, e.g., Leibman & Nathan, supra note 342, at 1508.
366. Iid at 1484-91.
367. Id. at 1490-93.
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egregious examples of its defects, but there is nothing conceptually
distinctive about them.
However, considering such cases as simple applications of the
pre-existing duty rule, in my view, oversimplifies the role the doctrine
of consideration plays in such cases and underestimates their
distinctiveness. Among the cases denying enforcement to post-
employment covenants not to compete, a few contain rather unusual
features. First, there are a few cases in which the covenants not to
compete in question were obtained so close to the commencement of
the employment relationship that the courts could easily have
classified them as contemporaneous with the inception of employment
and concluded that they were supported by the employer's initial
promise to employ.3( Promises that could be considered contempo-
raneous with employment thus become "subsequent" to employment
and subject to a "fresh" consideration requirement. The courts'
apparent insistence on strict contemporaneousness as a condition for
enforcement of such covenants as ancillary to an initial employment
contract suggests that consideration is playing a somewhat distinctive
role. Second, there are a few cases denying enforcement of
postemployment covenants not to compete in which the "inducement"
component of the requirement of consideration is applied in an
unusually rigid fashion.369 In these cases the employee's salary or
368. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. Il1.) (involving a
noncompetition agreement signed slightly over three weeks after hiring), affd, 24 F.3d 941
(7th Cir. 1994); National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982)
(involving a noncompetition agreement that was signed within one week of commencing
employment); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980)
(involving employer who was under the mistaken assumption that an agreement signed by
a minor would be void, and thus did not require employee to sign noncompetition
agreement until four months after the commencement of employment); Sanborn Mfg. v.
Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a noncompetition agreement
signed within three weeks of commencing employment);- Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392
S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that since the restrictive covenant was not
discussed during prehiring interviews, it was not part of the employment contract);
Stevenson v. Parsons, 389 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the employment
relationship was established prior to the noncompetition agreement), review denied, 389
S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1990); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that
written restrictive covenant was invalid since it was entered into one month after original
oral agreement and had no consideration).
369. Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. I1l.), affd, 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir.
1994); Gagliardi Bros. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982);Freeman v. Duluth
Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993); Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Environ-
mental Prod. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1981).
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other benefits may have increased subsequent to the execution of the
covenant not to compete, but the court withholds enforcement
anyway on the grounds that the covenant and the subsequent benefit
are not linked by the strict relationship of mutual inducement
required by the doctrine of consideration in its most stringent
formulation.37  Again, the fact that the requirement of mutual
inducement is applied with great strictness in a business context is
some indication that the doctrine of consideration is playing some-
thing other than its usual role.37 It suggests that the courts are
approaching the imposition of a promise-specific consideration
requirement-a requirement that a separate item of consideration be
allocable to the covenant not to compete-although it is clear that the
courts are not prepared to do so as clearly and specifically as they
were in the case of promises qualifying employment at will.
If courts are thus creeping toward a special, promise-specific
consideration requirement, it is probably because they are sensing
policy concerns with respect to covenants not to compete that act as
counterweights to the admittedly good reasons employers often have
for seeking such covenants. A covenant not to compete given, and
observed, by an employee always removes at least one participant
from the market for services and thus has at least a marginal impact
on competition.' At the individual level, a covenant not to
compete can severely restrict a former employee's ability to make a
living if not appropriately limited in temporal and geographic scope,
and in the nature of the activities restricted.373 In the abstract,
however, if there are reasons to enforce a particular type of promise
and also reasons to be suspicious of that type of promise, the
determination whether to enforce a promise of that type in a
particular case should normally be some sort of balancing ap-
proach-a determination of overall reasonableness based on the
370. See cases cited supra note 369.
371. Cf. DAWSON, supra note 37, at 204-05 & n.17 (arguing that the doctrine of
consideration does not require that securing the opposite party's performance be the
promisor's primary motive as long as it is somewhere in his range of motives).
372. See, e.g., National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982)
(requiring additional consideration for noncompetition agreement); Hill v. Mobile Auto
Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987) (emphasizing policy in favor of free competition),
superseded by statute as stated in DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991); Leibman & Nathan, supra note 342, at 1481.
373. See, e.g., Gagliardi Bros., 538 F. Supp. at 529-30; Iowa Glass Depot, 338 N.W.2d
at 383-84; Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 171-72; Pemco Corp., 257 S.E.2d at 891-92; Leibman &
Nathan, supra note 342, at 1481-82.
[Vol. 29:713
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION
relative strength of the reasons favoring or counting against enforce-
ment in the particular case. Thus, in the case of covenants not to
compete, one would expect to find a standard of enforceability
defined in terms of overall reasonableness, taking into account the
employer's need for such a covenant to protect some informational or
relational interest, the degree to which the employee's post-termina-
tion activity is restricted by the covenant, and the effect, if any, on
competition. Indeed, in the case of covenants not to compete
executed contemporaneously with the initial employment contract, as
well as postemployment covenants for which consideration is given,
the cases generally make enforcement of the covenant depend on such
a determination of reasonableness. 74 However, the background of
a general reasonableness standard for such covenants raises a question
about the role of the doctrine of consideration as a test of the
enforceability of postemployment covenants not to compete. In a
determination of overall reasonableness based on multiple factors,375
in the abstract there is no reason to suppose that any single factor
should be so decisive in all or any significant percentage of cases that
it should become the sole arbiter of enforceability, effectively
supplanting the general determination of reasonableness. Thus, while
it would not be surprising to find that courts, when faced with the
question of the reasonableness of a postemployment covenant not to
compete, would consider the presence or absence of a separate
payment for the covenant to be relevant, it is somewhat surprising
that the presence or absence of consideration is elevated to a litmus
374. See, e.g., Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.
1978); Uarco, Inc. v. Eastland, 584 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (D. Kan. 1984); Cherry, Bekaert
& Holland v. LaSalle, 413 So. 2d 436,437-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Iowa Glass Depot,
338 N.W.2d at 381; Davies & Davies Agency, 298 N.W.2d at 131-32; Brooks Distrib., 373
S.E.2d at 303; Records Ctr., 525 A2d at 434-35; Central Adjustment Bureau, 678 S.W.2d
at 35-37.
375. It deserves emphasis that the reasonableness inquiry reflected in the relevant cases
is truly multifaceted and is not, in practice, confined to examination of the economic effect
of a particular covenant on the markets in which relevant employers and employees
participate. While there are frequent references in the cases to the public interest in favor
of open competition, it is doubtful--except perhaps in the case of rock stars or sports
figures-that a restriction on any one employee has much effect on the market. Nor are
the cases filled with theoretical discussions of the economic effects of the general adoption
of particular kinds of covenants. Rather, the practical focus of the courts in most cases
seems to be upon the individual needs, interests, and equities of particular employers and
employees, making the reasonableness inquiry much more like a determination of fairness
in the individual case than an analysis of market conditions. See cases cited supra note 374
and infra note 378.
January 1996]
800 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
test capable of supplanting the general reasonableness analysis when
separate consideration is absent. The distinctive role of the doctrine
of consideration as a test for enforcement of postemployment
covenants not to compete thus calls for some explanation.
Two possible explanations immediately spring to mind. First, if
it is assumed that, 'in the current labor market, employees are
generally dependent for economic security on their employers and
that employers generally have dramatically more bargaining power
than employees, the employment relationship may normally be
assumed to be inherently coercive, particularly after it has com-
menced. A postemployment covenant not to compete, therefore, is
quite likely to be the product of unfair bargaining pressure on the
part of the employer unless such pressure is checked in some manner.
It may be that a fairly strict consideration requirement, approaching
the level of a promise-specific requirement, is a method of policing for
such pressure.
Second, the presence or absence of- consideration for a
postemployment covenant not to compete may be a good proxy for
reasonableness or unreasonableness, making summary disposition
more likely and conserving judicial resources that would otherwise be
used in making the broader reasonableness assessment.
It is, of course, relatively easy to question the premises of both
explanations. With respect to the first explanation, for example, it
may be doubted that an employee who has progressed to the point of
acquiring informational or relational assets from the employer is so
utterly lacking in bargaining power that the employment relationship
may be presumed to be coercive. Moreover, the clumsiness of the
doctrine of consideration as apolicing device for improper bargaining
pressure has been argued at some length, both in this Article 6 and
by a string of previous critics.37
With respect to the second explanation, employees challenging
postemployment covenants not to compete are likely to challenge
them both on grounds of lack of consideration and lack of reasonable-
ness, in part because pleading rules permit it and iry part because both
consideration doctrine and the standards of reasonableness are
sufficiently tricky that reliance on one theory when two are available
would probably strike most lawyers as too risky. Therefore, it may be
376. See supra notes 180-190 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 89.
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doubted that a special consideration requirement results in any
significant conservation of judicial resources. Even under current
standards, which include a consideration requirement, there are a
number of cases in which appellate courts find consideration absent
and then make an assessment of the reasonableness of the covenant
at issue anyway,37' and there are others in which appellate courts
address only the issue of consideration but the trial courts involved
were forced to address both the consideration issue and the reason-
ableness issue at the most labor-intensive stage.379
Quite apart from the accuracy of their express premises or
implications, however, both of the foregoing explanations for the
consideration requirement rely on an assumption that may not be
apparent at first glance. Both rely on an implicit assumption that the
peppercorn theory of consideration has been eliminated from the
usual cluster of rules constituting the doctrine of consideration. If the
requirement of consideration used as a test for postemployment
covenants not to compete can be satisfied by providing some
commitment or performance of negligible value, such as the addition
of a thirty-day notice requirement before termination 8 or the
378. See Bilec v. Auburn & Assoc., Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d 538 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); Records Ctr., Inc. v. Comprehensive Management, Inc., 525 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1987); Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex..1987); Pemco Corp. v.
Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994); see also Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1978)
(reversing trial court findings of lack of consideration and unreasonable scope); Curtis
1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. Ill.) (addressing reasonableness of covenant
despite finding inadequate consideration), affd, 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994); Gagliardi
Bros. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (addressing reasonableness of covenant
despite finding inadequate consideration); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, 334 N.W.2d 626
(Minn. 1983) (addressing lack of consideration where arbitration panel addressed both
issues); Davies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980) (finding lack of
consideration as to one employee and addressing reasonableness of covenant with respect
to another).
379. National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323"N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Sanborn Mfg.
v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993): Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 376
A.2d 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), vacated, 37.8 A.2d 1164 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977); Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 433 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Young v.
Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Environmental Prods. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1981).
380. See Advanced Copy Prods. v. Cool, 363 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (finding
30-day notice provision sufficient consideration). But see Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843
F. Supp. 441 (C.D. I11.) (finding one-week notice provision insufficient), affid, 24 F.3d 941
(7th Cir. 1994); Evco Distrib. v. Brandau, 626 P.2d 1192 (Kan. Ct.,App. 1981) (finding
provision requiring employer to notify employee whether post-termination activity would
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continuation of at will employment for even a single day,38 it is
difficult to see how consideration provides much protection against
coercion or serves as any reliable proxy for the reasonableness of the
covenant's terms. Employers, who are presumably the most likely
parties to the employment relationship to be represented by counsel,
could master the peppercorn requirement with relative ease. Coercive
bargaining power is not mitigated by the need to supply a trifle for a
major concession, and, absent some requirement of rough equivalence
in value, a trifling consideration could support the most draconian of
restrictions. Both explanations thus depend on an implicit assumption
that, contrary to the usual rules relating to consideration, courts
assessing postemployment covenants not to compete will examine the
adequacy of consideration.
Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of the cases involving
postemployment covenants not to compete is that the formulation of
the consideration requirement seems to presuppose that a peppercorn
will not suffice. Courts tend to speak in terms of a requirement of
"adequate""2 or "reasonable"'3  consideration, and some cases
be considered a breach insufficient consideration); Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446
(N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding 30-day notice provision insufficient); Collier Cobb & Assocs.
v. Leak, 300 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (finding 30-day notice provision insufficient).
381. If one conceptualizes at. will employment as a continuing series of offers of
unilateral contracts accepted by successive performances, one could regard a post-
employment covenant not to compete as supported by consideration in the form of the
employer's forbearance from exercising his unqualified right to discharge, even if the
forbearance lasted only a short while.
382. See, e.g., Curtis 1000. Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. I1l.), aff'd, 24 F.3d 941
(7th Cir. 1994); National Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Gagliardi Bros. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Cherry, Bekaert &
Holland v. LaSalle, 413 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Creative Entertainment, Inc.
v. Lorenz, 638 N.E.2d 217 (III. App. Ct. 1994); Mid-Town Petroleum v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d
1221 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983);
National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Davies & Davies
Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980); Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d
161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Kari Family Clinic of Chiropractic v. Bohnen, 349 N.W.2d 868
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Young
v. Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 492
N.E.2d 867 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Bilec v. Auburn & Assocs. Inc. Pension Trust, 588 A.2d
538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Environmental Prods. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1981); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979); see also McCandless v.
Carpenter, 848 P.2d 444 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (imposing special consideration
requirement for specific performance of covenant executed incident to sale of used
equipment); Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1983) (finding
sufficient consideration in continued employment to satisfy consideration requirement but
examining adequacy of consideration in determining whether covenant met reasonableness
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require that the employee have received "real advantages.''384  In
part, such formulations are no doubt due to the fact that the
employers seeking to enforce covenants not to compete generally seek
injunctive relief,385 and in equity the rule that the adequacy of
consideration will not be examined has never held complete sway.
However, it also seems plausible to suppose that such formulations
reflect the fact, whether it is recognized or not, that consideration
doctrine cannot accomplish what judges want it to do in this context
unless it amounts to a requirement that the employee be fairly
paid-not just paid a trifle-for the execution of a postemployment
covenant not to compete.
Somewhat ironically, however, if the consideration test that is
applied to a postemployment covenant not to compete must be a
substantive test of rough equivalence in value, the justification for
retaining consideration as a separate test of enforceability, indepen-
dent of the requirement that the covenant be reasonable, is complete-
ly undercut. Surely, the determination whether an employee has
requirement); Stevenson v. Parsons, 384 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing
"valuable consideration"), review denied, 389 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1990); Martin v. Credit
Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (requiring "independent valuable
consideration").
383. See, e.g., Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 433 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Central
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); see also Evco Distrib. v.
Brandau, 626 P.2d 1192 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (finding no "actual benefit" or "real detri-
ment").
384. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, 334 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1983); National
Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Josten's Inc. v. National
Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982); Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
385. Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 843 F. Supp. 441 (C.D. Ill.), affd, 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir.
1994); National Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Gagliardi Bros. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982); McCandless v. Carpenter, 848
P.2d 444 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Creative Entertainment, Inc. v. Lorenz, 638 N.E.2d 217
(I1l. App. Ct. 1994); Mid-Town Petroleum v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d 1221 (Iil. App. Ct. 1993);
Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1983); Evco Distrib. v. Brandau,
626 P.2d 1192 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626
(Minn. 1983); National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Davies
& Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980); Sanborn Mfg. v. Currie,
500 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 433 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Young v.
Mastrom, Inc., 392 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. 1990); Environmental Prods. Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1981); Pemco
Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1979); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994).
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received "fair consideration" for a covenant not to compete depends
not only on what the employer serves up at the time of the execution
of the covenant, but on the benefits the employer has conferred on
the employee by way of informational and relational assets as well as
on the extent of the restrictions the employer wants to impose.
Whether the employer supplies some new benefit contemporaneous
with the execution of the postemployment covenant may be one fact
relevant in determining whether the covenant was coerced or whether
the employee has been "fairly paid," but there is no reason to isolate
it for separate treatment and regard it as an independent gatekeeper.
A requirement of fair consideration is, in fact, a truncated form of the
requirement that a covenant not to compete be reasonable overall, an
assessment requiring an examination of the same factors and the same
range of evidence as a general determination of reasonableness."6
If so, neither conceptual clarity nor judicial efficiency is improved by
isolating the issue of consideration for separate treatment and
assigning it the status of a gatekeeper.
V. THE GENERAL REQUIREMENT OF BARGAINED EXCHANGE
A. The Residual Cases
Though the analysis of the numerous cases decided under the
various specialized corollaries to the doctrine of consideration is
complete, a significant class of cases decided under the general
requirement of bargained exchange remains. It is still easy to find
cases in which a promise is not enforced because nothing is exchanged
or promised for it, or because, although there may be performances
or promises on both sides of a transaction, the promise ultimately
denied enforcement did not induce, or was not induced by, the
performance or promise on the opposite side of the transaction.
Initially, there are two interesting aspects of this group of cases. First,
although a reference to "gratuitous" promises may conjure up images
of doting relatives making imprudent promises to younger family
members or wheedling relatives extracting deathbed promises from
aged-and wealthy-benefactors, and although intrafamily promises
do form part of the relevant class of cases,3" the overwhelming
386. Obviously, however, the truncation of the general reasonableness inquiry under
the rubric of "adequate consideration" threatens to distort that inquiry by masking the
breadth of the range of factors relevant to the determination of overall reasonableness.
387. See Grubbs v. Mattson, 599 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Simonian v.
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majority of promises invalidated for failure to satisfy the requirement
of bargained exchange are promises made in a business context.3"
Patterson, 27 Cal. App. 4th 773, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (1994); Kremser v. Tonokaboni, 356
So. 2d 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Grandon v. Amcore Trust Co., 588 N.E.2d 311 (111.
App. Ct.), cert. denied, 602 N.E.2d 451 (111. 1992), Thomas v. Bryant, 597 So. 2d 1065 (La.
Ct. App. 1992); Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978), overruled on other grounds,
545 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1991); In re Estate of Wahby, 758 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1988). In addition,
there are a few cases that deny enforcement of promises one would not normally classify
as business promises or intrafamily promises. See, e.g., Altimus v. Manhood Found., 425
F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (involving a claim for preparation of inadequate parole plan
for prisoner), aff d, 559 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1977); Vallaire v. Lee, 430 So. 2d 1080 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (discussing note and second mortgage executed by mistress without
consideration as subterfuge designed to defeat her mother's claims under state forced
heirship law); Whitten v. Greeley-Shaw, 520 A.2d 1307 (Me. 1987) (various promises to
mistress); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979)
(charitable subscription); Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691
(Mass. 1989) (charitable subscription); Cash v. Benward, 873 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (involving alleged promise to provide assistance in obtaining insurance coverage);
Bartmess v. Bourassa, 639 P.2d 1147 (Mont. 1982) (discussing a note obtained fraudulently
by son from mother); Kully v. Goldman, 305 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1981) (dealing with
promise to obtain and transfer season tickets to college football games); Schreiber v. Olan
Mills, 627 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (involving an alleged agreement by telemarketer
to pay for "listening services" of those solicited).
388. See Patel v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 975 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir.
1992); Henig Furs, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1993); Banque
Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement v. Bulk Oil (USA), Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1411
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F.
Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Wadsworth v. Nalco Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ala.
1981), affd, 679 F.2d 251 (11th Cir. 1982); Erika, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 496 F.
Supp. 786 (N.D. Ala. 1980); ACMAT Corp. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
442 F. Supp. 772 (D. Conn. 1977); Soar v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 438 F.
Supp. 337 (D.R.I. 1975), affd, 550 F.2d 1287 (1st Cir. 1977); FDIC v. Butler (In re Conner
Corp.), 127 B.R. 775 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1991); Munoz v. New Metro. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n (In re Munoz), 81 B.R. 695 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); McHale v. Kohut (In re Ocean
Beach Club, Inc.), 79 B.R. 505 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Griffith v. Lawrence Sys., Inc. (In
re Hipp, Inc.), 71 B.R. 643 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); Kennebago Corp. v. Blackburn (In
re Kennebago Corp.), 50 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985); Memorial Assocs. v.Sunset
Memorial Gardens, Inc. (In re Sunset Memorial Gardens, Inc.), 49 B.R. 817 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985); Sepco, Inc. v. Valley State Bank (In re Sepco, Inc.), 36 B.R. 279 (Bankr.
D.S.D.), aff d sub non, United States v. Arlon Indus., Inc. (In re Sepco, Inc.), 750 F.2d
51 (8th Cir. 1984); Kittle v. Sand Mountain Bank, 437 So. 2d 100 (Ala. 1983); Certified
Collectors, Inc. v. Lesnick, 570 P.2d 769 (Ariz. 1977); City of Arvada v. Concrete
Contractors, Inc., 628 P.2d 170 (Colo. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 621 P.2d 320
(Colo. 1981); Grant v. Oten, 626 P.2d 764 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Lambert v. Weeks. 554
So. 2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kaufman v. Harder, 354 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978); Davidson v. Willis, 362 S.E.2d 115
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Wilson v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982);
Gulden v. Newberry Wrecker Serv., 267 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Trust Co. v.
Rhodes, 242 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Verson v. Steimberg, 548 N.E.2d 363 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989); Agnew v. Brown, 422 N.E.2d 111 (111. App. Ct. 1981); Codo v. Union Nat'l
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In this respect the cases decided under the general requirement of
bargained exchange are no different from those decided under the
various corollaries to the doctrine of consideration. 9 Second, cases
decided Under the general requirement of bargained exchange also
fall into the patterns observed in the examination of cases decided
under the corollaries. In most of the cases in which a promise is
denied enforcement for lack of consideration, some other legal
defense or doctrine also provides, or could provide, a sufficient reason
to deny enforcement. Most commonly, the alternate ground of
decision is one of the group of doctrines that form the law of mutual
assent.39  In a smaller, but still significant, group of cases, the
Bank and Trust, 370 N.E.2d 140 (111. App. Ct. 1977); Burdsall v. City of Elwood, 454
N.E.2d 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Hormuth Drywall & Painting Serv. v. Erectioneers, Inc.,
381 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Urbanational Developers v. Shamrock Eng'g, 372
N.E.2d 742 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978); Graves v. Porterfield, 555 So. 2d 595 (La. Ct. App. 1989);
Eustis v. Moons, 367 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 577 (La. 1979);
Bethany Trust Co. v. Harker, 780 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Lillo v. Thee, 676
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P.2d 388 (Mont. 1978);
Schrempp v. Gallup, 315 N.W.2d 248 (Neb. 1982); Chasan v. Village Dist., 523 A.2d 16
(N.H. 1986); Arcan Transp., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 388 N.Y.S.2d 737
(App. Div. 1976); University of N.C. v. Shoemate, 437 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 447 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. 1994); Labarre v. Duke Univ., 393 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. Ct. App.
1990), review denied, 399 S.E.2d 122 (N.C. 1990); Home Elec. Co. v. Hall & Underdown
Heating & Air Conditioning, 358 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 366 S.E.2d 441
(N.C. 1988); Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 351 S.E.2d 786
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Reidy v. Macauley, 290 S.E.2d 746 (N.C. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 294
S.E.2d 221 (N.C. 1982); Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 780 P.2d
674 (Okla. 1989).
389. 1 should add that, in this respect, my examination of recent cases is entirely
consistent with Professor Havighurst's 1942 examination of 183 cases from the Northeastern
and Northwestern Reporters. See Havighurst, supra note 61, at 20 n.45.
390. See, e.g., Patel v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, 975 F.2d 1312 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that no consideration existed for written assurance that foreign
internship satisfied certification requirements; facts suggest communication was not a
promise); Henig Furs, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (holding
that alleged promise by large retailer to permit fur dealer to solicit individual stores was
not an offer and was not supported by consideration); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc.
v. Schlaifer Nance & Co., 679 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding that manufacturer's
promise to include advertising and licensing agent in future deal was mere agreement to
agree, indefinite, and unsupported by consideration); Erika, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 496 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (holding that agreement by insurer to make
direct payment to provider lacked both consideration and offer and acceptance); Altimus
v. Manhood Found., 425 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding no evidence that
defendants made a promise to prepare adequate parole plan for prisoner or that prisoner
supplied any consideration), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1977); Soar v. National Football
League Players Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 337 (D.R.I. 1975) (finding alleged promise of
retroactive pension coverage too indefinite and not supported by consideration), affid, 550
F.2d 1287 (1st Cir. 1977); FDIC v. Butler (In re Conner Corp.), 127 B.R. 775 (Bankr.
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alternate ground is one of the defenses based on misconduct.391
E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that alleged agreement to maintain specified level of capital for
savings and loan lacked both consideration and mutual manifestation of assent); Munoz
v. New Metro. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Munoz), 81 B.R. 695 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)
(finding no consideration and absence of intention to assign note); Memorial Assocs. v.
Sunset Memorial Gardens, Inc. (In re Sunset Memorial Gardens), 49 B.R. 817 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985) (holding that alleged agreement between cemetery and joint venture of
funeral homes lacked both consideration and mutual assent); Certified Collectors, Inc. v.
Lesnick, 570 P.2d 769 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (holding that a purported assignment which
merely recited consideration but lacked basic elements of an assignment failed for
indefiniteness); Simonian v. Patterson, 27 Cal. App. 4th 773, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (1994)
(holding alleged promise by father to daughter's fiance to assist in efforts to collect debt
from daughter lacked consideration; facts suggest that alleged promise was indefinite and
too casual to amount to contractual undertaking); Burdsall v, City of Elwood, 454 N.E.2d
434 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that alleged promise by mayor to appoint plaintiff fire
chief failed for lack of consideration; facts suggest assurances were not an unequivocal
promise); Hormuth Drywall & Painting Serv., Inc. v. Erectioneers, Inc., 381 N.E.2d 490
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that no consideration existed for alleged promises by owner
and general contractor to assist one subcontractor in collecting payments due from
another; facts suggest communications were too vague and indefinite to be enforceable);
Eustis v. Moons, 367 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that no consideration existed for
alleged guaranty by general agent of employee's obligation under commission-sharing
arrangement, and that alleged beneficiary of guaranty was not party to subsequent
memorandum), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 577 (La. 1979); Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435
(Me. 1978) (holding that alleged agreement to purchase stock failed for lack of
consideration and mutual assent); Cash v. Benward, 873 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that alleged promise to assist in obtaining insurance coverage lacked consideration
and was too casual to be reasonably understood as contractual undertaking); Chasan v.
Village Dist., 523 A.2d 16 (N.H. 1986) (holding that board of directors report was not
properly classified as offer under objective theory of assent and lacked both definiteness
and consideration); Arcan Transp., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 388 N.Y.S.2d
737 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that alleged working capital agreement was too indefinite
and lacked consideration); Reidy v. Macauley, 290 S.E.2d 746 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding
that no consideration existed for buyers' alleged obligation to pay broker's commission;
facts suggest that promise was made only by sellers, not buyers), cert. denied, 294 S.E.2d
211 (N.C. 1982); Schreiber v. Olan Mills, 627 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that
alleged agreement by telemarketer to pay for "listening services" of those solicited lacked
consideration and unconditional manifestation of assent); see also Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 780 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1989) (holding that alleged promise
by secured creditor to pay supplier of debtor directly lacked consideration; existence of
promise disputed).
391. See, e.g., Banque Arabe etInternationale D'Investissement v. Bulk Oil (USA) Inc.,
726 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that no consideration existed for oil buyer's
promise to post letter of credit and advise through bank financing seller; facts suggest
promise was induced by seller as part of a scheme to mislead the bank); McHale v. Kohut
(In re Ocean Beach Club, Inc.), 79 B.R. 505 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that no
consideration existed for note and mortgage; facts suggest transaction was either collusive,
sham, or usurious); Griffith v. Lawrence Sys., Inc. (In re Hipp, Inc.), 71 B.R. 643 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1987) (finding no consideration for note executed and transferred as part of
series of sham transactions designed to manufacture bankruptcy claim); Sepco, Inc. v.
Valley State Bank (In re Sepco, Inc.), 36 B.R. 279 (Bankr. D.S.D.) (finding that
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There are also a few cases in which the alternate ground is failure of
some condition attached to the alleged promise,3" as well as a small
subordination agreement in favor of bank was obtained from holder of mechanic's lien
through fraud and lacked consideration), affd sub norm, United States v. Arlon Indus., Inc.
(In re Sepco, Inc.), 750 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1984); Grubbs v. Mattson, 599 S.W.2d 148 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that no consideration existed for alleged agreement between
sisters to share mother's estate, where lower court found agreement induced by fraud and
duress of one sister); City of Arvada v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 628 P.2d 170 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (finding no consideration for developer's promise to pipe ditch, and declining
to address duress defense raised in trial court); Grant v. Oten, 626 P.2d 764 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that no consideration existed for note and second deed of trust
executed by functionally illiterate and blind maker at the direction of her employer and
the payee of note, upon whom maker was dependent for explanation); Kremser v.
Tonokaboni, 356 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that note and mortgage
executed by aunt in favor of niece's husband lacked consideration; facts suggest fraud and
undue influence); Davidson v. Willis, 362 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no
consideration for note executed as part of transaction allegedly induced by fraud and
duress); Verson v. Steimberg, 548 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding no consideration
for execution of trust deed by estranged wife to secure notes given by husband as part of
purchase of business; facts suggest character of document was misrepresented); Agniew v.
Brown, 422 N.E.2d 111 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (finding no consideration for alleged
assignment of rights under land sale contract; facts suggest fraud on part of assignee or
misunderstanding between parties); Codo v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust, 370 N.E.2d 140
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (finding no consideration for note and mortgage executed as part of
sham transaction designed to create priority over other possible creditors); Vallaire v. Lee,
430 So. 2d 1080 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that note and second mortgage executed by
mistress without consideration was subterfuge designed to defeat claims of her mother
under state forced heirship law); Whitten v. Greeley-Shaw, 520 A.2d 1307 (Me. 1987)
(holding mistress's promise not to phone married lover without permission was insufficient
consideration for substantial return promises; facts suggest promises were induced by
threat to visit vacation home and expose affair to wife); In re Estate of Wahby, 758 S.W.2d
440 (Mo. 1988) (holding that agreement to share estate was induced by duress, including
death threats; absence of consideration reduced burden of proof of duress); Lillo v. Thee,
676 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no consideration for note and deed of trust;
facts suggest payee induced maker to execute note as refinancing of a prior note that had
already been paid); Bartmess v. Bourassa, 639 P.2d 1147 (Mont. 1982) (finding no
consideration for note and mortgage executed by widow under erroneous belief that the
note and mortgage were necessary to obtain bail bond for son; facts suggest fraud);
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. L.N. Properties Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(affirming denial of summary judgment for defendants on issues of fraud and lack of
consideration for note); Fuchs v. MiCAD Sys., Inc., 526 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div. 1988)
(reversing summary judgment on notes, finding material issues of fact on issues of fraud
and consideration); University of N.C. v. Shoemate, 437 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. Ct. App.)
(holding that employment agreement between purported physician and hospital lacked
consideration as physician had not attended medical school; facts suggest fraud in the
inducement), cert. denied, 447 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. 1994).
392. See Thomas v. Bryant, 597 So. 2d 1065 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing summary
judgment against maker of promissory note where maker defended on grounds of lack of
consideration and failure to comply with conditions); Graves v. Porterfield, 555 So. 2d 595
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding a promisory note invalid because payee, who was not a
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group in which one suspects that consideration doctrine has been
manipulated in service of judicial notions of public policy.393 In all
of these cases the doctrine of consideration is once again redundant.
When that class of cases is disregarded, there remains a smaller class
of cases in which the doctrine of consideration really does pull the
laboring oar but in which the results it produces are a source of some
intellectual discomfort.3 94 In some cases the intellectual discomfort
is simply a recognition that consideration doctrine itself has been
holder in due course, failed to provide consideration; maker had contended note intended
only as security for return of car); Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 351 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a promise to purchase a
construction loan lacked consideration and was unenforceable due to unfulfilled
conditions).
393. The most obvious-and perfectly acceptable--examples are cases in which a
finding of lack of consideration is simply an element or stage in the analysis leading to a
case disposition expressly based on a policy defined by statute. See, e.g., Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992)
(finding charitable contributions avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code as fraudulent
conveyances), affd, 152 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). More troublesome are cases
in which it is clear that a court could have found consideration for a promise but applied
the requirement of consideration with more than the customary rigidity, presumably for
the purpose of reaching a result in accord with its own conception of policy. See ACMAT
Corp. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 442 F. Supp. 772 (D. Conn. 1977)
(holding that ironworkers' local union was not bound by its agreement with a subcontrac-
tor and another local union allocating work between the two unions because subcontractor
was not party to separate subcontract with ironworkers and thus furnished no consider-
ation); Wilson v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
an idea must be novel for its disclosure to constitute a property right sufficient to serve as
consideration for implied contract to compensate); Urbanational Developers v. Shamrock
Eng'g, 372 N.E.2d 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing summary judgment as to validity of
"no lien" agreement between an owner and general contractor executed simultaneously
with general construction contract); Higgins v. Monroe Evening News, 272 N.W.2d 537
(Mich. 1978) (holding that the reward of a dime, candy, or soft drink did not constitute
consideration for services, and that provider of services was therefore not eligible for
workers' compensation benefits), rev'd on other grounds, 295 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 1976);
Labarre v. Duke Univ., 393 S.E.2d 321 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that a physician's oral
promise to perform an epidural anesthetic procedure personally required consideration
beyond submission to treatment), review denied, 399 S.E.2d 122 (N.C. 1990). I have
argued elsewhere that it would be better for courts to face the policy questions presented
by such cases directly. See supra notes 302-19 and accompanying text; see also Wessman,
supra note 2, at 93-97 (arguing that public policy questions should be faced directly and
expressly).
394. In addition to the cases in which consideration doctrine is redundant and cases in
which it does harm, there is a small class of cases in which the judicial description of the
facts is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine whether or not the case disposition is
desirable. See Lambert v. Weeks, 554 So. 2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kaufman v.
Harder, 354 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).
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misapplied395 or that idiosyncratic subrules have introduced a degree
395. In some instances the misapplication is apparent judicial conflation of the defenses
of lack of consideration and failure of consideration. See, e.g., Williamson v. Guice, 613
So. 2d 797 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 617 So. 2d 937 (La. 1993); City Bank & Trust Co.
v. White, 434 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Johnson v. Bond, 540 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976). The real gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration is performed
by the legal theory of lack of consideration, which normally consists of a claim that a
promise is not part of an exchange or was not induced by a return promise or perfor-
mance. Lack of consideration is said to make a promise unenforceable at the outset. The
conceptually distinct defense of failure of consideration presupposes that, at the outset, a
promise was part of a bargained-for exchange and so was supported by consideration. If
one party to the bargain fails to perform, however, the other party's performance is
excused. It is the defense of lack of consideration that is the subject of criticism in this
Article, in part because it unduly restricts the class of enforceable promises. Not all
enforceable promises need be bargains. However, I have indicated, supra note 1, that I
have no quarrel with the general proposition that the presence of consideration should
make a bargain promise presumptively enforceable. Likewise, when a promise is made as
part of a bargain, I have no quarrel with the defense of failure of consideration. If both
parties do, in fact, contemplate an exchange, the failure of the exchange on one side
should excuse performance on the other. The conceptual basis for the defense is, in effect,
that each party's duty to perform is conditional upon the other's correlative duty. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. a (1981). Indeed, the drafters of the
Restatement recommend use of the phrase "failure of performance" rather than "failure
of consideration" precisely to avoid confusion with lack or absence of consideration. Id.
In other instances of apparent misapplication of consideration doctrine, courts appear
reluctant to recognize what appear to be fairly strong showings of the presence of
consideration. See Urbanational Developers v. Shamrock Eng'g, 372 N.E.2d 742 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (remanding for determination of consideration for "no lien" agreement
executed simultaneously with construction contract); Schrempp v. Gallup, 315 N.W.2d 248
(Neb. 1982) (remanding to determine whether forbearance from renewal of a lease was
consideration for a note executed by sublessee in favor of sublessor as underlying lease
was expiring). Finally, there are occasional cases in which the doctrine of consideration
is distorted in an apparent attempt to reach a fair result that the court seems unable to
reach any other way. In Gulden v. Newberry Wrecker Serv., 267 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980), for example, a sublessor and sublessee entered into a five-year sublease of real
property in spite of the fact that the sublessor's own leasehold interest expired in two
years. Id. at 764. When the true owner dispossessed the sublessee slightly less than two
years before the termination of the sublease, the sublessee sued the sublessor for breach.
Id. While the facts of the case at least suggest a possible defense of mutual mistake, the
court was precluded from disposing of the case on that theory by its belief that both
parties were chargeable with notice of the limitations on the sublessor's interest. Id. at
765. Assuming that to be correct, one would suppose the appropriate conclusion would
be that the sublessor breached and that the sublessee either waived the breach or failed
to mitigate. Instead, the court reached the same result-that is, no liability-by the
dubious step of splitting the sublease into the part coinciding with the sublessor's interest
and the part beyond his interest and holding the latter part to be without consideration.
Id. Quite apart from the fact that subparts of contracts need not normally be assigned
separate consideration, the court clearly analyzed the consideration issue from the wrong
perspective. It is fairly obvious that the party seeking to enforce the sublease had supplied
consideration in the form of a promise to pay rent for five years.
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of incoherence into the doctrine." The latter category includes a
few recent cases in which courts carve out exceptions to the general
rule that consideration for a promise or performance may be supplied
by a third party or provided to a third party.97  For example,
although a pledge of one's own assets may normally be supported by
consideration in the form of a loan or extension of credit to someone
else, courts occasionally use the doctrine of consideration to invalidate
a wife's mortgage of real estate to secure her husband's debts398 or
a corporation's pledge of assets to secure the debt incurred by
purchasers of its stock in a leveraged buyout.399 The first exception
may be motivated by a concern that one spouse will overreach or
deceive the other, and the second may be motivated by a concern that
a corporation's creditors may be prejudiced by an encumbrance of all
assets to secure the debt of the privileged shareholders.' ° Those
are commendable concerns, and they may, in some instances, justify
exceptions to the normal consideration rules, assuming the consider-
396. See, e.g., Grandon v. Amcore Trust Co., 588 N.E.2d 311 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied,
602 N.E.2d 451 (I11. 1992). In Grandon the critical issue was the enforceability of a
restrictive legend on the shares of stock of a close corporation that gave the corporation
the right to repurchase the shares upon the death of the shareholder. Id. at 312. The
court expounded the familiar reasons in favor of permitting such restrictions upon the
transfer of shares of a close corporation and noted that such restrictions are even valid
against an employee who receives a gratuitous transfer of shares or options to purchase
shares. Id. at 314-15. A gift of stock to an employee, it seems, may be beneficial to both
transferor and transferee, even if the benefits are not part of a bargain, and that is enough
to validate the restriction. After recognizing the validity of conditions attached to a gift
of stock to an employee, the court refused to recognize the validity of the same conditions
attached to a gift of stock to the wife of a major shareholder because intrafamily transfers
are presumed gratuitous on the part of both transferor and transferee. Id. at 315.
Obviously, however, the reasons that lead a close corporation to restrict transfers of its
shares apply whether the party against whom enforcement is sought is the heir of a
deceased or retired employee or the heir of a former shareholder's deceased spouse.
397. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4).
398. See, e.g., Kittle v. Sand Mountain Bank, 437 So. 2d 100 (Ala. 1983); Verson v.
Steimberg, 548 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
399. Kennebago Corp. v. Blackburn (In re Kennebago Corp.), 50 B.R. 153 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1985).
400. Indeed, in addition to finding a lack of consideration for the note and mortgage'
at issue, the Kennebago court found the note and mortgage subject to equitable subordina-
tion under § 510 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 157.
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ation rules are already in place.:" Even if they do, however, they
render an already complicated doctrine even more labyrinthine.
Further reason to be dissatisfied with the doctrine of consider-
ation is provided by a pair of cases in which the courts seem to use
lack of consideration to deny enforcement of promises regarded as
trivial or so casual that legal consequences could not have been
intended.' The dissatisfaction arises because the presence or
absence of consideration is an unreliable proxy for seriousness or legal
intent. For example, in Wadsworth v. Nalco Chemical Co.3 the
promise at issue truly was gratuitous. A prospective employer
promised an applicant for employment that his current employer
would not be told of the application. When the current employer
nonetheless learned of the applicant's wandering eye, the current
employer terminated him. 5 The applicant's suit against the pro-
spective employer on the promise of confidentiality was dismissed on
summary judgment because there had been no consideration for the
promise.
In contrast, in Kully v. Goldman 7 the court technically misap-
plied the doctrine of consideration. At issue was an alleged promise
by one football fan, Goldman, to another, Kully, to obtain four season
tickets to University of Nebraska varsity football games every year
and resell them to Kully for the same price he paid for them."0
The arrangement was apparently necessary because excessive demand
made it impossible for anyone except students to obtain new season
tickets and impossible for nonstudents to get permission from the
401. Of course, once the doctrine of consideration reaches a certain level of
complication, it seems unlikely that retention of the doctrine of consideration, with all its
corollaries and exceptions, is a better way of addressing those concerns than direct
application of the defenses of fraud, duress, and undue influence in the case of mortgages
by spouses and fraudulent conveyance law in the case of leveraged buyouts.
402. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Nalco Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ala. 1981), aff'd,
679 F.2d 251 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Kully v. Goldman, 305 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1981); see also
Simonian v. Patterson, 27 Cal. App. 4th 773, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (1994) (holding that an
attempt to use the legal system to sue an ex-flance's father to recover an engagement ring
under a tort theory was frivolous); Cash v. Benward, 873 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a gratuitous promise was not intended as consideration for contract to
perform).
403. 523 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ala. 1981), affd, 679 F.2d 251 (11th Cir. 1982).
404. Id. at 998.
405. I
406. Id. at 1000-01.
407. 305 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1981).
408. Id at 801.
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university for an official transfer of season tickets.' The parties
performed under the agreement for seventeen seasons, and, when
Goldman sought to terminate, Kully brought an action for equitable
relief.4"' The suit was unsuccessful, in part because the Supreme
Court of Nebraska ultimately held the promise lacked consider-
ation.4 ' The court's instinct, of course, was reliable. Goldman was
indeed making a gift, and the gift is most appropriately characterized
as a gift of his access to scarce and coveted tickets. However, as a
technical matter, the doctrine of consideration was satisfied. A resale
contract without a profit is still a contract, and the consideration
consists of a promise to convey on one side and a promise to pay on
the other.
The point, however, is not simply that the Nebraska court made
a technical error. Rather, the point is that the two cases together
illuStrate the difficulty of using the doctrine of consideration as a
vehicle for screening out promises that are casual, trivial, or made
without serious intention to be bound. The promise of confidentiality
in Wadsworth may have been gratuitous, but it was arguably a serious
one. It was made in the business context for the purpose of exploring
the desirability of a future exchange in the form of a possible
employment relationship. It is arguable that promises thus ancillary
to potential exchanges should be enforced.412 In contrast, the
promise of football tickets in Kully, though clearly part of a reciprocal
arrangement, was arguably a mere social promise-a mere favor for
a friend. Only a truly rabid Cornhusker fan could be enthusiastic
about judicial intervention in support of such a promise. In these two
instances, therefore, the seriousness of the promise at issue is in no
way correlated to the presence or absence of consideration.
A further source of dissatisfaction with the doctrine of consider-
ation is the fact that some jurisdictions still lag behind in recognizing
exceptions to the doctrine that otherwise command widespread
support. In recent cases, for example, courts have refused to enforce
charitable subscriptions in the absence of consideration or demonstra-
ble reliance.4 3 The court in one recent case414 effectively refused
409. Id. at 802.
410. IdL at 801.
411. IL at 802-03.
412. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652-56; Gordon, Consideration, supra
note 67, at 289-90, 292-98; Reiter, supra note 89, at 456-58; infra notes 437-38, 452, 488-89
and accompanying text.
413. See, eg., Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, Inc., 407 A.2d 1130
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to recognize that a voidable or unenforceable promise may be
consideration for a return promise,415 and another court recently
refused to permit the "offensive" use of promissory estoppel." 6 The
objectionable feature of such cases is not only that they make the law
less uniform but that they apply the doctrine of consideration with its
classical rigor in circumstances in which it is generally agreed to be
desirable to carve out exceptions.
Finally, as was observed earlier with respect to the cases decided
under more specific corollaries to the doctrine of consideration, one
occasionally encounters a case in which the general requirement of
bargained exchange is used to deny enforcement to a promise that has
enough in common with a conventional bargain to have a similar
claim to enforcement. For example, in Trust Co. of Columbus v.
Rhodes4 7 a bank made loans to a motorcycle dealer over a period
of years 1 One note was secured by a blanket security interest on
the dealer's inventory of motorcycles and parts. 9  When the
motorcycle business, including the bank's collateral, was destroyed by
fire, the bank learned, no doubt to its chagrin, that it was listed as a
loss payee only on the dealer's insurance policy covering motorcycles,
not on the policy covering parts.42" The bank nevertheless notified
the dealer's insurers of the full extent of its security interest and
obtained from the insurer's agents two separate and undisputed
promises to make any insurance proceeds checks jointly payable to
the bank and the dealer.421 The insurer performed as promised on
the first check it issued but issued a second check payable only to the
dealer.4' The dealer cashed the check and failed to pay the
bank.4z The bank sued to recover the balance of its debt from both
the dealer and the insurer, relying on the promise of joint payment
(Md. 1979); Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (recommending enforcement of
charitable subscriptions in the absence of consideration or reliance).
414. Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P.2d 388 (Mont. 1978).
415. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 cmt. c., illus. 2.
416. Home Elec. Co. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning, 358 S.E.2d
539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), af.Pd, 366 S.E.2d 441 (1988).
417. 242 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).
418. Id. at 739.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id
423. ld
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for recovery against the latter.424 The appellate court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the insurer, noting quite correctly that
the bank had neither promised to provide any benefit to the insurer
nor agreed to forbear collection activities or any other action.'
However, if the blinders of consideration doctrine are removed,
there is much to commend enforcement of the insurer's promise of
joint payment. The bank's claim to the insurance proceeds generated
by bank collateral was clearly superior to the debtor's,4 26 and the
promise of joint payment was thus an appropriate response to the
bank's notification of the extent of its security interest. There was no
question that the promise was made, and any evidentiary need for
consideration was therefore lacking. Though the promise was not
itself part of a discrete bargain, it was, in effect, bounded by the
context of two perfectly ordinary bargains-the insurance contract and
the lending arrangement. It was a promise made by one sophisticated
business participant to another. Moreover, it would appear to be the
type of promise likely to induce reliance by the promisee, albeit
reliance of a type-failure to take alternative steps to protect the
bank's interest-difficult to prove.4' Ift as will be suggested below,
such factors figure in traditional explanations of the reasons conven-
tional bargains are enforced, they also favor enforcement of gratuitous
promises like the promise at issue in Rhodes.
424. Id.
425. 1l at 740.
426. See U.C.C. § 9-306 (1994).
427. For a similar example of a promise likely to induce reliance that is difficult to
prove, see Bethany Trust Co. v. Harker, 780 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). The case
was a suit brought on a note payable to a bank executed by Leroy Harker and allegedly
guaranteed by Colleen Harker. Id. at 151-52. Colleen's written guaranty agreement was
executed in 1974, and Leroy's note was not executed until 1984. Id Perhaps because of
the length of time between the execution of the guaranty and the note, the appellate court
ultimately held that the bank was required to prove it had relied on the guaranty in
extending credit to Leroy, effectively requiring the bank to prove the guaranty was part
of the 1984 bargain. Id. at 153. Unfortunately, the bank did not sue on the note until
1987, at which point the relevant loan officer-who had presumably engaged in numerous
transactions in the meantime-could not recall his subjective thought processes three years
earlier. Id. at 152. Given that a written guaranty is the type of promise likely to generate
reliance, for reasons to be developed infra part V.B, it would have been preferable to
presume the guaranty was enforceable and handle any concerns over the length of time
between the guaranty and the note through an analysis of whether the guaranty lapsed
after a reasonable length of time.
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B. Preliminary Conclusions
At the end of a long journey through the thicket of consideration
cases, it is possible to draw the following conclusions. First, and most
obviously, the doctrine of consideration and its corollaries are alive
and well, at least if the test of viability is frequency of use as an
express ground of decision. Second, and somewhat in tension with
the first conclusion, most uses of the doctrine of consideration and its
corollaries are redundant, in the sense that there are usually indepen-
dent reasons not to enforce the promises they are used to invalidate.
Probably the simplest explanation for this phenomenon is that
consideration doctrine has been qualified and limited so many times
that the most common harsh results produced by the simple, classical
statement of the doctrine have gradually been reduced. Indeed, it is
presumably this gradual erosion of the doctrine of consideration that
led scholars like Gilmore to conclude that it had been, or soon would
be, qualified right out of existence.4" However, contrary to
Gilmore, it is necessary to draw a third conclusion. Specifically,
consideration doctrine has not entirely lost its bite. Except with
respect to corollaries for which its redundancy is virtually complete,
the various branches of consideration doctrine each produce a group
of cases that are objectionable. The number of objectionable cases is
small relative to the number of cases in which consideration doctrine
is redundant, but the objectionable cases persist and seem to defy the
attempt to civilize the doctrine of consideration through a process of
limitation, qualification, and creation of exceptions. At some point,
legal theorists must face the question whether the whole qualifying
and limiting enterprise has collapsed under its own weight. The
persistence of troublesome cases in the face of progressive articulation
and complication of the doctrine of consideration would suggest that
the process of qualification can never be completed, and that
something would be gained by abandonment of the gatekeeping
function of the doctrine of consideration altogether.4"9
Before embracing that conclusion, however, it is necessary to
move the analysis to a somewhat more general level. The sheer
tenacity with which judges cling to the doctrine of consideration and
its corollaries counsels a certain degree of caution in abandoning
428. See GILMORE, supra note 33.
429. Cf. Knapp, supra note 89, at 938, 943-44 (suggesting that when a supposed "rule"
is understandable only in light of its exceptions it should cease to be regarded as a rule).
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them. The preceding analysis has demonstrated that, as currently
applied, the doctrine of consideration and its corollaries do little good
and some harm. It is theoretically possible, however, that there are
reasons to retain them that are of a more general character and are
not readily ascertainable from an examination of cases. It is worth
asking whether there are reasons to deny enforcement to gratuitous
promises, either because they lack some element or feature that forms
part of the rationale for enforcing promises or because they have
some feature that makes it positively undesirable to enforce them. It
is to those questions, as well as the most common answers to them,
that the next section is devoted.
VI. THE THEORY OF CONSIDERATION: THE GATEKEEPER'S
LAST STAND
A. Introduction: The Promising Continuum
It is likely that most first-year contracts teachers, at some point,
describe the doctrine of consideration as a vehicle, admittedly
imperfect, for distinguishing between gifts and bargains. Our students
must often be tempted to regard gifts and bargains as mutually
exclusive categories divided by a clear conceptual line. One of the
benefits of reading large numbers of cases is that it dispels any such
notion.4 To be sure, there are clear cases of gifts and of bargains,
and the clear cases form opposite poles. But between the two poles
are a broad spectrum of transactions and promises, 431 and, for
purposes of the analysis to follow, it is helpful to illustrate that range.
Accordingly, in the discussion of the reasons for enforcing or not
enforcing promises, it will be beneficial to refer occasionally to the
following illustrative, although nonexclusive and nonexhaustive, list of
types of promises:
430. Indeed, the strict dichotomy between gifts and exchanges has occasionally been
questioned in the critical literature. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form,
64 IND. L.J. 155, 157, 190-201 (1989); Rose, supra note 326, at 309-17.
431. This point was appreciated quite clearly in Samuel Stoljar, Enforcing Benevolent
Promises, 12 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 18-20 (1989) (distinguishing three different types of gift
promises with corresponding differences in the strength of the obligation incurred).
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1. The completely altruistic promise to make a gift to a
stranger, of which Williston's "tramp hypothetical" '432 pro-
vides a convenient example.
2. The promise to do a favor for a friend, for example, a
promise to pick up a friend at the airport.
3. Intrafamilial promises, including the following examples:
A. Father promises to buy a car for son upon son's
graduation from high school;
B. Mother promises to pay for daughter's medical
school education;
C. Grandfather promises grandson that he will
inherit the family farm upon grandfather's death;
D. Sister, to whom much has been devised in parent's
will, agrees with brother, to whom little has been
devised, that, notwithstanding the will, they will share
parent's estate equally.
4. A formal pledge of a sum of money to a specific charity.
5. Nonexchange promises reflecting cooperative business
behavior, including:
A. A promise by an insurer to make a check jointly
payable to the insured and the insured's secured lender,
with whom the insurer has no cofitract;
B. A promise by a first mortgagee to inform a
second mortgagee if the common mortgagor defaults
and the first mortgagee institutes foreclosure proceed-
ings.
6. Promises in the business context that are technically
gratuitous but nonetheless related to exchange, including:
A. The one-sided modification of a contract;
B. The postloan guaranty of a borrower's obligations
by a third party;
C. The uncompensated firm offer or option;
D. The promise made with a hope of inducing future
unspecified exchanges, for instance, an automobile
432. Williston's tramp hypothetical involved a donor moved by sympathy to make a
conditional gift promise of a coat to a tramp. It was designed to illustrate the distinction
between a bargain and a conditional gift. See 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACrS § 7:18 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1992). For an argument that
such impulsive generosity is relatively rare, see Havighurst, supra note 61, at 15.
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dealer's promise to make free repairs for a customer
whose warranty has recently expired;
E. Promises in recognition of a past benefit;
F. Proposed business deals that give one party an
unlimited termination right, for instance, Professor
Eisenberg's "confident law student" hypothetical.433
7. The conventional business bargain, for instance, a
forward contract for the purchase and sale of 10,000 bushels
of wheat at a fixed price.
While further examples could be added to the list almost
indefinitely, it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive taxonomy
of promises.. The foregoing examples sufficiently illustrate the variety
of gratuitous promises, and the task that remains is to assess them in
light of the reasons commonly assigned for enforcing promises, as well
as the defects commonly attributed to gratuitous promises, in order
to determine if retention of the gatekeeping function of consideration
doctrine is desirable. Ultimately, I conclude that most of the reasons
commonly given for retention of the doctrine have already been
found inadequate or appear to be inadequate upon further analysis.
B. Reasons for Enforcing Promises
1. Exchange
It is generally assumed that society should foster exchange
because exchange creates "wealth" ' or "surplus."435  It is some-
times argued that a regime of enforcement of exchange promises is
justified because it increases the likelihood of beneficial exchange,
presumably by reducing the incentive to breach436 and providing
some assurance to the party who must perform first that he will
receive the agreed return or its rough equivalent. As Dawson
observed, this is why the presence of more than merely technical
433. Eisenberg's hypothetical involves a law student with substandard grades who offers
to work for a prestigious law firm for one-third the normal starting salary, subject to an
unlimited termination right in favor of the law firm. It is designed to illustrate how a
genuine bargain may include an illusory promise on one side. See Eisenberg, Principles,
supra note 34, at 650-51.
434. See Baron, supra note 430, at 156; Fuller, supra note 77, at 815.
435. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 643.
436. See id. at 652. For an accessible summary of the economic analysis of the incentive
effects of contract remedies on the breach decision, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-36 (1983).
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consideration is generally regarded as a sufficient reason for enforcing
a promise.437 Making consideration a necessary condition for
enforcement of a promise, however, seems to reflect an assumption
that only bargain promises play a role in increasing utility through
exchange.
A number of commentators, however, have observed that the
latter assumption is false. The gratuitous exchange-related business
promises of category (6) of the illustrative list probably increase the
likelihood of beneficial exchange, even, if they do so less directly than
the bargain promises illustrated by the forward grain contract of
category (7).438 Even the nonexchange cooperative business promis-
es of category (5) probably make exchange more likely, if only by
reducing the apparent risk of further or continued business relations
for one party. Moreover, economic theory is in no way committed to
the notion that only bilateral exchange increases utility.43 Interde-
pendent utility is a perfectly familiar phenomenon and is quite likely
to be present in the context of true donative promises among family
or friends like those in categories (2) and (3)."' Even the purely
altruistic promisor of category (1) may derive more satisfaction from
using money to buy a coat for a stranger than he would from keeping
it, particularly if the promisor has plenty of money. While there may
be other reasons not to enforce such promises, it cannot be assumed
that they play no role in enhancing utility."
437. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 220-21.
438. See STrrrON, supra note 76, at 215; Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652-56;
Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 290-91, 293, 298; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note
76, at 995. Indeed, illusory promises of the type exemplified in 6.E. may be components
of genuine bargains. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 649-51; Gordon,
Consideration, supra note 67, at 290-91; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 988-89.
439. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1981)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Promises] (conceding that gifts have a wealth redistribution effect
and probably redistribute wealth to persons who have more utility for money than the
donors, but arguing that the effect of legal enforcement of donative promises is trivial).
440. See Mary L. Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL
EDUCATION 27, 29-30 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
LJ. 1261, 1272 (1980). But see Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and
Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,412 (1977) (arguing that interdependent utilities explain gifts,
but not gift promises, and giving an alternative explanation of the enhancement of utility
by certain gift promises).
441. For a strong argument that a regime of enforceable gratuitous promises would
enhance utility, see Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
39 (1992).
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2. Protecting expectations and reliance
Alternatively, it is often argued that promises are enforced
because it is desirable to protect the expectations2 promises
generate in promisees or the actions they induce promisees to take in
reliance. 4 The argument has a number of strands and variations,
some normative and some descriptive. The widespread acceptance of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is strong evidence of the
descriptive claim that the protection of rdasonable reliance is, in fact,
one of the functions of the common-law system of contracts.444
Economic theorists have argued that a regime of enforceable promises
is desirable because it encourages beneficial adaptive behavior
designed to enhance the utility to the promisee of the performance
promised.45  Others have emphasized the need for protection of
reliance in an economy characterized by specialization,' the
impossibility of confining exchange to simultaneous exchange, 7 and
the need for predictability and planning."8  Fuller and Perdue
suggest that even the enforcement of the fully executory bilateral
bargain is justified by the likelihood of reliance, particularly reliance
in forms that are difficult to prove."9 In Whatever variation they
442. See SUTTON, supra note 76, at 238-39, 248; Baron, supra note 430, at 182-83;
Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1945). But see Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 3 (arguing that mere
disappointment of expectations is, in the case of donative promises, a trivial injury);
Patterson, supra note 89, at 942-43 (arguing that expectations alone are not a sufficient
basis for enforcement of promises).
443. See Baron, supra note 430, at 182-83; Fuller, supra note 77, at 810-12; Lon L.
Fuller & William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54
(1936).
444. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 811. Of course, this is not to say that the promissory
estoppel as applied by judges is confined to cases of demonstrable individual reliance. See
Farber & Matheson, supra note 326, at 909-10, 920-29 (arguing that, although individual
reliance is of reduced significance as a determinant of liability and remedy in promissory
estoppel cases, reliance remains the policy basis behind promissory liability); Edward Yorio
& Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
445. See Fellows, supra note 440, at 28; Goetz & Scott, supra note 440, at 1266-71.
446. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 643; Farnsworth, Past of Promise, supra
note 280, at 585-86; Hillman, Restatement, supra note 89, at 681 n.9; Patterson, supra note
89, at 945.
447. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 643; Farnsworth, Past of Promise, supra
note 280, at 585-86.
448. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652; Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt
Servanda, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 783, 784-85 (1941).
449. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 443, at 61-62; see also Farnsworth, Past of
Promise, supra note 280, at 597 (citing Fuller & Perdue's contention that the justification
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are found, however, the reliance and expectation rationales for
promissory enforcement are impossible to confine to the class of
promises blessed by the doctrine of consideration. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel itself dramatically expanded the class to include
promises that generated unbargained-for reliance, at least where the
reliance takes a quantifiable form, such as out-of-pocket expenditure.
If the reliance to be encouraged extends to any utility-enhancing
adaptive behavior, whether reflected in out-of-pocket expenditure or
not, it is arguable450 that virtually all promises should be presump-
tively enforceable unless they are either induced by some form of
misconduct, suspect for policy reasons, or qualified by the promisor
in ways that indicate an intention not to be bound. Certainly, the
bulk of the gratuitous promises on the illustrative list outlined above
would make possible, and would seem likely to generate, such
adaptive behavior." Perhaps this is most obvious in the case of the
business promises ancillary to exchanges falling into category (6),45
but even the nonexchange cooperative business promises of category
(5) would seem likely to generate negative reliance by the promisee
in the form of omitting to take alternative action to protect her
interest. Charitable organizations make grand plans on the basis of
the income stream represented by charitable subscriptions in much the
same way that profit-making organizations make plans relying on the
proceeds of exchanges,453 although, in the case of charitable organi-
zations, it may be difficult or impossible to isolate the action taken in
reliance upon one specific pledge.4' The intra-family promises
exemplified in category (3) seem likely to induce each promisee to
for protecting the expectation interest is that it is the most effective way of protecting the
reliance interest).
450. Economic theorists are not in agreement on the question whether, in the case of
gratuitous promises, the costs of some form of enforcement outweigh the utility-enhancing
effects of "beneficial reliance," which is presumably possible with any promise. Compare
Goetz & Scott, supra note 440, at 1303-04 (arguing that enforcement of nonreciprocal
promises is unnecessary and would result in a suboptimal level of promising) with Fellows,
supra note 440, at 29-32 (disputing several premises of the Goetz and Scott analysis) and
Kull, supra note 441, at 57-58 (arguing that gratuitous promisors will make promises
conditional or give mere statements of intent rather than refraining from promising under
a regime of legal enforcement).
. 451. Cf. Hamson, supra note 89, at 250 (suggesting that any honest, serious promisor
can foresee reliance on his promise).
452. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652-56.
453. See, e.g., the description of fundraising and budgeting activities in Maryland Nat'l
Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979).
454. See Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989).
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alter life plans and are most naturally explainable as attempts to do
exactly that.455 A friend whom I have promised to meet at the
airport may fail to make other arrangements or neglect to bring cab
fare, and even Williston's tramp might alter his action in light of the
promise of a warm coat, although, if the promisor is a perfect stranger
whose motives and character are unknown, the adaptive behavior may
not be very extensive.
45 6
Of course, not all of the foregoing promises will actually induce
reliance in every case. However, if Fuller is correct in asserting that
the mere likelihood of unprovable reliance-rather than demonstrable
reliance in each case-is the rationale for protecting even fully
executory expectations,4 57 it is difficult to see why the likelihood of
reliance should not be enough to make gratuitous promises presump-
tively enforceable.458 The common forms of gratuitous promises
illustrated above cannot be demonstrated to be less likely to induce
beneficial adaptive behavior than conventional bargains.
Nor can it be objected that reliance on the types of gratuitous
promises illustrated above is inherently less rational than reliance on
bargain promises. The reliance and expectation rationales for
promissory enforcement are occasionally said to be circular on the
grounds that expectations or reliance cannot be reasonable unless it
is presumed in advance that the promises that generate expectations
or induce reliance are legally enforceable.459 To accept the premise
that only legal enforceability would induce a rational being to rely on
a promise is to block out the behavior of real human beings with legal
blinders and to assume that all reasoning must be legal reasoning.
Under any commonsense notion of rationality, if my parents promised
455. See Stoljar, supra note 431, at 32-33. Havighurst argues that, in such cases, the
courts strain to find consideration, and concedes that reliance strengthens the case for
enforcement. See Havighurst, supra note 61, at 15-16; see also Knapp, supra note 89, at
951 (arguing that reasonable expectations may be generated by relations between promisee
and promisor that give the promisee reason to believe in the promisor's altruistic concern
for his welfare).
456. See Stoljar, supra note 431, at 18.
457. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 443, at 61-62.
458. Cf. SUTTON, supra note 76, at 201 (articulating Whiteside's view that deliberate,
intentional promises should be enforced if they are of a type ordinarily relied upon in
economic or business dealings).
459. Cf. Fellows, supra note 440, at 37-38 (articulating, and then rebutting, the
argument); Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 291 (recounting the "paradox" of the
enforceability of the executory bilateral exchange of promises); Gordon, Dialogue, supra
note 76, at 1002 (same).
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to pay for my medical school education, I probably know enough
about their character or their concern for my welfare to make a
rational prediction about the likelihood that the promise will be kept
and adapt my behavior accordingly.'f The fact that the promise is
donative makes little difference. It may, indeed, be more rational to
rely on the parental donative promise than on the promise of a used
car dealer that the 1949 Packard about to be sold to me will last
another 50,000 miles, notwithstanding the fact that the car dealer's
promise is part of a proposed bargain.
The reliance and expectation rationales for promissory enforce-
ment thus seem to push in the direction of including the kind of
gratuitous promises illustrated above within the class of enforceable
promises. Moreover, if the difficulty of proof of negative reliance and
the burden of proving reliance in every case has already led to
validation of broad classes of promises even in the absence of
individualized proof of reliance,46 perhaps those rationales even
militate in favor of a presumptive rule of enforceability of promises
generally, in the absence of specific reason to deny enforcement.
3. Autonomy
There is an alternative strand of contemporary contracts
scholarship that finds the basis for promissory enforcement in the
propriety of effectuating the intentions of rational, autonomous agents
when such agents wish to create legally binding obligations.62
Whether denominated "will" theories46 or "consent"4 " theories,
such accounts of contract attempt to find the reason for enforcing
promises in some conception of human autonomy and respect for the
individual. The details of such theories, however, are of little concern
in the present context. The core of such theories is the principle that
promises should be enforced because they are the freely-chosen
obligations of autonomous agents. The principle, quite obviously, is
460. See Fellows, supra note 440, at 37-38, 50 n.64; Stoljar, supra note 431, at 32-33.
461. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 811-12; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 443, at 61-62.
462. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-6 (1981); Fuller, supra note 77,
at 806-10; see also Farnsworth, Past of Promise, supra note 280, at 599-600 (describing the
will theory of contract).
463. See A.S. Burrows, The Will Theory of Contract ReviVed-Fried's "Contract as
Promise," 38 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 141, 142 (1985) (characterizing Fried's theory as
a "will theory"); Anthony T. Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE
L.J. 404 (1981) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981)).
464. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
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entirely neutral with respect to the character of the promise, and
specifically with respect to the question whether the promise is
gratuitous or part of a bargained exchange.4 ' Even Williston, who
some have characterized as a principal architect of the classical
doctrine of consideration, had sufficient respect for autonomy to
believe that there should be some purely formal device for the
creation of a legally binding promise.466 The seal once served that
function,' 67 and Williston's dramatically unsuccessful Uniform
Written Obligations Act was -presumably intended to serve it as
well.4" To those sufficiently familiar with the doctrine of consider-
ation, providing a peppercorn in return for an otherwise gratuitous
promise can make a gift pass for a bargain,.69 and at various points,
the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recommend
recognition of promises based on a mere recitation of consider-
ation.47 While all of these formal devices are subject to practical
difficulties, they all reflect at least partial recognition of the autonomy
rationale for promissory enforcement, and they are all capable of
operating just as well in favor of gift promises as exchange promises.
Therefore it is apparent that, whatever content is given to the
somewhat problematic notion of autonomy, that notion provides no
basis for retention of the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of
consideration.
465. Kull, supra note 441, at 50-51.
466. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 659 (quoting Williston).
467. See Baron, supra note 430, at 187; Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 660;
Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 8-9; Fuller, supra note 77, at 800; Paul R. Hays,
Formal Contracts and Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 849,850
(1941); K.N. Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consideration: A Foreword, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 777, 781 (1941) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Complexity].
468. See Baron, supra note 430, at 187 n.187; Hays, supra note 467, at 850.
469. See A.G. Chloros, The Doctrine of Consideration and the Reform of the Law of
Contract: A Competitive Analysis, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 137, 155 (1968); Malcolm S.
Mason, The Utility of Consideration-A Comparative View, 41 COLUM..L. REV. 825, 832
(1941); Stolijar, supra note 431, at 20-21, 24.
470. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87(1)(a), 88(a) (1981)
(recommending the recognition of a mere recitation of consideration in option contracts
and guaranties).
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C. Possible Reasons to Refuse to Enforce Gratuitous Promises
1. Gratuitous promises are trivial
It has been argued that, in contrast to the bargain promises with
which the world of commerce is concerned, gratuitous promises are
simply too unimportant to justify putting the enforcement mechanism
of the state at the disposal of recipients of such promises." ' Such
a claim immediately prompts a request for a description of the criteria
by which "important" promises are distinguished from the "unimpor-
tant." If the criterion is the economic value of the promise in
question, there are two fairly obvious responses. First, many of the
promises that are technically gratuitous may actually involve rather
significant sums. One-sided modifications to business contracts, for
example, may very well take the form of significant price increases.
Indeed, even promises that are not only technically gratuitous but
clear examples of gifts are not necessarily trivial in a financial sense.
It is true that a promise to meet a friend at the airport is of no
greater value than the price of a cab ride. A parent's promise to
finance a medical school education, however, is in a decidedly
different class, and charitable subscriptions are often conspicuously
large. The claim that gratuitous or donative promises are financially
trivial is thus empirically suspect.
Second, even if gratuitous promises were financially trivial, that
fact would not establish the need for retention of the gatekeeping
function of the doctrine of consideration. Indeed, it has been argued
that the implication would be precisely the reverse. The state
mechanisms for contract enforcement will not be invoked for
financially trivial promises in any event; litigation is simply too
expensive to use for recovery of small amounts.4" The doctrine of
consideration is not necessary to screen out suits for small change.473
471. See Baron, supra note 430, at 156, 180, 189 (describing traditional views); Fuller,
supra note 77, at 799 (attributing the view to Ballantine and Willis).
472. See Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 994-95; cfi Stoljar, supra note 431, at 19
(arguing that practical remedial difficulties screen social promises out of the legal system).
473. Indeed, it has been observed that the doctrine of consideration is actually
indifferent to the financial stakes involved in a promise. See Kull, supra note 441, at 48-49.
If trivial gratuitous promises are common, so are trivial bargained exchanges. The latter
may not be litigated, but it is not to the credit of the doctrine of consideration that they
are kept out of court.
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If the criterion of importance is not financial, how should it be
specified precisely? Perhaps the concern is to screen out promises
that are merely social promises among friends or family members,
either because such promises are not worth state resources or,
alternatively, because the relationships in question should not be
subject to state intrusion.474 Quite apart from the fact that mere
social promises will be screened out of state enforcement mechanisms
by their lack of economic value, however, it has been argued that the
doctrine of consideration would not screen them out reliably in any
event. Many social or family arrangements are reciprocal and fit
rather easily into bargain form.475 I have argued elsewhere that the
job of screening out such promises properly belongs to the objective
theory of assent, not to the doctrine of consideration.
476
Alternatively, donative promises between family members might
initially seem appropriate for classification as unimportant or
otherwise inappropriate for state intervention. A moment's reflection,
however, makes any such initial plausibility disappear. Intrafamilial
donative transfers generally are the subject of a variety of formal legal
mechanisms, including the laws of inheritance, wills and trusts as well
as laws pertaining to dissolution. Donative transfers among family
members are thus apparently of sufficient importance to society to
devote significant resources to creation and enforcement mechanisms,
and any interest in family privacy is apparently not of sufficient
magnitude to prevent the state from facilitating and regulating such
transfers.4" Moreover, the intimacy of the family context does not
preclude the enforcement of actual bargains among family members
or intrafamilial promises upon which one party has relied.478
Against that background, it seems anomalous that intrafamilial
donative promises should receive radically different treatment.
The argument that gratuitous promises should be denied
enforcement because they lack importance must ultimately be
rejected. While some gratuitous promises are unimportant in some
definable sense, many are not. Moreover, the doctrine of consider-
474. See Reiter, supra note 89, at 440.
475. See Chloros, supra note 469, at 147 (" [In purely domestic arrangements there is
often consideration but no intention to be bound.").
476. See Wessman, supra note 2, at 61-65.
477. See Baron, supra note 430, at 200; Fellows, supra note 440, at 28; see also Kull,
supra note 441, at 48 (arguing that private enabling law generally makes no distinction in
principle between significant and trivial undertakings).
478. See Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 6 n.15.
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ation is neither necessary nor sufficient to screen out the unimportant
classes.
2. Gratuitous promises are impulsive or foolish
The doctrine of consideration is occasionably said to be necessary
or desirable as a safeguard against rash or foolish gratuitous promis-
es.47 9 Fuller's influential article popularized the view that the
doctrine of consideration performs a cautionary function analogous to
that performed by legal formalities generally."s The fact that a
promise is part of a bargain purportedly impresses the promisor with
the seriousness of the commitment and encourages deliberation and
prudence. Apparently, the fear is that, without the safeguard
consideration provides, people would make extravagant promises
motivated by surges of emotion or the importunings of wheedling
relatives.
481
The argument really has two strands, and they need to be
unraveled. First, the argument reflects an apprehension that there are
promisors who need to be prevented from making gift promises so
generous that they. risk the promisor's own financial health. Second,
the argument reflects a concern that people often make gift promises
for the wrong reasons or motives. As an empirical matter, of course,
it is possible to question how often these implicit premises are true.
One suspects that more people have been bankrupted by entering
into speculative bargains-by exchange promises-than by excessive
philanthropy. Moreover, of the promises on the illustrative list, only
the promise in Williston's tramp hypothetical seems impulsive. Even
the intrafamilial promises on the list seem to be designed for the
facilitation of future planning4" and so seem likely to be deliberate.
It may be, therefore, that the need for a cautionary device is not as
great as the argument suggests. Nevertheless, everyone can probably
think of examples of imprudent gifts-for example, the cult devotee
who donates all his worldly goods to the cult leader-and, particularly
in the family context, it is fairly easy to find occasional examples of
479. See Baron, supra note 430, at 160-84 (describing traditional justifications for
formality in the case of donative promises); Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 5;
Fuller, supra note 77, at 799 & n.2 (attributing the view to Ames, Ballantine, and
Whittier); Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 285-86; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note
76, at 992-93.
480. Fuller, supra note 77, at 800, 805, 815.
481. See Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 5; Patterson, supra note 89, at 955.
482. See Stoljar, supra note 431, at 32-33.
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promises made because the promisor was cajoled or pressured by
relatives. Accordingly, a further response to the argument is
necessary.
The best answer that has been given is that the problems that
allegedly create the need for a cautionary device are in no sense
confined to gratuitous promises or donative promises. Except in the
sort of exceptional circumstances that justify an application of the
defense of unconscionability, the law simply does not police for
imprudence where exchange promises are concerned.4" By making
the adequacy of consideration officially irrelevant, the doctrine of
consideration itself expressly disclaims any such policing function.4 4
Given that foolish deals are probably more common than foolish gifts,
it seems curious to police for prudence in the latter case, but not the
former, and doubly curious to assign the job to the doctrine of
consideration. The same is true with respect to impulsive promises.
A bargain promise is not disqualified from enforcement simply
because it was made quickly or impulsively. Bargain promises made
for the "wrong reason" are often disqualified from enforcement, but
the task of disqualification is assigned, not to the doctrine of
consideration, but to traditional defenses such as duress, fraud, and
undue influence. If gratuitous promises were presumptively enforce-
able, there is no reason why circumstances establishing one of those
defenses should not overcome the presumption just as they do in the
case of bargain promises. The argument that the doctrine of
consideration is desirable as a safeguard against rash, imprudent, or
wheedled promises thus ultimately collapses.
3. Gratuitous promises are too easily fabricated
Again taking a cue from Fuller's influential analogy of consider-
ation to a legal formality, some argue that consideration performs an
evidentiary function.4rs Eliminating the doctrine of consideration
and opening the door to enforcement of gratuitous promises would
also open the door to the enforcement of too many fabricated promis-
483. See Fellows, supra note 440, at 33; Havighurst, supra note 61, at 8-9; Kull, supra
note 441, at 54.
484. Of course, the disclaimer is undoubtedly false in some instances. The doctrine of
consideration is sometimes used covertly as a way to police fairness, although its use for
that purpose is quite unfortunate. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. In
addition, see Llewellyn, Reform, supra note 48, at 865-66; Wessman, supra note 2, at 86-93.
485. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 800, 815.
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es.486 It is easy to make a fraudulent claim that my father promised
to leave me the family farm, particularly if my father is already dead.
If I must furnish consideration in order to make a promise enforce-
able, however, I must engage in some overt conduct, and that is
harder to fabricate.4 7
There are several responses to the foregoing argument. First,
even if the claim that gratuitous promises are easier to fabricate than
bargain promises is correct, the doctrine of consideration nevertheless
denies enforcement to gratuitous promises even in cases in which
there is absolutely no doubt or dispute that the promise was made.
As a vehicle for the prevention of fraudulent claims, therefore, the
doctrine of consideration is overbroad.
Second, the doctrine of consideration is overbroad in a second
sense. It should be recalled that the class of promises the doctrine
screens out is in no sense limited to the stereotypical gift promise
from parent to child just used as an example. It has often been
observed that the class of technically gratuitous promises includes
many that are ancillary to ongoing exchanges,4O even if they are not
"paired" with specific reciprocal items of consideration. If connection
to an exchange fulfills an evidentiary function, therefore, at least that
class of gratuitous promises already has the desired connection to an
exchange.
489
Third, the premise that exchange promises are inherently harder
to fabricate than bargain promises is open to dispute.4' As some
critics have observed, this is in part because the completely executory
bargain is enforceable.49 t If it is easy to lie by claiming that my
father agreed to leave me the family farm, it is nearly as easy to lie
by claiming he agreed to sell it to me for an advantageous price. If
I am believed, the sale contract is enforceable even if I have not yet
486. See Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 4-5.
487. See Patterson, supra note 89, at 949 ("Consideration requires something to be done
outside the writing and that is less easy to fake.").
488. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652-56; Gordon, Consideration, supra
note 67, at 289-90, 292-98; Reiter, supra note 89, at 456-58.
489. See Fuller, supra note 77, at 818-19.
490. See Kull, supra note 441, at 53.
491. Cf Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 286 (arguing that consideration serves
no evidentiary function in an executory bilateral contract); Gordon, Dialogue, supra note
76, at 991 (arguing that promisee may not point to promisor's "possession" of
counterpromise as evidence); Havighurst, supra note 61, at 7 (arguing that a perjurer
swearing to a false promise would only enhance his credibility by swearing to a false return
promise as well).
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paid. Moreover, if words may be ambiguous or difficult to verify,
conduct is often even more ambiguous. If a friend has actually paid
me $5000, it may make his claim that I promised to sell him my car
more credible. If, however, my response to the claim is that the
payment was merely the repayment of an earlier loan, the evidentiary
value of the conduct is exhausted.4 2 In sum, bargains are some-
times as easy to fabricate as gifts, and consideration is not necessarily
of evidentiary value.
Finally, it would seem desirable to address the question of the
need for a formality more directly than is possible with the doctrine
of consideration 3 If there is a need for a formality with respect
to a class of promises, it is presumably because the subject matter of
such promises is important enough to create an incentive for fraud
and because fraudulent assertion of such promises is relatively easy to
accomplish and relatively difficult to detect. Given the imprecision of
the doctrine of consideration as an evidentiary tool, it would seem
more sensible to ask directly which promises are particularly
important or particularly subject to fraudulent assertion and impose
some genuine formality494 like a writing requirement on whatever
class is identified.495
4. Enforcing gratuitous promises might
bind promisors inadvertently
The next argument sometimes made in favor of the doctrine of
consideration draws its premise from the third of "Fuller's famous
492. A similar point is made by Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 286 and
Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 76, at 990.'
493. See Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 293 (suggesting amending the statute
of frauds if more evidentiary security is deemed necessary).
494. Cf Chloros, supra note 469, at 155 (arguing that the need for greater formality in
English contract law must be assessed independently of the doctrine of consideration).
495. That appears to be the conceptual approach implicit within the statute of frauds
and dead man's statutes. Cf. Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consider-
ation: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1009, 1018, 1027-28 (1959)
(noting that the statute of frauds, unlike the doctrine of consideration, identifies
"unenforceable transaction types in functional or economic terms"). Both of the latter are
somewhat out of favor at the moment, undoubtedly because a writing requirement can
itself be used as an instrument of fraud. Arguably, however, the current distaste for such
formalities is less an indictment of the general conceptual approach than the lack of
success in finding a suitable formal device. If a writing requirement is too narrow a
restriction, it may be that a more general requirement of independent corroboration, Le.,
evidence of the promise other than the word of the promisee, would fulfill the necessary
evidentiary function without itself becoming a ready instrument of fraud.
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functions of form,"-the channeling function.496 Legal formalities
are useful because they provide an accessible way for those who
desire certain legal consequences to channel their behavior so that
that intention will be easily recognizable and the intended conse-
quences achieved. 497 Conversely, a good formality also provides a
way for those desiring to avoid legal consequences to accomplish that
intention, if only by avoiding use of the formality.498 Consideration,
it is argued, accords roughly with the layperson's sense of which
promises must be kept.4 If promises without consideration were
presumptively enforceable, too many gratuitous promisors would find
themselves saddled with legal consequences they never intended."'
To the extent that the argument relies upon an empirical premise
that gratuitous promises are perceived by laypersons to be "less
binding" than bargain promises, part of the answer to the argument
must be postponed until the next subsection. For the moment,
however, it should be recalled that the correlation between bargain
form and the intention to effect legal consequences is far from
perfect. As noted earlier many social promises that all would concede
to be too trivial to merit enforcement are nevertheless reciprocal
promises that technically satisfy the doctrine of consideration."'
Conversely, many of the technically gratuitous promises that are
ancillary to exchanges, and so in no sense gifts, are undoubtedly made
with the same level of deliberation and legal intention as the bargain
promises constituting the underlying exchange."° Indeed, the sorts
of intrafamilial promises exemplified in category (3) of the illustrative
list are normally accompanied by a serious intention to perform."0 3
496. Fuller, supra note 77, at 801-03.
497. Id. at 801; Patterson, supra note 89, at 948-49.
498. See Patterson, supra note 89, at 948-49.
499. It at 949.
500. Id. at 949-50; cf. Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 5 (arguing that, absent
formality or explicit reciprocity, it is difficult to distinguish a promise from a statement of
present intent, and that even the donative promisor may not know what he or she means
or is understood to mean).
501. See SUrrON, supra note 76, at 226-27; Chloros, supra note 469, at 147; Gordon,
Dialogue, supra note 76, at 995.
502. See Reiter, supra note 89, at 457, 494 n.235 (arguing that channeling and
cautionary functions are served by business context in the case of gratuitous modifica-
tions); see also Havighurst, supra note 61, at 6-7 (arguing against Fuller's view that
distinguishing between exploratory and legally effective expressions of intention is
fundamentally easier in the business context than in the'case of gratuitous promises).
503. Cf Knapp, supra note 89, at 938-39 (permitting enforcement of intrafamilial prom-
ises in proposed restatement of promissory obligation and specifying ties of affection as
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Once again, therefore, the doctrine of consideration proves to be an
imprecise proxy for some other issue-in this case, serious legal
intention-and one is left wondering why the latter issue is not
addressed directly if it is of such importance.
More importantly, however, defenders of the doctrine of
consideration seem to have misperceived the nature of the need for
a channeling device. The previous discussion of the notion of
autonomy suggests that what is necessary is a. device for making
promises enforceable when the doctrine of consideration does not do
so." When the seal was in its heyday as a legal formality, use of
a sealed instrument would make a gratuitous promise enforceable.
The seal, however, was trivialized to death,.05 and the problem of
developing an alternative device that provides a purely formal
sufficient condition of enforcement has proved extremely intracta-
ble.5 6 That problem, however, is generated by the very fact that
one basis for inferring seriousness of promise).
504. See supra text accompanying notes 462-70.
505. See Baron, supra note 430, at 187; Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 660;
Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 9; Hays, supra note 467, at 851.
506. Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 9. Indeed, in my view, the fact that no
reliable substitute for the seal has been developed signals a need for greater doctrinal
creativity in contract law. Various possible formal validation devices have been suggested.
Williston's Uniform Written Obligations Act, which made the recitation of an intention
to be bound decisive, was a colossal failure in the legislatures, perhaps because the
requisite recitation was too easy to hide in a mass of boilerplate language. See SUTTON,
supra note 76, at 202-04; Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 12; Gordon, Consider-
ation, supra note 67, at 311-12. At times, it has been suggested that putting a promise in
a signed writing should be sufficient to create liability. See Hamson, supra note 89
(describing the proposal of the English Law Revision Committee of 1937); see also
Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 10-11 (describing state legislation making a writing
presumptive evidence of considerition and other statutes making written promises
enforceable per se). That suggestion, however, has been attacked as both overinclusive
and underinclusive. Some have suggested that writing is today very nearly as casual as
ordinary speech, and thus performs neither cautionary nor channeling functions. See
Hamson, supra note 89, at 247; Patterson, supra note 89, at 958. On the other hand,
writing requirements can be used as instruments of fraud in situations in which one party
knows of, and exploits, the existence of the requirement to the disadvantage of another
who is ignorant.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, at various points, suggest a
recitation of consideration as a potential formal validation device for otherwise gratuitous
promises. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87(1)(a), 88(a) (1981). While
I have no wish to contest that the promises in question should be enforceable, it has been
observed that the recitation of consideration is not, at present, something accessible to
laypersons. See Gordon, Consideration, supra note 67, at 294. Presumably, if one knows
enough to recite consideration, one knows enough not to be frustrated by the doctrine of
consideration. The problem is that too many people seem not to know that much.
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consideration has, to some extent, retained its gatekeeping function,
not by efforts to eliminate it.
The proponent of the doctrine of consideration, moreover, is
suggesting that a different channeling problem, the avoidance of
unintended legal consequences, is a major concern of contract law.
That suggestion is, at the very least, a great exaggeration. Contract
may be generally distinguishable from tort and other fields by the fact
that a greater percentage of the duties in contract are voluntarily
assumed, and it may be conceded that the core of most contracts
consists of the dickered terms as to which the parties have reached
subjective agreement. However, at least in the case of bargains,
American law has never required proof of an additional element
called "the intention to be bound" as a necessary condition of
enforcement.5 7 Moreover, many of the operative rules governing
any contract are "default rules," which the parties might have
displaced but, in all probability, did not specifically even think about.
The objective theory of assent, both in its role in determining when
The last point, incidentally, provides the basis for refuting another argument
sometimes made against abolishing the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of
consideration. It has been suggested that the doctrine of consideration need not be
abolished because anyone who needs to make a gratuitous promise, or even a true gift
promise, enforceable has devices other than the bare promise for doing so. See Baron,
supra note 430, at 186 n.176 (describing the views of others); Havighurst, supra note 61,
at 15; Patterson, supra note 89, at 955. The promisor may avail himself of the "peppercorn
theory" of consideration and have the promisee supply some item of negligible value. See
SUTTON, supra note 76, at 223; Chloros, supra note 469, at 155 (noting that the use of
nominal consideration may make a donation pass as an enforceable bargain); Rose, supra
note 326, at 308. Alternatively, the gift promisor may simply declare that he holds the
subject matter of the gift in trust for the promisee or that the gift will be transferred by
will. See Baron, supra note 430, at 186; Fellows, supra note 440, at 35-36. Of course, the
case analysis of the preceding sections of this Article suggests that the empirical claim
implicit in the argument is false. The problem may be that, though such devices may be
familiar to lawyers, their technical aspects are not part of the general culture, and they are
therefore unlikely to be known, or easily used, by those who most need them. A good
"natural" channeling device should be both sufficiently ritualistic to be easily recognized
and sufficiently accessible in the culture to be used by those who do not resort to lawyers.
See Patterson, supra note 89, at 948. Informal promising, of course, is familiar to all, but
it is not clothed in any particular ritual. Something akin to the Roman law stipulatio,
which could be accomplished verbally but involved a recognizable ritual, would seem to
be in order. See Farnsworth, Past of Promise, supra note 280, at 588-89. However; I am
unaware of any broadly recognized equivalent in our culture. For a more detailed
description of the Roman law stipulatio and its evolution, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN,
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 68-113
(1990).
507. See SUTroN, supra note 76, at 226; WILLISTON, supra note 432, § 3:5; Hamson,
supra note 89, at 255; Patterson, supra note 89, at 958; Shatwell, supra note 91, at 314-15.
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the parties have manifested sufficient agreement that legal conse-
quences should attach and in its role as the arbiter of the specific
terms included in a contract, makes a promisor's subjective intentions
concerning legal consequences a great deal less important than what
a reasonable person would conclude from his language and con-
duct.5° Similarly, liability under the theory of promissory estoppel
makes a promisor's subjective intentions as to legal consequences far
less important than the reaction of a reasonable person to the
promise. All of these aspects of the common-law system of contracts
create possibilities for unintended legal consequences. Thus, although
most would probably agree that, other things being equal, unintended
legal consequences should be avoided, the system of contract law
seems to reflect an assumption either that the threat of unintended
legal consequences is not particularly common or that, if common, it
is not a harm of any great degree of magnitude. If that is true, the
fear of inadvertent contracting is scarcely a reason to retain the
gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration.5 °9
5. Making gratuitous promises presumptively enforceable is
incompatible with the fundamental human need to weasel
"Many of us indeed would shudder at the idea of being bound by
every promise, no matter how foolish, without any chance of letting
increased wisdom undo past foolishness. Certainly, some freedom to
change one's mind is necessary for free intercourse between those
who lack omniscience.""' In the foregoing two sentences, Morris
Cohen encapsulated an argument that, in various permutations, recurs
in much of the literature on the doctrine of consideration specifically
and the enforcement of promises generally.5 ' The argument,
however, is inherently ambiguous, and it is important to distinguish
among its various possible claims, as well as to distinguish what it
asserts from what it does not.
Initially, the argument is not just an assertion that not all
promises should be enforced. No one believes that all promises
508. See Shatwell, supra note 91, at 316-18.
509. See also Kull, supra note 441, at 54 (arguing that the gratuitous promisor has
precisely the same linguistic resources as the bargain promisor for distinguishing between
a promise and a mere statement of intent and thus avoiding unintended legal conse-
quences).
510. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 573 (1933).
511. See Farnsworth, Past of Promise, supra note 280, at 591; Fuller, supra note 77, at
813; Patterson, supra note 89, at 942-43; Reiter, supra note 89, at 440.
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should be enforced. Quite apart from the fact that some promises are
induced by improper means, some are simply too insignificant to
enforce. Nor is the argument the somewhat less trivial claim that
some promises are made without an intention to be bound legally.
Everyone knows that, and the system of common-law contracts
accommodates the fact' 12 Nor, finally, is the argument confined to
the uncontroversial claim that, particularly in the case of some large
and complex business deals, the parties to certain transactions do not
wish to be bound until all the details of the transactions in question
are fully worked out.5 13 There clearly are such transactions, but the
appropriately qualified letter of intent, together with the objective
theory of assent and the law of conditions, would seem to be quite
adequate as vehicles for effectuating such intentions.
Rather, the interesting aspect of the argument is an assertion that
there is something special about gratuitous promises or gift promises
that makes it necessary or desirable to permit the gratuitous or
donative promisor to renege more freely than the bargain promisor.
In one version the argument relies on an analogy to civil-law systems,
in which gratuitous promises are enforced to a greater extent than in
common-law systems.5 14 In civil-law systems, it has been argued,
increased legal recognition of gratuitous promises is accompanied by
increased recognition of special defenses to them, including improvi-
dence and ingratitude. 15  Those defenses are complicated, and
increased enforcement of gratuitous promises is probably not worth
the effort of transplanting or developing the defenses in question. 16
The civil-law analogy, however, is a false one. As Dawson
observed, the hostility to donative promises in civil-law systems
512. Although English law occasionally makes the intention to be bound a separate
"element" of a valid contract, American law generally presumes such an intention, at least
in the case of bargain promises, but gives effect to manifestations by the parties of an
intention not to be bound. See WILLISTON, supra note 432, § 3:5; Patterson, supra note
89, at 958. Of course, because of the objective theory of assent, a party may sometimes
be bound to a promise even in the absence of a subjective intention to create a legal
obligation.
513. Clearly, however, the uncontroversial claim is at least part of what Cohen and
Fuller meant when they articulated the argument in question. See Cohen, supra note 510,
at 574; Fuller, supra note 77, at 813. If the argument were confined to the uncontroversial
claim, however, it would be of little further interest.
514. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 660.65; Eisenberg, Promises, supra note
439, at 13-18.
515. Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 660-65.
516. let at 650; Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 15-16; see von Mehren, supra
note 495, at 1078.
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reflects a social commitment to the civil-law scheme of forced
heirship, a* scheme that has no equivalent at common law.' 17 Civil-
law experience thus provides no support for the view that recognizing
gratuitous promises in common-law jurisdictions would require
defenses in addition to those now available in the case of bargain
promises. At the very least one may not conclude from the civil-law
experience that the development of such defenses is an inevitable
consequence of the legal recognition of gratuitous promises.
At this point the argument is likely to take a more normative
turn. It is only fair, it might be argued, that the donative promisor
have greater freedom to renege than the bargain promisor. As a
result the development of special defenses like improvidence and
ingratitude will be necessary even in a system in which there is no
concern for the protection of a patrimony.18 If a parent promises
to pay for a child's car or the child's education, for example, the
normal bonds of affection will, in most cases, induce the parent to
keep the promise. However, if the child treats the parent particularly
contemptuously, or if the parent suffers financial reverses that make
performance particularly onerous, it is intuitively plausible to suggest
that the parent should be excused.519 The parent in reduced circum-
stances should not be driven to the wall for the sake of a gift.
Enforcement of gift promises is thus likely to be either unnecessary
or undesirable.
The argument is intriguing and, particularly when the examples
on which it relies are taken from the family context, initially appeal-
ing. Nevertheless, it is possible to question whether the difference the
argument posits between donative promises and bargain promises is
as sharp as the argument suggests. After all, in the most extreme
cases of reduced circumstances, even performance of bargain promises
is excused. The discharge in bankruptcy operates in favor of gift and
bargain promises alike, and defenses of impossiblity or frustration
may also reflect some concern for a contracting party in dire
circumstances. The argument nonetheless suggests that the role of
517. See DAWSON, supra note 37, at 221-30; Baron, supra note 430, at 192-94; Kull,
supra note 441, at 58-59.
518. Cf ATIYAH, supra note 113, at 242-43 (suggesting broader range of excuses for gift
promises); Knapp, supra note 89, at 944 (permitting broader range of excuses for
nonbusiness promises in proposed "Restatement" of promissory obligation).
519. A similar example is used in Eisenberg, Promises, supra note 439, at 5-6,
apparently for the purpose of showing that informal donative promises should be subject
to a broad range of excuses quite apart from any analogy to civil law.
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changed circumstances in excusing performance of a promise should
be triggered at a lower threshold in the case of donative promises
than in the case of bargain promises. Why should this be the case?
Though that question has not received a systematic answer, the
only response to it to date is the descriptive claim that a broader
range of excuses for donative promises is in accord with the expecta-
tions of most people, including most laypersons.5" The parent who
promises a child a car or a medical school education only expects to
be held to the promise if things remain roughly as they are, 2 1-if
the parent's financial circumstances permit and if parent and child do
not become estranged. Even the layperson, on the other hand, knows
that "a deal is a deal"-that the range of excuses from performance
of bargain promises is relatively small.5' On the theory that it is
normatively undesirable for contract law to be at variance with
standard expectations, it is argued, the inherently "less binding"
character of donative promises should be recognized by making them
presumptively unenforceable and letting the promisor decide when
there is an excuse.5'
It is interesting that, at this turn in the argument, its linchpin has
become an empirical claim about how seriously ordinary people take
their own promises of various kinds. Such claims are notoriously
difficult to prove, and there does not appear to be definitive empirical
research on the alleged difference in social attitudes toward gift and
bargain promises. P.S. Atiyah once suggested that, although moral
philosophers and legal scholars who write about promising tend to be
high-minded individuals with a strong sense of the duty to keep
promises, the average contemporary Englishman did not regard any
promise as a particularly strong form of moral obligation.524 My
own suspicion is that there may be regional variations in the range of
excuses people believe they are morally entitled to invoke in order to
avoid keeping a gift promise z2 and I am not at all certain that all,
520. See Baron, supra note 430, at 184-86 (describing traditional arguments); Hamson,
supra note 89, at 242-47,256-57; Havighurst, supra note 61, at 12, 16; Patterson, supra note
89, at 942-43.
521. This argument is made most forcefully in Stoijar, supra note 431, at 18, 20,34-36.
522. See Hamson, supra note 89, at 242-43; cf. Shatwell, supra note 91, at 329
(suggesting that the test of bargain corresponds with lay expectations).
523. Hamson, supra note 89, at 247; Patterson, supra note 89, at 942-43.
524. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 138-42 (1981).
525. Like most propositions that are, for practical purposes, unprovable, my suspicion
of regional variations is based only on anecdotal evidence. In the semirural Midwest,
where I spent most of my youth, one component of the local culture seemed to be a fairly
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or even most, people would regard a significant gift promise to a
family member-for instance a promise to pay for medical school-as
subject to a greater range of moral excuses than an ordinary business
bargain. To those imbued with a strong enough sense of family
loyalty, the permissible range of excuses may be precisely the reverse.
Moreover, even assuming that most people do, in fact, regard gift
promises as "less binding"-subject to a wider range of excusing
conditions-than bargain promises, it does not necessarily follow that
gift promises should be screened out of the legal system entirely by
retention of the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration.
Indeed, many critics have observed that the doctrine of consideration
is overbroad as a device for screening out gift promises. Many
socially desirable promises that the doctrine classifies as technically
gratuitous are ancillary to exchanges and are in no sense gifts.526
The doctrine of consideration thus has its own built-in costs.
Moreover, if the justification for retention of the doctrine of consider-
ation is the allegation that a rule of presumptive enforceability for gift
promises would be too complicated in light of the broader range of
necessary excuses, the degree of additional complication alleged is
open to dispute. Even if most people recognize that more conditions
excuse performance of gift promises than bargain promises, and even
if a rule of presumptive enforceability of gift promises would have to
reflect the increased range of excuses, it may very well be that the
doctrinal tools currently at our disposal are adequate to cope with the
challenge. The law of implied conditions, the objective theory of
assent, and, to a lesser extent, defenses of frustration or impossibility
may be sufficiently adaptable to permit excuse under the requisite
range of conditions.527
Finally, even if a rule of presumptive enforceability for gift
promises would require the development of some new defense of
changed circumstances, the argument under discussion may overstate
the degree of difficulty in developing it. A system capable of evolving
the unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule
is sufficiently flexible to develop a more general changed circumstanc-
strong belief in the duty to keep one's word. I now live in Louisiana. The current
governor's name is Edwin Edwards. Need I say more?
526. See Eisenberg, Principles, supra note 34, at 652-56; Gordon, Consideration, supra
note 67, at 289-90, 292-98; Reiter, supra note 89, at 456-57.
527. See Kull, supra note 441, at 63-64.
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es defense to a gift promise, if such a defense is required.5" To a
certain extent, the civil-law defenses of improvidence and ingratitude
might serve as useful models, although in light of the unique civil-law
purpose served by those defenses, borrowing might have to be careful
and selective. Similarly, a changed circumstances defense to claims
for restitution has long been recognized,529 and selective borrowing
from the restitution context may likewise be possible. In the final
analysis, therefore, the alleged need for increased freedom to change
one's mind in the case of donative promises would not seem to be a
conclusive reason to retain the gatekeeping function of the doctrine
of consideration, particularly since there are other reasons to abandon
it.
6. The seamless web argument
The final argument occasionally made in favor of retention of the
gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consideration is somewhat
more general. It is argued that the doctrine of consideration is part
of a system of rules and principles. The system of which it is a part
is not the only one to address the problems that generate the law of
contract, and there are alternative systems without a doctrine of
consideration. However, jettisoning the doctrine of consideration
from the common-law system of contracts might create enormous and
unpredictable strains elsewhere in the system. Systems of law are
interrelated groups of rules, and they must be accepted or rejected
more or less as wholes, with only marginal tinkering. Simply picking
and choosing the bits from each system that appear desirable is a
recipe for chaos.
530
528. For a statement of the unforeseen circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty
rule, see § 89(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
529. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS §§ 69, 142 (1937).
530. The argument is seldom made in quite as stark a'form as I have put it. Variations
of it can be found in several articles, including Hamson, supra note 89, at 234-35 ("[l]f the
notion of consideration is as fundamental as that of offer and acceptance, any radical
alteration of the doctrine of consideration will necessarily alter a great part of the rules
concerned with simple contract."); Havighurst, supra note 61, at 2-3 ("[I]t would be a
mistake, productive of more harm than good, to amputate the single doctrine of
consideration and leave the rest untouched."); Llewellyn, Complexity, supra note 467, at
780-81 ("[U]nless attention is paid not to the 'consideration' phase alone, but to any other
phases of law which have silently become intertwined with that particular aspect of
'consideration,' the engagements which rightly claim admission will not come in alone, and
their companions are likely to be no people to have in the house."); Mason, supra note
469, at 847-48 ("The question therefore presents itself whether we should not change our
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At this level of generality, the argument is not very useful and
invites primarily rhetorical responses. Those who invoke the
argument have been branded "timorous souls" 31 who fail to
recognize the obligation of legal academics to bring some rational
order to the law.532 Indeed, at this level of generality, there may
very well be no way to resolve the dispute between those who assert
that the law is a seamless web and those who assert that the law only
seems to be webbed.
However, the seamless web argument is useful if it is simply an
exhortation to humility for legal reformers. It is beneficial to
remember that the various rules of a system are related and that
doctrinal tinkering can have unintended consequences. It does not
follow, however, that the appropriate response is doctrinal paralysis.
Instead, it may imply that any revision to the doctrine of consider-
ation must be statutory, in order that any necessary adjustments to
other doctrines may be made simultaneously.33 Nevertheless, I
would have thought that the need for a statute would have been
obvious in any event, in light of the tenacity with which judges seem
to cling to the doctrine of consideration in the face of academic
criticism."
Moreover, it is to be hoped that a study of the existing legal
materials would enable proponents of reform to be sensitive to the
strains that changes in one part of a legal system may cause in others.
In my view one of the reasons to study large numbers of cases is that
it offers some hope that the interrelated functions of various branches
of doctrine will become observable and amenable to analysis. It may
rules, and particularly whether we should not adopt or imitate some of the French rules.
I believe that any such course would be, unwise .... We must work with what we have
.... Starting with the rules we have we must search out the principles that inspired these
rules and we must build up new rules to the measure of those principles."); Shatwell, supra
note 91, at 326-28, 329-31 ("To minimise or remove the doctrine of consideration is to
minimise or remove the Prince from Hamlet.").
531. See SUtrON, supra note 76, at 244.
532. Cf. Chloros, supra note 469, at 157-58 (rejecting piecemeal reform in favor of
codification on the grounds that common law has reached the stage of rationalization).
533. Indeed, there have been attempts to draft such a statute. See, eg., SUTrON, supra
note 76, at 198-243 (describing New York statutory modifications to the doctrine of
consideration, modifications effected by the Uniform Commercial Code, statutory reforms
of the doctrine of consideration in the British Commonwealth, and the 1938 recommenda-
tions of the English Law Revision Committee); Chloros, supra note 469, at 163-64; see also
Knapp, supra note 89, at 938-41 (regarding proposed Restatement of law of promissory
obligation without the doctrine of consideration).
534. See SUTrON, supra note 76, at 248.
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then be possible, within limits, to predict the additional adjustments
that must be made if the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of
consideration is to be abandoned.
Indeed, the conclusion that seems compelled by actual study of
the cases in which consideration functions as a gatekeeper is that the
seamless web argument is, at best, a gross exaggeration. The high
percentage of such cases in which consideration is simply redundant
suggests that elimination of its gatekeeping function would produce
neither enormous nor catastrophic results. This conclusion is
reinforced by Sutton's 1974 comparative study, which revealed that
many of the subrules embraced within the doctrine of consideration
have been abandoned somewhere in the world without producing
chaos.535 The world may indeed be in a state of disarray, but it
apparently has little to do with the law of contract. Yet the doctrine
of consideration continues to deny enforcement to classes of promises
it would be desirable to enforce, and it continues to do so in apparent
defiance of ad hoc attempts to qualify and limit it. This suggests that
further tinkering with the doctrine of consideration is futile and that
something would be gained by abandoning the gatekeeping function
of the doctrine. A rule of presumptive enforceability for both
gratuitous and exchange promises would seem to be a viable
alternative, provided the necessary parallel adjustments to other
doctrines are not too numerous or severe.
Moreover, the cases examined for purposes of this Article suggest
that the necessary parallel changes would not be extensive. The
precise nature and extent of the adjustments necessary if the doctrine
of consideration is abandoned is, of course, a subject worth further
study in its own right if the conclusions drawn in this Article are
accepted. Based on the foregoing study of the recent consideration
cases, it is nevertheless possible to identify four specific areas of
potential change, some of which clearly require revision and some of
which simply should be addressed, one way or another, by some
collective decision.
First, some adjustments will be required in the law concerning the
burden of proof of contractual defenses such as fraud, mistake, duress,
and undue influence. In the course of examining cases in which
consideration doctrine appeared to be redundant because the facts
535. See id. at 244. In this connection it should be noted that the abandonment of the
pre-existing duty rule in § 2-209 of the U.C.C. has not produced untoward consequences.
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suggested some misconduct-based defense, it was observed that, in
some cases, the judicial description of the facts was not sufficient to
establish the defense conclusively. Whether this reflected merely
judicial brevity of description or a paucity of supporting facts, of
course, could not be determined. It may be that, if consideration
doctrine is currently used to dispose of promises that "smell bad,"
even if they are not clearly subject to a vitiating defense, the burden
of proof on such defenses should be relaxed to some extent if
consideration requirements are abandoned. This, of course, is
incompatible with the requirement in many jurisdictions that reform
or rescission of a contract on grounds of fraud or other similar
defenses requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.536 How-
ever, those heightened proof requirements seem to reflect a concern
either for the integrity of commercial contracts or for the integrity of
written instruments.5 37 Accordingly, it would not be incompatible
with the spirit of such requirements to abandon them in the case of
gift promises, particularly if the gift promises were informal. A
demonstration that consideration was absent, or even merely nominal,
could either signal a shift to a preponderance of the evidence
standard, with the burden of persuasion as to the defense remaining
on the promisor, or an actual shift in the ultimate burden of persua-
sion to the promisee.
Second, the study of the pre-existing duty rule cases suggests that
the defense of duress must assume an increased role in policing
modifications if the doctrine of consideration is abandoned.538 This,
in turn, would require some substantive clarification of the defense
itself. I do not mean to suggest that defining duress in terms of
general, somewhat vague notions such as "improper threat" or "no
reasonable alternative" is improper or even avoidable.539 However,
the defense of duress, in some jurisdictions, may still carry old
536. Weiner v. Fleischman, 54 Cal. 3d 476,483-84,816 P.2d 892,896,286 Cal. Rptr. 40,
44 (1991); Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, 497 A.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Annon II,
Inc. v. Rill, 597 N.E.2d 320, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); DiVincenti v. McIntyre, 611 So. 2d
140, 146 n.4 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 1264 (La. 1993); Estate of Whitlock,
615 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Me. 1992).
537. Pinnacle Peak Dev. v. TRW Invest. Corp., 631 P.2d 540,544 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980);
Kentucky v. Reyes, 764 S.W.2d 62,66 (Ky. 1989); Haines v. Mensen, 446 N.W.2d 716,719-
20 (Neb. 1989); Karkaria v. Karkaria, 592 A.2d 64, 68-69 (Pa. 1991); First Nat'l Bank v.
Scalzo, 235 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Wis. 1975).
538. Cf. SUTrON, supra note 76, at 244-54.
539. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175.
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common-law burdens-for example, the notion that the means
employed must be criminal-and those burdens may require elimination.'
Third, particularly in the case of intrafamilial gift promises,
elimination of the doctrine of consideration would require a social
decision on whether to create a new defense when a donative
promisor's circumstances subsequently change for the worse or the
promisor and promisee become estranged. Current doctrines, such as
the objective theory of assent, the law of implied conditions, or
defenses of impracticability or frustration may make a new defense
unnecessary. Further study of this question appears desirable if the
suggestions made in this Article are accepted.
Fourth, if consideration is abandoned, some thought, must be
given to the question whether there are certain classes of gratuitous
promises so subject to fraudulent assertion that they should only be
enforceable if they satisfy certain formal requirements. Gift promises
made by one who has since died, promises to make a bequest, and
promises to share an estate in a manner inconsistent with either a will
or intestate succession are all fairly obvious candidates, but there may
be others.54" ' At the same time, it is necessary to address the type
of formality to be required. Some form of writing requirement is the
most intuitive solution. However, because writing requirements can
operate harshly or be used exploitatively, it is necessary to consider
whether some more general requirement of corroboration by evidence
other than the mere word of the promisee should suffice.
Obviously, all four of these topics require more extended
treatment than can be given in an Article that is already of some
length. However, there is no apparent reason why the resolution of
the questions raised should present any insuperable difficulty. Indeed,
any changes required seem much more like tinkering at the margins
than a full-scale overhaul of contract doctrine. If so, the seamless web
argument has been given its due as a cautionary instruction but
rejected as an impediment to the abandonment of the gatekeeping
function of the doctrine of consideration.
540. Dawson argues that the requirement that the threatened conduct be illegal should
be excised in any event. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective,
45 MICH. L. REv. 281, 287-88 (1947).
541. Chloros's attempt at codification of a system of contract law without a doctrine of
consideration devotes some attention to this question. See Chloros, supra note 469, at 163-
64.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis both an examination of the current operation
of the doctrine of consideration and an examination of the reasons
that have been mustered for and against enforcing various kinds of
promises suggest that something would be gained, and very little lost,
by abandoning the gatekeeping function of the doctrine of consider-
ation. I have suggested that it would be desirable to adopt a
presumptive rule that gratuitous promises are enforceable, subject to
the same defenses that are available with respect to exchange
promises, and perhaps one or two new defenses 42 Does it follow
that consideration doctrine should no longer play any role in contract
doctrine? Obviously not. I have emphasized that one of the major
branches of consideration doctrine-the proposition that the presence
of substantial consideration should presumptively constitute a
sufficient condition for enforcement-remains completely intact and
should continue to do so." Moreover, even if, as I am suggesting,
the gatekeeping branch of the doctrine-the proposition that
consideration is a necessary condition of enforcement-is abandoned,
the concept of consideration may retain one other residual function.
Even if an absence of consideration for a promise should not doom
the promise's chances for enforcement, it may indicate that judicial
inquiry should be channeled in a new direction. In the modification
context it might signal a court to look for duress or fraud. In the case
of intrafamilial gift promises, it might signal a court to look for undue
influence. In the case of promises to make bequests, promises to
share estates, or promises made by one who has died, it might signal
a court to look very strictly at the evidence that the promise was
made. Even if consideration is no longer used as a gatekeeper, it may
thus be retrained to play a useful, if somewhat less decisive, role as a
signalman.5 "
542. See supra part V.B.6.
543. See supra part I.
544. Mason once described the role of the French civil-law notion of "cause" in much
the same way. See Mason, supra note 469, at 825-28. He suggested that the "require-
ment" of cause was "pleonastic," by which he meant that it lacked independent
significance as a test of contractual obligation but nonetheless served a useful function by
reduplicating, and directing attention selectively, to other legal issues that varied in
significance depending upon the transaction type at issue. Id It is my suggestion that the
concept of consideration be relegated to a similar function in the common-law system.
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